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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis explores the imaginary dimensions of economic crisis through a study of the 
interface between practices of historical representation and processes of social construction. 
Its core argument is that a sense of history cannot be disentangled from the phenomena that it 
strives to apprehend. As a result, there can be no fixed and objective relation between the 
evolution of global capitalism and its long history of crises. Instead, the very intelligibility of 
both ‘crisis’ and ‘history’ is produced through an iterated telescoping of time, whereby more 
or less distant events and episodes are grasped together in ways that lend meaning to those of 
the present. This argument is taken forward via an in-depth and quasi-historical analysis of the 
2008 crisis. Focusing on how past crises figure within the pronouncements of international 
policymaking organisations and the commentary of the global financial press between 2007 
and 2009, it develops a typology of different practices of historical representation and the 
various interpretive functions they are capable of performing. In so doing, it makes a 
theoretical contribution to the constructivist and cultural political economy literatures on the 
discursive negotiation of crisis. 
	  	  
 
 
	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Adnan 
	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
The first acknowledgement must go to my supervisors, Ronen Palan and André Broome. Each 
has shaped this thesis in a different way. Ronen’s seemingly casual comments always took at 
least two weeks to reveal themselves as the pearls they truly were, and I would never have 
written this particular work without the productive derailments that these revelations 
inevitably initiated. Meanwhile, André has provided unflinching encouragement and advice 
on a day-to-day basis, guiding me through the lows and always making some time to help 
celebrate the highs. Both now join a group of teachers and mentors who have all in one way 
or another enabled me to end up where I am now. Those before them include Stephen 
Davenport, Nick Miller, Wendy Carlin, Daphné Josselin, Eilís Lawlor, and Stephen Spratt. 
 
I also wish to express my gratitude to those scholars who have been kind enough to respond 
to my unsolicited emails, comment upon and exchange draft papers, or make time to meet 
with me and discuss ideas. These include Mark Blum, David Boje, Dick Bryan, Christian de 
Cock, Earl Gammon, Martijn Konings, Anastasia Nesvetailova, and Hayden White. 
 
Finally, I must thank everyone who has shared his or her time with me in Birmingham, 
providing welcome support, disagreement, camaraderie, noise, and real ale. You know who 
you are: Linda Åhäll, Frances Amery, Simon Bailey, Laurence Cooley, Andrew Futter, James 
Harris, Oz Hassan, Anthony Hopkins, Martin Monahan, David Norman, Jonna Nyman, Zoë 
Pflaeger, Ken Searle, Liam Stanley, Mathias Svensson, Ben Taylor, Steve Young, and Ben 
Zala. 
 
To my family and friends in Hong Kong, Australia, the UK, and elsewhere: I acknowledge 
how bad I’ve been at staying in touch. I apologise for this and I will make it up to you all. 
 
The last words are for my grandfather, Adnan Samman, who completed his doctoral thesis at 
the ripe old age of 82. This one is in his memory. 
 
 
 
	  	  
Abridged table of contents 
 
Introduction 
 
2008 – A crisis in the present perfect tense     
 
Part I.  History and crisis in theory and practice 
 
1.  Histories of crisis theory       
2.  Crises of historical practice       
3.  Towards a history of real-time crisis historiography  
  
Part II.  Past crises and the international policymaking organisations 
 
4.  The Great Depression of the 1930s 
5.  1970s stagflation and the S&L crisis of the late 1980s 
6.  The Asian crisis of 1997-98 
 
Part III.  Past crises and the global financial press 
 
7.  The idea of another Great Depression     
8.  Histories of crisis management     
9.  Histories of policy activism 
10.  Histories of structural reform 
 
Part IV.  Re-imagining the crises of global capital 
 
11.  Meta-historical dimensions of crisis 
 
Conclusion 
 
2008 – The crisis in past and future perfect tense 
 
 
	  	  
Table of Contents 
List of figures i	  
Introduction 1	  
PT I. HISTORY & CRISIS IN THEORY & PRACTICE 9	  
1. Histories of crisis theory 10	  
1.1 	   A history and typology of the crisis concept 12	  
1.1.1	   The etymology of crisis 12	  
1.1.2	   Early Greek uses of the word 14	  
1.1.3	   Crisis as a modern concept 16	  
1.2	   From extrinsic events to crises of capitalism 20	  
1.2.1	   Situating crises within capitalism 20	  
1.2.2	   Situating capitalist crises within history 23	  
1.2.3	   Situating the crises of capitalism within history 25	  
1.3	   From objective contradictions to subjective interventions 28	  
1.3.1	   Marxist philosophy and the overdetermination of crisis 29	  
1.3.2	   Cultural Marxism and the impossibility of crisis 32	  
1.3.3	   New political economy and the social construction of crisis 34	  
1.4	   Historical imagination and the new crisis theory 38	  
1.4.1	   The function of the past within the new theories of crisis 38	  
1.4.2	   Invoking the past, interpreting the present 42	  
1.5	   Summary: Re-imagining crisis theory 45	  
2. Crises of historical practice 47	  
2.1	   The fictions of history 49	  
2.1.1	   Meaning and function in the writing of history 50	  
2.1.2	   Modes of historiography and their historicity 52	  
2.1.3	   The historical past versus the practical past 54	  
2.2	   Historical imagination and narrative discourse 55	  
2.2.1	   The story of history and narrative 56	  
2.2.2	   The content of the narrative form 60	  
2.2.3	   The form of the narrative content 63	  
	  	  
2.3	   History, historiography, and historicity in world politics 68	  
2.3.1	   The deadlock of history in IR 69	  
2.3.2	   The poverty of historicism in IPE 72	  
2.4	   Summary: Re-imagining historical practice 75	  
3. Towards a history of real-time crisis historiography 77	  
3.1	   From historical theory to the experience of history 79	  
3.1.1	   Empiricism and historicity 79	  
3.1.2	   Operationalising a critical historical empiricism 82	  
3.2	   From historical experience to the experience of crisis 85	  
3.2.1	   Making space for time in the analysis of crisis 86	  
3.2.2	   International policymaking organisations 89	  
3.2.3	   The global financial press 93	  
3.3	   Outline: Histories of global financial crisis, 2007-2009 96	  
PT II. PAST CRISES & INTERNATIONAL POLICYMAKING ORGANISATIONS 98	  
4. The Great Depression of the 1930s 102	  
4.1	   Price stability, financial stability and monetary policy 104	  
4.2	   Trade, exchange rates and international cooperation 106	  
4.3	   Under-regulation, deregulation and financial innovation 110	  
4.4	   Summary: The return of the Great Depression 115	  
5. 1970s stagflation and the S&L crisis of the late 1980s 117	  
5.1	   The ECB and the crisis of the 1970s 118	  
5.2	   The US FRB and the S&L crisis of the 1980s 121	  
5.3	   Summary: Old organisational stories versus new policy histories 125	  
6. The Asian crisis of 1997-98 127	  
6.1	   Domestic institutions versus international capital flows 129	  
6.2	   Emergency financing, supervisory cooperation and international institutions 132	  
6.3	   Under-investment, over-saving and global imbalances 137	  
6.4	   Summary: Rewriting the Asian crisis 142	  
PT III. PAST CRISES & THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL PRESS 143	  
7. The idea of another Great Depression 147	  
	  	  
7.1	   Visions of cyclical repetition 149	  
7.2	   Visions of epochal repetition 152	  
7.3	   Repetition averted, repetition resumed 156	  
7.4	   Summary: The 1930s as historical black mirror 161	  
8. Histories of crisis management 163	  
8.1	   Banking on disaster 165	  
8.2	   Bad assets and good rescues 169	  
8.3	   The rise of the state and/or the fall of capitalism 175	  
8.4	   Summary: Re-opening the history of crisis management 179	  
9. Histories of policy activism 182	  
9.1	   Tales of monetary excess 183	  
9.2	   Roadmaps to monetary rectitude, pt. I: Central banking in the present 189	  
9.3	   Roadmaps to monetary rectitude, pt. II: Central banking in the future 193	  
9.4	   Fisco-financial fixes and fiascos 202	  
9.5	   Summary: Retro-activist policy histories 211	  
10. Histories of structural change 214	  
10.1	   Stories of financial disorganisation, pt. I: Dangerous axioms 215	  
10.2	   Stories of financial disorganisation, pt. II: Broken codes 221	  
10.3	   Regulatory reversals, returns and reorientations 226	  
10.4	   Summary: Reorganising finance in and after crisis 236	  
PT IV. RE-IMAGINING THE CRISES OF GLOBAL CAPITAL 240	  
11. Meta-historical dimensions of crisis 241	  
11.1	   The crisis of 2008 and the return of the past 242	  
11.1.1	   Transformations in the phenomenology of global capital 243	  
11.1.2	   Transformations in the operation of capitalist historiography 247	  
11.1.3	   The return of the past as meta-historical crisis 251	  
11.2	   Historical imagination and the constitutive anachronism of crisis 252	  
11.2.1	   Revisiting the new crisis theory 253	  
11.2.2	   Three basic varieties of historical representation 256	  
11.2.3	   Revelation and recurrence in the return of the Great Depression 258	  
11.3	   Towards a theory of capitalist history-production 262	  
	  	  
11.3.1	   The strange loops of capitalist history 262	  
11.3.2	   From crisis construction to history-production 264	  
Conclusion 269	  
Bibliography 280	  
Speeches from international policymaking organisations 280	  
Bank of International Settlements 280	  
European Central Bank 281	  
International Monetary Fund 285	  
US Federal Reserve Bank 287	  
US Treasury 290	  
Articles from the global financial press 293	  
The Economist 293	  
The Financial Times 299	  
Forbes Magazine 307	  
The Wall Street Journal 312	  
List of references 318	  
 
 
 
 
	  	   i	  
List of figures 
Figure 1.1   Basic varieties of crisis theory       13 
Figure 1.2   Dimensions of ‘crisis’ in its early Greek uses     16 
Figure 1.3   Crisis as a concept for interpreting historical time      18 
Figure 3.1 Overview of corpus for the international policymaking organisations 92 
Figure 3.2 Differences between global financial publications    94 
Figure 3.3  Overview of corpus for the global financial press    95 
Figure II Past crises mentioned by international policymaking organisations  99 
Figure 4 References to the Great Depression, 2007-2009    103 
Figure 5.1 References to the 1970s OECD crises, 2007-2009    118 
Figure 5.2 References to the 1980s S&L crisis, 2007-2009    122 
Figure 6 References to the 1997-1998 Asian crisis, 2007-2009   128 
Figure III  Past crises mentioned in the global financial press    144 
Figure 7 References to the Great Depression, 2007-2009    147 
Figure 8 Main past crises mentioned in discussions of crisis management  164 
Figure 9.1 Main past crises mentioned in discussions of monetary and fiscal policy 182 
Figure 9.2 Main past crises mentioned in discussions of monetary policy activism 184 
Figure 9.3 Main past crises mentioned in discussions of fiscal policy activism  202 
Figure 10 Main past crises mentioned in discussions of structural change  214 
 
 
	  Introduction 
2008 – A crisis in the present perfect tense 
There is no such thing as history in general, or crisis in general … What is 
dramatic in every crisis is the sudden telescoping of time. 
– Régis Debray1 
This thesis stems from having lived the abstraction of financial crisis three times. The first 
was the Asian crisis of 1997-98. I was a fourteen year old at an international school in Hong 
Kong, and would spend my weekends skateboarding under the shadow of Norman Foster’s 
HSBC building. When the crisis hit it was all over of the news, but I went on as if nothing had 
happened. Or at least I did until a question occurred to me: Is this what they call history? The 
second was the dotcom crash of 2001. This time I was more interested, reading books about 
the Enron and WorldCom scandals, but my experience of this new crisis had the memory of 
the last one folded into it: Is this what capitalism does, I asked myself. Finally, the third was 
the global financial crisis of 2008. I was just about to begin a thesis on how meanings of the 
Asian crisis had changed over time, only now I found it taking on yet another shape as a new 
crisis unfolded around me. But this time the Asian crisis did not just return to me; it also 
returned – along with a parade of other past crises – to the minds of those who wrote about it 
in newspapers, paperbacks, and academic journals. Finding a sign of my own thought process 
in others brought with it a new question: Might this strange looping of events not tell us 
something important about the relationship between crisis and history? This is the question 
that underpins this thesis.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 (1975: 112-3). 
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Of course the thesis is also structured around a set of more specific questions, and these 
reflect an assessment of the existing theoretical literature on crisis and history. What I find in 
this literature is a puzzling silence over the question of how appeals to the past relate to the 
dynamics of a crisis in the present. The silence is puzzling for two reasons. First, it is a 
commonplace within economic history that the past is there to be used or abused – that is, 
politicians and other agents can either learn the ‘right’ lessons, using past crises to find an 
appropriate response to some turmoil in the present; or they can wilfully peddle the ‘wrong’ 
ones, turning the past into a tool through which to advance their own agendas (cf. James, 
2009; Daunton, 2010; Livingston, 2010; and Temin, 2010). Both are plausible scenarios, but 
the point is that they are discussed only in passing and with little attempt to consider any 
alternatives ‘uses’ for the past. This becomes all the more puzzling when situated against the 
backdrop of recent developments in crisis theory (i.e. Blyth, 2002; Jessop, 2004; Hay, 2006; 
Widmaier et al., 2007). Because these new approaches emphasise the importance of narration 
during crisis, they should be especially alert to the issue of historical representation. Yet in 
fact they possess neither the conceptual nor the methodological tools that would help them 
come to terms with how the recollected past might shape a crisis in the present. 
The purpose of this thesis is to begin just such a process of coming to terms with the 
recollected past. In order to do so, it delves into the domain of what is sometimes referred to 
as continental philosophy. More specifically, it draws on a range of thinkers who have sought 
to grapple with the idea of history in a reflexive manner. Although some of the ideas that are 
dealt with may seem a world away from either International Political Economy (IPE) or the 
kinds of processes it seeks to understand, they turn out to be useful in the further development 
of crisis theory. Moreover, while much of this discussion does take place at high level of 
abstraction, its purpose is in fact to gain an improved understanding of what is a deeply 
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practical question – namely, that of how past events are used to diagnose and negotiate the 
dilemmas of the present. In relation to finance this is a question whose significance should not 
be underestimated, for it is an increasingly open secret that people flee theory and turn instead 
to the historical record when faced with “wildly surprising and inherently unpredictable 
events” (Bordo & James, 2010: 127). Quite simply, there is no better time for the past than the 
present. 
Central research questions and contribution of the study 
Understanding the crises of global capitalism has always been a central concern within the 
field of IPE. This reflects a longstanding intuition that they serve as critical turning points 
through which the nature of world order might be glimpsed. The early hegemonic stability 
theories approached this problematic through the lens of states’ material interests, but the rise 
of constructivism has shifted focus onto how the interests of both state and non-state actors 
are intersubjectively constituted. This shift has had the effect of foregrounding the imaginary 
dimension of crisis. Rationalist approaches to crisis do of course persist, but it has become 
increasingly common to ask how the representation of a crisis can determine the kind of 
turning point that it will be. This thesis contributes to the development of these new 
approaches by exploring the presence of the past as a heretofore-unacknowledged dimension 
of crisis. More specifically, it provides a theoretical and empirical account of how imagining a 
crisis in present can rely on a re-imagining of those went before it. 
The central research questions are identified through an immanent critique of the new 
theory. This is so that the research they enable may contribute to the further development of 
crisis theory. The first step in this process locates the problem of historical representation 
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within constructivist and cultural political economy approaches to crisis. The second then 
uses the literature on history and narrative to clarify some of the ambiguities identified in 
crisis theory, and to formulate the central research questions. These are:  
1. What are the different ways in which a past crisis can be invoked during a 
crisis in the present? 
2. How might these practices of historical representation shape efforts to 
diagnose or manage a crisis in the present? 
3. How might these efforts to diagnose or manage a crisis in the present alter 
the meaning and significance of a crisis in the past? 
The theoretical contribution of this thesis is to develop a number of analytical distinctions in 
response to these questions. The first of these is a distinction between the function that a past 
crisis might perform within the present, and the specific practices of historical representation 
through which that past crisis finds a determinate form. The second is a typology of three 
basic varieties of historical representation. These correspond to those historical 
representations that are produced through practices of emplotment, analogical reasoning, and 
lesson drawing. The third and final contribution is to introduce a concept of history-
production, which captures how these varieties of representational practice can be combined 
to yield a wider range of functions for the imagined past than is currently envisioned by crisis 
theory. Here each basic variety of historical representation is used to identify a distinct mode 
of history-production, wherein the imagined past serves to either constitute or help negotiate 
the historicity of a crisis in the present. Taken together these points highlight a complex 
interaction not only between historical analogies, lessons and narratives, but also between 
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these diverse practices and the discursive negotiation of crisis. It is argued that this nexus 
should form the basis for future research in crisis theory. 
However, these clarifications are not the product of speculative theorising alone. The 
typologies and concepts introduced above are instead developed through in-depth and 
systematic empirical research. This entails an experimental form of quasi-historical analysis, 
which focuses on how different past crises figure within elite discourse during the 2007-2009 
period. This elite discourse is approached via two methodological constructs. The first is the 
category of ‘international policymaking organisations’, which grasps together five agencies 
that are differentially implicated in the management of global finance. These are the Bank of 
International Settlements, the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the 
US Federal Reserve Bank, and the US Treasury. The second is the category of the ‘global 
financial press’, which designates four specialist publications that mediate between financial 
market dynamics and their apprehension. These are The Economist, The Financial Times, 
Forbes Magazine, and The Wall Street Journal. The analysis is guided by the following 
questions:  
1. Which past crises were most frequently mentioned during the crisis of 
2008? 
2. What were the practices of historical representation through which they 
were brought into the present? 
3. How did these representations interact with attempts to diagnose or 
negotiate the ongoing crisis? 
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In developing answers to these questions, the thesis also makes an empirical contribution. 
Specifically, it provides detailed history of real-time crisis historiography during the period of 
2007 to 2009. Insofar as these imagined histories are themselves part of the present within 
which they circulate and are put to work, this is a unique contribution to the literature on the 
crisis of 2008. Finally, the thesis also makes a methodological contribution by developing and 
operationalising a form of critical historical empiricism. This goes beyond mere questions of 
crisis and crisis theory by showing how ‘critical’ IPE theory might benefit from a more 
systematic analysis of empirical material. 
Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into four main parts. Part I is devoted to a theoretical discussion of crisis 
and history, using this to underline the need for a heretofore-missing mode of crisis 
historiography. Chapter 1 begins by locating the problem of history within existing theories of 
capitalist crisis. It argues that the concept of crisis contains a temporal ambiguity that is both 
foregrounded and obscured by its use within the new political economy. Chapter 2 then 
focuses on philosophical debates over historical theory and method, using these to assess the 
ability of modern historiography to provide insight into the nexus of crisis and historical 
imagination. It argues that while there is much to be gained from this literature, it still stops 
short of exploring how imagined histories might serve as a practical resource within the 
context of a particular present. Finally Chapter 3 turns to the literature on critical empiricism, 
using this to identify and develop a mode of historiography fit for the further development of 
crisis theory. It also introduces the categories of the international policymaking organisations 
and the global financial press.  
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The next two parts are devoted to an empirical analysis of how past crises figure within 
the discourse of global financial elites between 2007 and 2009. Part II focuses on the 
pronouncements of the international policymaking organisations and is divided into three 
chapters. All of these focus on how a particular past crisis is drawn into different kinds of 
policy debates. Chapter 4 focuses on how the Great Depression is portrayed by the five 
organisations. Chapter 5 adopts a slightly different focus, exploring how the US Federal 
Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank portray the Savings-and-Loans crisis and the 
crisis of the 1970s respectively. Finally, Chapter 6 focuses on how appeals to the Asian crisis 
evolve over the course of the crisis. 
Part III shifts its focus to the commentary of the global financial press. It is split into 
four chapters, and all of these adopt an inverse of the approach used in Part II. Specifically, 
rather than using portrayals of a particular past crisis to explore the different kinds of debates 
they are drawn into, these chapters use a particular set of debates to explore how different past 
crises are drawn into these. Chapter 7 focuses on those references to the Great Depression that 
entail a suggestion that it might recur in the near or distant future. Chapter 8 then focuses on 
debates over crisis management. These are debates that concern the immediate measures to be 
enacted in the face of acute crisis. The focus of Chapter 8 is on debates over policy activism, 
or arguments over the appropriate use of monetary and fiscal policy in both good times and 
bad. Finally, Chapter 9 focuses on debates over structural change. What is at stake here are 
questions of medium to long term oriented change in the practices of financial market 
participants and their regulators. 
Part IV then uses the preceding empirical analysis to develop a set of reflections on the 
issues raised in Part I. Specifically, an attempt is made to achieve greater theoretical and 
analytical clarity on precisely those aspects of crisis theory that were identified as neglected 
Introduction 
	   8	  
or underdeveloped. Here the aforementioned typologies are introduced and discussed using 
examples from the empirical chapters. It is argued that these analytical and conceptual 
innovations hint at a future that would see theorists of crisis afford a greater sense of history 
to the subjects of their theory. Finally, it concludes by outlining some possible futures for 
crisis theory and historical method. It also offers a reflection on the political implications of 
the arguments that underpin these futures. 
 
 
 
 
 
	  Part I 
History and crisis in theory and practice
	  Chapter 1 
Histories of crisis theory 
The very ambiguity of crisis turns the word into a basic concept … it takes hold of 
old experiences and transforms them metaphorically in ways that create altogether 
new expectations. 
– Reinhart Koselleck1 
The core argument of this thesis is that capitalist crises cannot be fully understood until they 
are seen as consisting in a ‘grasping together’ of seemingly similar or affiliated events within 
the history of capitalism. This first chapter begins to make the case for such an approach by 
developing a critique of contemporary crisis theory. In order to do this, it provides a 
discussion of the place that history occupies within the extant literature on capitalism and 
crisis. More specifically, it focuses on the histories that are implicit in the very concept of 
capitalist crisis. 
To begin with, it should be noted that there is nothing particularly novel about bringing 
together the concepts of crisis and history. Indeed, within the broad field of political 
economy, all theories of crisis entail a more or less explicit sense of history. In some cases the 
idea of ‘crisis’ serves as a building block in broader theories of historical development and 
change, whereas in others, it instead either reflects or produces an impressionistic image of 
history and its dynamics. The important point, however, is that the idea of crisis – along with 
the various events in which it finds resonance – remains conspicuously absent from the 
theories and visions of historical process it has proved able to generate and sustain. Or to put 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 (2006: 374). 
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it differently, the very recollection and patterning of prior crises that the theorist must 
undertake in order to recognise one in the present are somehow missing from the accounts 
they provide of such ruptures. And yet this comes at a time when the constructivist and 
cultural turns in political economy have underscored how crises must be understood as such 
in order to properly exist. Indeed, while once dominated by the mechanistic metaphor of 
equilibrium, the field is now rife with ruminations on the role of ideas during times of crisis. 
The present chapter seeks to address this disjuncture by exploring precisely how history 
has figured within different accounts of capitalism and its crises. It is not intended to be 
comprehensive, and it does not focus on those debates over the relative importance of 
production, consumption, and finance that have structured so many histories of crisis theory 
in political economy (e.g. Shaikh, 1978a; Mattick, 1981; Clarke, 1994; Toporowski, 2005; cf. 
O'Connor, 1987; Besomi, 2012a). Instead, it begins by developing a historically oriented 
typology of the crisis concept. This typology is then used to identify a series of co-existing 
and overlapping perspectives on the relation between history and crisis under capitalism. 
Finally, the aforementioned disjuncture is revisited in light of this exercise and an immanent 
critique of contemporary crisis theory is developed. Specifically, it is argued that the 
ambiguity of the concept itself – and of its relation to historical process in particular – is 
revealed when the imaginary or intersubjective dimension of crisis is foregrounded. Those 
new variants of crisis theory that do enact such a foregrounding are therefore invited, if not 
logically required, to build the figuration of history into their very understanding of crisis. 
One clear way to do this, it concludes, would be to focus more closely on the interpretive 
practices through which such figurations of history might be generated. 
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1.1  A history and typology of the crisis concept 
The idea of crisis has a long and complex history in the human sciences. On the one hand, it 
has been consistently deployed to understand issues of order and change since at least the late 
eighteenth century. Influential contributions run the gamut from Marx and Engels on the 
evolution of economic and social relations, all the way through to Freud and Lacan on how 
the individual finds and maintains its place within these (see O'Connor, 1987). On the other 
hand, though, its sheer ubiquity and apparent polyvalence have served to render the concept 
an object of inquiry in its own right. Reinhart Koselleck, for example, has written at length on 
how its meanings and referents have varied across space and time. This section uses 
Koselleck’s work to develop a general typology of crisis that draws out the various 
ambiguities implicit in the concept. In order to do this, it begins with an etymology of the 
term and a brief survey of its early Greek uses. It then uses Jacob Burckhardt’s theory of crisis 
to illustrate how the ambiguity of the term is multiplied through its transformation into a 
modern historical concept. 
1.1.1 The etymology of crisis 
The first important point to make is that the everyday usage of the word ‘crisis’ already 
reveals an ambiguity in terms of its basic meaning. Generally speaking, the word is typically 
used to indicate a mixture of danger, uncertainty and the compulsion to act. This can be traced 
back to the Greek term krisis, which is derived from the verb krinō – meaning “to cut, to 
select, to decide, to judge; [and] by extension, to measure, to quarrel, to fight” (Koselleck, 
2002: 237). The word itself therefore immediately brings with it a double meaning, for it 
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refers not only to the simple need for a ‘decision’, but also to the ‘measuring’ and 
‘quarrelling’ through which such a decision might be reached.  
As Koselleck (2006: 359) points out, this apparent two-sidedness is in fact a 
foundational unity, reflecting how modern ideas of ‘subjective critique’ and ‘objective crisis’ 
were still “conceptually fused” under the Greek notion of krisis. However, on the basis of 
their subsequent separation within European thought, it is possible to use these two domains 
of meaning as a tool for distinguishing between the basic analytical strategies of different 
crisis theories. Thus, while a given theory of crisis might focus on the objective conditions 
that constitute a danger and create the compulsion to act, another might instead stress the 
subjective processes involved in overcoming uncertainty and enabling action.2 Alternatively, 
and in keeping with the etymology of the term, a theory of crisis might seek to somehow 
grasp together these two phenomena. These stylised vantage points are summarised in the 
table below. 
Analytical focus Phenomena of interest 
Objective   Observable conditions that constitute a danger and create the compulsion to act 
Subjective   Process of interpretation needed to overcome uncertainty and enable action 
Objective/Subjective   Intertwinement of conditions and their interpretation in a critical moment 
 
Figure 1.1 Basic varieties of crisis theory  (Source: Author’s own) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Here I follow a string of twentieth-century scholars that have drawn such a distinction so as to underline the 
need to retain both of these dimensions in a theory of crisis. See, for example, Koselleck (1988: 103-4, 167-8 n. 
31; 2002: 237-47; 2006: 358-61), Robinson (1968: 510-11), Starn (1971: 3-5; 2004: 500-1), Debray (1975: 99-
115), O’Connor (1987: 143ff.), and Hay (1999: 323-4). 
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1.1.2 Early Greek uses of the word 
In addition to this basic question of analytical focus, a further and specifically temporal 
ambiguity is created through early Greek uses of the word. As the preceding discussion 
illustrates, krisis connotes a critical moment or turning point within a larger process, and thus 
brings with it the notion of time passing (see also Koselleck, 2002: 237ff.). But because the 
term was employed within different semantic spheres, the nature of the process it sought to 
grasp varied, and so too did its perceived temporal dimensions. Or to put it differently, each 
of its early applications implied distinct figurations of time.  
In legal discourse, for example, decision meant a judgment or the reaching of a verdict, 
and therefore implied a potentially endless series of discrete legal rulings. For Thucydides, 
these included decisions regarding the Greeks’ battles with the Persians, leading him to situate 
krisis within a broader rhythm of war and peace (Starn, 1971: 3-4; Koselleck, 2002: 237). 
According to Aristotle, however, it was through participating in such a general process of 
passing judgment that individuals become citizens and political orders become just 
(Koselleck, 2006: 359; Aristotle, 1998: 84-97). The juridical meaning of the word therefore 
implies a linear yet nested temporality, for it yields a vision of governmental decision-making 
that simultaneously encompasses discrete strategic dilemmas and an ongoing process of civic 
participation.  
Meanwhile, in theological circles, krisis acquires an eschatological meaning. The 
juridical sense of the word is retained, but in the ancient Greek translation of the Old and New 
Testaments, the verdict in question becomes the one that is eventually delivered by God 
(Koselleck, 2006: 359-60). As a result, it is the decisions that will have been made – rather 
than a mere ongoing or punctuated process of decision-making – which provide crisis with its 
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temporal dimension. Specifically, the coming Apocalypse operates through a “cosmic 
foreshortening of time”, wherein one’s faith both anticipates and enacts the Last Judgment 
before its arrival (Koselleck, 2002: 245). The early Christian usage of the word therefore 
entails a non-linear and entangled temporality, for it designates an ongoing experience in the 
present of an event that has actually yet to occur. 
Finally, following its appearance in Hippocrates’ treatise On Affections, Greek 
physicians use krisis to denote a critical point or phase in the progress of a disease (Starn, 
1971: 4). As a deciding moment in the “battle between life and death”, its temporal dimension 
is relatively straightforward: it marks a threshold (Koselleck, 2002: 237). However, as a 
“judgment … about the course of the illness” that will ultimately determine the outcome of 
this battle, a more complex figuration of time can be identified (Koselleck, 2006: 360, 
emphasis added). Indeed, Hippocrates himself provides a range of possibilities when he states 
that a crisis occurs “whenever … [diseases] increase in intensity or go away or change into 
another disease or end altogether” (quoted in Starn, 1971: 4, emphasis added). The early 
medical usage of the word therefore implies a non-linear and differentiated temporality, for in 
addition to an overarching and diachronic conception of the relationship between sickness and 
health, the concept also suggests the possibility of recoveries, relapses, and displacements or 
mutations. The dimensions of krisis as it appears in each of these three registers is 
summarised in the table on the following page. 
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Semantic 
sphere Object/Subject Alternatives Frequency/Duration Directionality Temporality 
Law Governmental decision Right/Wrong 
Discrete points; 
Ongoing process Open-ended Linear (nested) 
Theology Spiritual judgment 
Salvation/ 
Damnation 
Singular event; 
Ongoing process Teleological 
Non-linear 
(entangled) 
Medicine Physiological threshold Life/Death 
Discrete points; 
Multiple durations Open-ended 
Non-linear 
(differentiated) 
 
Figure 1.2 Dimensions of ‘crisis’ in its early Greek uses (Source: Author’s own) 
1.1.3 Crisis as a modern concept 
Quite clearly, then, both the etymology of ‘crisis’ and its initial usage invest the term with a 
wide variety of meanings. However, as a Latinised form of the word is translated into national 
languages during the seventeenth century, these meanings provide the basis for a further 
extension of the concept into new semantic spheres (Koselleck, 2006: 361-7). Generally 
speaking, the medical variant dominates early modern social and political thought, where it is 
applied to the notion of a ‘body politic’ and used to describe a moment of upheaval in either 
the internal or external affairs of state (pp. 362-3, 368-70). Meanwhile, the eschatological 
aspects of its religious variant find voice in later, speculative philosophies of history, where 
‘crisis’ figures as both an ongoing epoch and coming threshold for humankind (pp. 368-81). It 
is also in this context that a distinctly economic meaning of the term begins to take shape, 
doing so at first through a medical language of ‘convulsions’ and ‘blockages’ (p. 389; see also 
Besomi, 2012b). The important point, however, is not that the ambiguities already implicit in 
the concept are reproduced via its translation into nascent modern disciplines. Rather, it is that 
these are actually multiplied as new questions about historical time prompt scholars to 
combine and redeploy some of the concept’s earlier forms. 
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Jacob Burckhardt provides a particularly clear illustration of this process in his 1868 
lectures on The Crises of History (1979: 213-68). By using ‘crisis’ to denote a decisive 
moment that is capable of transforming the “political and social foundations of the state”, 
Burckhardt retains the original double meaning of the term (p. 223). Yet in developing it into 
an explicitly historical concept, he also draws on and develops prior uses of the term.3 For 
example, while Burckhardt’s examples are of wars and revolutions, he frequently employs 
medical language, likening the consciousness of crisis to a spreading “infection” or “fever” 
(pp. 226, 248). “Something breaks out”, he writes, and “all men are suddenly of one mind … 
Things must change” (pp. 224, 226, emphasis in original). Beyond such metaphors, 
Burckhardt also reproduces the pathological dimension of the term’s earlier medical uses by 
attempting to identify recurrent patterns in the development of crises. The important 
difference, however, is that this diagnostic exercise serves also as the basis for a distinction 
between different periods in world history. An anthropological pathogenesis of crisis 
therefore transforms the concept into a means of periodising human history. 
Meanwhile, Burckhardt’s theory of crisis also entails some of the temporal dimensions 
implicit in theological variants of the concept. Specifically, although Burckhardt does seek 
similarities between the crises of world history, he also stresses their defining novelty, and 
this leads him to distinguish between ‘genuine’ and ‘incomplete’ crises. The former usher in 
“an absolutely new form of life … [that is] founded on the destruction of what has gone 
before”, whereas the latter begin with a “deafening clamour” for change but end up yielding 
none of the “vital transformations” that their onset seems to demand (pp. 247, 223). On this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 There has been some debate amongst historians over Burckhardt’s theory of crisis. According to Randolph 
Starn, it is not so much a theory as “an affirmation of the mysterious vitality, variety, and challenging 
discontinuities of history” (1971: 9). For Koselleck, however, Burckhardt was one of the few to develop an 
explicitly historical theory of crisis during the nineteenth century (2002: 239), and the apparent intransigence of 
his conceptual manoeuvres merely reflect an attempt to link “the multi-layered and complex character of 
structural transformations” to their “explosive aggregate impact” (2006: 388). See also Martin (2010). 
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basis, Burckhardt is then able to diagnose an ongoing age of crisis, wherein a veritable 
graveyard of aborted crises bequeaths to the future “a great general crisis” (p. 219). Crucially, 
though, because this crisis-to-come is rooted in “human nature as a whole” – and in particular, 
an enduring desire for “great periodical changes” – its eventual resolution is not determined in 
advance, but is instead posed in the form of an open question onto humanity itself (pp. 213, 
226; see also Martin, 2010: 312-3). Thus, in addition to a tool for periodisation, Burckhardt 
also uses the concept of crisis to describe an entire epoch whose time is defined by the 
pressure for a different future. The table below disaggregates the various dimensions and 
functions of ‘crisis’ implicit in Burckhardt’s application of the concept to history. For 
purposes of clarity, it also includes historicised versions of the term’s earlier uses that 
Burckhardt himself goes beyond. 
Function Semantic origins  Definition Frequency 
Periodising concept Medical usage Ongoing and culminating point in a chain of events Unique; Recurring 
Epochal concept Theological usage Forthcoming and final point of transformation Unique 
Epochal periodising 
concept Combined 
Permanent or existential 
situation Unique; Recurring 
Epochal periodising 
concept Combined 
Historically immanent transition 
phase Unique  
 
  Figure 1.3   Crisis as a concept for interpreting historical time   (Source: Adapted from Koselleck, 2006: 371-2) 
When taken together, these different interpretive options produce a profound ambiguity 
regarding the nature of crisis. Or more precisely, once crisis becomes a properly historical 
concept, its meaning as an actual occurrence is opened up to range of seemingly endless 
Chapter 1 
	   19	  
possibilities. It compels a decision and thus marks a threshold, but the kinds of conditions or 
states that it provides a passage between is unclear. It can be unique or recurrent, specific or 
general, transient or final. It can be ongoing, forthcoming, or even both at the same time. 
Moreover, as a condition that can afflict the very consciousness of a people – and which must 
therefore be recognised as such in order to properly exist – it can be any combination of these 
things. Finally, by virtue of this sheer polyvalence, the very idea of crisis can be met with a 
range of different normative responses – as it is by Burckhardt, for whom the prospect of a 
‘genuine’ crisis holds both terror and promise (see 1979: 216, 248-9; and 1999: 68, 164-5). 
According to Koselleck it is this ambiguity that defines the term as a modern concept. 
‘Crisis’, he argues, “becomes a structural signature of modernity” because it gives free scope 
to the historical imagination: “it takes hold of old experiences and transforms them 
metaphorically in ways that create altogether new expectations” (Koselleck, 2006: 374). 
There are of course other ways in which such an operation might performed, but it is 
“precisely the exciting possibility of combining so many functions” (p. 374) that makes the 
idea of crisis such an attractive one. In this way, the concept can be understood as a tool for 
generating figurations of historical time. What follows here is a survey of crisis theory within 
modern political economy. The aim is to provide not so much a history of crisis theory as an 
account of the histories implicit in the concept’s various forms. In order to do this, it uses the 
typology developed above to draw out the establishment of distinct perspectives on the 
relation between capitalism and crisis. Its primary argument and conclusion is that the 
ordinarily productive ambiguity regarding the temporality of ‘crisis’ becomes theoretically 
problematic when the concept is itself turned into a tool for analysing how historical 
conjunctures are imagined or interpreted. 
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1.2 From extrinsic events to crises of capitalism 
Economic crises are nothing new. As long as there have been natural disasters, human 
societies have had to make critical decisions about how to secure their continued survival and 
prosperity. A flood, for example, may lead a society to reappraise its prevailing set of 
economic arrangements by taking lives, destroying equipment and reducing crop yields. But 
with the emergence of complex impersonal exchange in the eighteenth century comes 
disturbances of a seemingly different nature altogether: namely, those whose very appearance 
is already enmeshed in the economic (see Mirowski, 1984a). Thereafter, to speak of ‘crisis’ is 
to speak of the chaos wrought by abstract phenomena – such as falling asset prices or share 
values – and much of crisis theory becomes an attempt to identify the forces that might 
underpin these developments. Yet even within this basic ‘objectivist’ approach, the relation of 
crisis to both capitalism and its history is imagined in a range of different ways – they can be 
inside of capitalism but outside of history; they can serve as both the means and end of 
capitalist history; and they can mark a transition between different and historically unique 
forms of capitalism. 
1.2.1 Situating crises within capitalism 
In early classical theory crises are extrinsic events. Like the Physiocrats before them, the 
classical economists see the market as a natural order that is endowed with its own laws of 
motion (Veblen, 1898: 381-2), but they have yet to really situate economic fluctuations within 
these laws. This means that crises are treated as acts of God rather than something that can be 
attributed to the dynamics of capitalist growth. Specifically, because their theories of 
accumulation are paired with a vision of the market as a self-equilibrating system, this 
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“oblige[s] them to explain disturbances of the system’s equilibrium by reference to factors 
outside the system” (Mattick, 1981: 23). This line of analysis reaches its logical conclusion 
with W. S. Jevons (1878) and his attempt to link economic instability to sunspots: If crises 
cannot belong to either capitalism or history, then their causes might lie in the stars. 
In later revivals of classical theory, crises are brought back down to earth, but they 
retain an extrinsic quality. Specifically, as marginal utility theory is extended to cover the 
production process and then the economy as a whole, the framework of static equilibrium 
effectively displaces earlier theories of value and accumulation. Questions of growth and 
change are thus excluded from ‘pure theory’, leaving the analysis of macroeconomic trends to 
empirically oriented researchers (cf. Walras, 2003/1874; and Mitchell, 1913). Crucially, 
though, a division of labour emerges between these two camps, and the patterns that the latter 
uncover are framed as periodic adjustments that only serve as proof of the tendency towards 
general equilibrium in market economies (Mattick, 1981: 30-1). This same move is repeated 
in the real business-cycle models of the 1970s, where fluctuations in output are now explicitly 
attributed to changes in productivity and shifts in policy (see Lucas, 1983; and Hartley et al., 
1998). Hence, it is the figure of the cycle – already present in Jevons’ sunspot thesis – that 
comes to define early neoclassical and later new classical visions of crisis. These cycles are 
seen as properly belonging to economics, yet because the changes that trigger them are still 
treated as external shocks, capitalism itself is situated outside of history. Crisis, in turn, 
remains a quasi-natural occurrence. 
But even though history is excluded from the models of mainstream economics, the 
allocative efficiency these models purport to demonstrate imbue both the market and its 
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cycles with a progressive character that surreptitiously constitutes a figuration of history.4 
This gesture can already be found in Adam Smith, where wealth creation and its civilizing 
powers are routinely cast as compensation for the social upheavals wrought by capitalism 
(Blaney & Inayatullah, 2010: 37-41; see Smith, 1976/1776: 302-4; and 1979/1759: 182-4). 
With the Austrian School, however, a liberal theodicy of this sort produces a perspective on 
crisis distinctive from that of the neoclassicals and their predecessors. Specifically, by 
departing from the equilibrium framework and conceiving of markets in dynamic terms, both 
Joseph Schumpeter and Friedrich von Hayek explicitly interpret periodic slumps as a mark of 
progress for humankind. 
For Schumpeter (1980/1911), capitalist development takes place through the heroic 
interventions of entrepreneurs, which force the productive forces of society onto a new plane. 
But in order for such a qualitative leap to occur, existing production structures must adapt to 
the new possibilities that are uncloaked by the entrepreneur, and this can often prove to be a 
painful process. Business cycles register this process of adjustment, and are therefore an echo 
of the vital force that propels both growth and innovation under capitalism (Schumpeter & 
Clemence, 1989/1951: 112-17). In contrast, Hayek (1979: 67-8) argues that all market agents 
are involved in the process of discovery, for it is only through competition that producers are 
able to identify and meet the diverse demands of individuals. Yet once again, in order for 
some competitive strategies to be rewarded and encouraged, others must be punished (Hayek, 
1960: 71-84; 1976: 107-32). In macroeconomic terms, this means that periodic downturns are 
crucial in ensuring that production structures continue to adapt to the changing demands and 
needs of society (Hayek, 1931: 98ff.). Hence, although each employs a different conception of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 As Fredric Jameson (2002/1981: 13) points out, “Individual period formulations” – including those that 
employ the figure of the cycle – “always secretly imply or project narratives … of the historical sequence in 
which such individual periods take their place”. 
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entrepreneurship, both Schumpeter and Hayek see crises as providing markets with their 
dynamism and capacity for self-renewal. Capitalism is therefore returned to history, but 
insofar as it is reduced to the outcome of individuals acting in and through the market, it is 
now history that assumes the form of a quasi-natural order. 
1.2.2 Situating capitalist crises within history 
In order to situate both capitalism within history and crises within capitalism, it would take 
theorists willing to draw from classical theories of accumulation. With the orthodox Marxist 
tradition, this occurs via a return to David Ricardo’s vision of the stationary state economy. 
According to Ricardo (1969/1817: 64-76), a finite supply of fertile land would eventually 
bring growth to end by causing rents to rise and profits to fall. In Marx’s estimation, Ricardo 
was right to question to perpetuity of profits but wrong to “seek refuge in organic chemistry” 
(1973/1953: 754). Instead, he argues, the tendency for the rate of profit to fall should be 
traced back to a contradiction between exchange-value and use-value production, which 
drives a development of the productive forces to the point where capital can no longer find 
conditions conducive to its self-valorisation (Marx, 1977/1894: 247-59). Broadly speaking, 
Marx’s account of the accumulation process yields a dual role for crisis within history.5  
In the first instance there are periodic industrial crises, wherein a destruction of the 
productive forces temporarily restores profitability to the process of surplus-value production 
(pp. 251, 255). But because each these crises only serve to further exhaust the scope for future 
profits, there is also singular and final crisis that is still to come, after which the productive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Marx’s writings on crisis are notoriously fragmented and this has spawned an entire cottage industry in 
critical exegesis (see Itoh, 1978; Mattick, 1981: 43-77; and esp. Clarke, 1994). My focus here is on his 
comments in Volume III of Capital, as it is these that have come to underpin the orthodox branch of Marxist 
crisis theory. 
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forces of social labour will once and for all be transformed into the basis for a higher mode of 
production (pp. 257-9; see also Marx & Engels, 1998/1848: 41-2). The figure of the cycle is 
therefore embedded within a specific mode of production and a more general vision of 
historical progress. Later Marxists such as Anwar Shaikh (1978b) would go on to develop 
increasingly elaborate expositions of how ‘internal limits’ cause the rate of profit to fall, while 
others like Ernest Mandel (1998/1972) would see in the history of industrial cycles a nearing 
of the absolute barrier to capitalist production (see also Mattick, 1980). It is on these grounds 
that Russell Jacoby (1975) can lament the rise of ‘automatic Marxism’: at least within 
orthodox circles, crises are the relentless mechanism by which capital undoes itself. 
But beyond the falling rate of profit theory, classical economics provides a range of 
other tools for confronting capitalist crisis. Within the Marxist tradition this is evident in the 
various reformulations of crisis theory that take place over the course of the twentieth-century 
(see Olin-Wright, 1975; O'Connor, 1987: 49-107; and Clarke, 1994: 14-76). For example, 
during the 1970s Andrew Glyn and others use a Ricardian ‘profit share’ framework to identify 
rising wage-demands as the source of periodic crises (e.g. Glyn & Sutcliffe, 1972; Boddy & 
Crotty, 1975; see also Weeks, 1979). Most notably, however, the Malthusian concern with 
‘realisation’ is taken up and used to identify consumption as the ultimate regulator of 
capitalist production (Malthus, 1951/1820: Book II, Ch. 1; see also Bleaney, 1976). This line 
of analysis prompts a great deal of theoretical overhaul, but it does little to refigure the 
temporality of crisis. 
Take Rosa Luxemburg, who is widely regarded as a key contributor to the 
underconsumptionist tradition in Marxism. By situating the problem of underconsumption 
within Marx’s reproduction schema, Luxemburg (2003/1913) ties the very survival of 
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capitalism to a conquest of the non-capitalist world.6 Yet because this process of external 
expansion creates a world after capital’s image (pp. 375-98), the periodic gluts that drive it are 
ultimately subsumed beneath a tendency towards terminal crisis. Luxemburg therefore 
replicates the figure of history behind Marx’s dual conception of crisis. Meanwhile, in later 
attempts to root underconsumption within the ‘monopoly stage’ of capitalism, this figure is 
inverted but retains its basic shape. For example, with Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy (1968), 
imperialist expansion becomes but one of a few key measures that states can take to prop up 
demand; and such strategies are deemed to be significant because they work to indefinitely 
postpone an otherwise certain slide into chronic depression.7 Hence, even on the revisionist 
wing of Marxist crisis theory, recurrent patterns still draw their meaning from a later and final 
breakdown of capitalism. 
1.2.3 Situating the crises of capitalism within history 
This is clearly not the case with John Maynard Keynes, who restores history to crisis via 
different means. Specifically, Keynes develops a theory of under-investment that identifies 
modern finance as the primary source of crisis and depression (Toporowski, 2005: 79-98). 
The basis of this theory is a claim about how uncertainty shapes financial market dynamics. 
Keynes (1936) develops this through his famous ‘beauty contest’ analogy, which suggests 
that stock market prices are determined by second-order expectations about prospective yields 
(p. 156). But in order to make the leap from this to a permanent under-employment of 
productive resources, Keynes makes a second set of claims regarding the channels through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 More precisely, Luxemburg (2003/1913: 247-306) argues that a structurally-induced underconsumption 
renders capitalist societies dependent on external sources of demand. 
7 Baran and Sweezy (1968: 117-214) identify three primary means of absorbing the rising surplus that is 
produced via monopoly capital: advertising, public expenditure, and militarism/imperialism. 
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which finance affects the real economy. Here he relies on the concept of a ‘speculative 
demand for liquidity’ (p. 170), which is intended to capture how traders hold on to money 
when unsure of the prospects for profitable investment. Specifically, he argues that when a 
stock-market boom goes bust, the beauty contest turns ugly and investors seek refuge in 
liquidity. This is then deepened by a corresponding decline in the consumption of both traders 
and the ‘stock-minded public’ more generally, which only makes productive investment 
appear even less profitable (pp. 136, 319). And finally, once this vicious circle takes hold, 
attempts to restore investor and consumer confidence via monetary and fiscal policy may not 
be enough to induce a return to higher levels of growth and employment (pp. 320, 375-7). 
Hence, unlike many of his interpreters, Keynes sees capitalist crisis as consisting less in the 
ups and downs of a business cycle and more in the breakdown of such a cycle at its low point. 
Of course, there is something of the early Keynes in Baran and Sweezy’s (1968) 
suggestion that military expenditure can stave off depression, and the same can be said for the 
faith in a more benign form of demand management that comes with the ‘neoclassical 
synthesis’ (Samuelson, 1955: 212; see also Hicks, 1937; and Hansen, 1949).8 But as Jan 
Toporowksi (2005) points out, Keynes’ attempts to refine his theory of crisis should be 
understood as response to the failure of monetary policy to prevent the Great Depression (p. 
134); and the fact that he ends up advocating a socialisation of investment reveals a 
conviction that capitalism had fundamentally been derailed by its financial system (pp. 88, 
94-5). Keynes himself is quite explicit about this: it is only “with markets organised and 
influenced as they are at present” that uncertainty can breed permanent under-investment 
(1936: 320). Therefore, in spite of the more mechanistic aspects of the General Theory, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In fact, once divorced from their claims about the structural basis of underconsumption, Baran and Sweezy’s 
account of crisis management ends up looking remarkably similar to Alvin Hansen’s (1941) vision of the 
smoothed or managed business cycle. 
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Keynes’ focus on finance brings with it the potential for a more institutionally oriented theory 
whereby crises might be situated within the very evolution of capitalism. 
In many ways Keynes follows Thorstein Veblen, who already begins to develop an 
institutional perspective on financial and industrial crises even before the Great Depression.9 
Yet just as the institutional dimensions of Keynes’ crisis theory are largely ignored, the vision 
of crisis implicit in Veblen’s institutionalism is also left underdeveloped. Indeed, it is only 
with a later generation of economists that an evolutionary institutionalism is eventually 
brought into crisis theory. The early works of Michel Aglietta (1979) and Alain Lipietz 
(1985) are decisive in this regard. Writing after and with Marx but within and against 
‘bourgeois economics’, both Aglietta and Lipietz set out to understand the resiliency of 
capitalist growth. In order to do this they replace the capitalist mode of production as a whole 
with the idea of historically specific ‘accumulation regimes’, and then argue that each of these 
regimes rely on an associated ‘mode of regulation’ for their continued reproduction.10  
According to Lipietz (1987: 15) such a correspondence is a not “pre-ordained part of 
capitalism’s destiny” – nor is it even the product of conscious design – but it nevertheless 
serves the crucial function of enabling a particular set of contradictions to be managed or 
“mitigated” (Aglietta, 1979: 383). 
While this approach might still afford an unquestioned primacy to the process of 
accumulation within history (Gibson-Graham, 2006/1996: 149-61), the Parisian 
Regulationists quite clearly attempt to go beyond the traditional Marxian gesture of situating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Between his two books Veblen’s focus shifts from finance to industry, but within both crises figure as the 
expression of a conflict between historically-contingent customs and habits of thought (cf. Veblen, 1978/1904; 
1945/1923). Keynes uses the first of Veblen’s books while lecturing at Cambridge before the First World War 
(Toporowski, 2005: 80). 
10 An accumulation regime refers to a sustainable pattern of investment and consumption within a capitalist 
social formation; a mode of regulation refers to the ensemble of norms and institutions that stabilise this pattern 
and enable its reproduction (cf. Aglietta, 1979ff.; and Lipietz, 1987ff.). 
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the evolution of social relations within capitalism.11 Instead, they expressly seek to situate 
capitalism within the path-dependent transformation of intra- and inter-national social 
relations (see Lipietz, 1993). This effort brings with it two distinct figurations of crisis. On 
one hand, there are those that have not yet transpired and exist only as tendencies kept in 
check by an effective mode of regulation. These crises are immanent to a social formation and 
in particular to its regime of accumulation. But on the other hand, there are those that mark 
the dissolution of an accumulation regime and the beginning of the struggle through which a 
new one might be found. This second variety of crisis is structural in a different sense to the 
first. Specifically, rather than expressing either the normal course or structurally determined 
demise of a social system, these crises are the transformative thresholds through which such 
systems pass and emerge out of qualitatively anew. Or in other words, they are properly 
historical moments invested with the power to create entirely new institutional modalities, 
interdependencies and crisis-tendencies. Aglietta and Lipietz therefore resume Veblen’s 
attempts to wrest crisis from both nature and necessity. In many ways this line of analysis is 
still being developed within heterodox political economy (cf. Jessop & Sum, 2006a; and 
Palan, 2007). 
1.3 From objective contradictions to subjective interventions 
If the crises of the eighteenth century prompt an attempt to uncover the objective forces that 
produce them, then those of the twentieth turn this very endeavour into an object of theory. 
This does not extend to mainstream approaches, where a positivist epistemology enables 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 During the 1980s the ‘Regulation Approach’ quickly becomes difficult to view as a coherent school (Jessop, 
1990a). For a more in-depth discussion of the Parisian school to which I refer here, see Jessop (1997); for a 
comprehensive anthology of key works within the broader tradition, see Jessop (2001). 
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economic determinism to go largely unquestioned (see Lawson, 1997). But within Marxist 
thought, the failure of a final crisis to arrive leads some to stress the profound contingency of 
crises and their resolution. At the same time, a more specific concern with the portrayal of 
crises prompts others to question their status as objective or unmediated events. With these 
parallel developments, ‘crisis’ no longer connotes a mere economic imbalance or 
contradiction – it is now also a surplus of causes or a deficit of meaning; an event propped up 
or masked by fiction; and a threshold more or less created through its recognition as one. This 
emphasis on the subjective dimensions of crisis yields new perspectives on its relation to both 
capitalism and history. However, it also begins to indicate a place for historical interpretation 
within the concept of crisis itself. 
1.3.1 Marxist philosophy and the overdetermination of crisis 
The first key change to Marxist theory comes with its questioning of economic essentialism. 
In the (neo-) orthodox approaches already discussed, it is presumed that the complexity of 
crisis can be pared back to reveal an underlying simplicity in the form of an economic logic at 
work. There is disagreement over precisely how this logic works, but crises are universally 
rooted in the sphere of production and the process of accumulation, implying that other 
dimensions of a capitalist society can be regarded as inessential to its development and 
ongoing reproduction (Wolff & Resnick, 1987: 2-3). Among those to take issue with this 
stance is Louis Althusser. Rejecting the orthodox vision of a determining economic base and 
a dependent or epiphenomenal superstructure, Althusser sees the social whole as a “decentred 
structure” whose reproduction entails a “reciprocal action of the superstructure on the base” 
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(1969: 254; 2008/1971: 10).12 This has direct implications for questions of causal inference. 
Specifically, because contradictions can stem from different regions of the social body, 
interruptions to the process of reproduction can no longer be attributed to a “sole [and] unique 
power of the general ‘contradiction’” (Althusser, 1969: 100). Instead, he argues, such events 
have to be regarded as fundamentally overdetermined; the forces behind them are simply too 
commingled for any one to be singled out as primary. 
Althusser’s legacy is a diverse and contested one (cf. Kaplan & Sprinker, 1993; and 
Gibson-Graham, 2006/1996: 24-45), but in terms of crisis theory there are two developments 
worth highlighting. The first of these comes with the Regulation Approach and its emphasis 
on the complexity of capitalist social formations (see § 1.2.3). Lipietz is quite explicit on the 
connection, admitting that Althusser’s critique enabled the early Regulationists to envision 
social totality as “an articulation of relatively autonomous and specific relations, 
overdetermining one another” (1993: 127).13 At the same time, though, he is also clear that 
the concept of regulation is meant to moderate the more structuralist elements in Althusser’s 
account of reproduction and restore some sense of agency to history (see also Jessop, 2002: 
91-3). The consequence of this double-move is to theoretically sanction a retreat from the 
actual event of crisis. Specifically, because crises are deemed to be both overdetermined and 
non-reducible to pre-existing logics, concrete analysis is necessarily forced onto either side of 
their occurrence. On the one hand, there is the retrospective reconstruction of emergent 
contradictions within a social formation; on the other, a prospective identification of new and 
potentially stabilising complementarities between institutional forms, but in neither instance is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Antonio Gramsci pre-empts this conclusion with his denouncement of ‘vulgar economism’ in Marxism 
(1971: 407ff.). For recent critiques of economism in IR and IPE, see Ashley (1983) and De Goede (2003). 
13 Moreover, many of the social institutions and processes that Althusser identifies in his discussion of 
ideology feature in their key concept of regulation. For example, compare Lipietz (1985: 11-3) on the ‘enchanted 
world’ of lived experience to Althusser (2008/1971: 36-8) on the ‘imaginary relation’ of men to their real 
conditions of existence. 
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the transformative threshold itself opened up to investigation. Hence, in the name of its novel 
and non-necessary place within history, the Regulationists end up pushing the very moment of 
crisis beyond the purview of their research. 
The second key development comes with the theoretical writings of Régis Debray 
(1975: 87-166). Reflecting his own debt to Althusser, Debray also sees the outbreak of crisis 
as “objectively overdetermined” (p. 113). Moreover, he anticipates the position that Lipietz 
would eventually adopt by arguing that such events are “epoch-making” (p. 99), and therefore 
cannot be entirely reduced to the logics that either precede or follow them. But rather than 
stopping here – that is, with the theoretical uncertainty that comes with the overdetermination 
of crisis – Debray goes a step further. “In every crisis situation”, he writes, “there is an 
interplay of darkness and clarity”:  
The objective conditions provide a background, a containing framework of 
propositions, which restricts the spectrum of possible initiatives or responses to 
events, but that background then seems to fade … So much so that the outline, the 
thing that can be seen by everyone, shifts from the objective to the subjective, the 
indeterminate, with the individual initiatives of a few characters suddenly thrust 
into the forefront of the stage. (pp. 104-5) 
In this visual metaphor, ‘darkness’ is the slipping away of certainty that accompanies the 
overdetermination of crisis, while ‘clarity’ is the shape given to such an event by those who 
speak out on it. Crucially, though, this latter process is as much a question of political praxis 
as it is one of epistemology. Indeed, the “knot” of crisis can never be fully untangled by 
theory (p. 111), and it is only through the strategic reductionism of political actors that they 
can be envisioned and then resolved in one way or another. Debray therefore not only situates 
the uncertainty that comes with overdetermination within the very logic of a crisis situation, 
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but also sees in this the basis of its path-shaping power. Or to put it differently, it is through 
the subjective indeterminacy they create that crises find their novel place with history. 
1.3.2 Cultural Marxism and the impossibility of crisis 
In using the concept of overdetermination in this way, Debray already suggests that questions 
regarding the essence of crises are inextricably bound up with those of their appearance. 
However, this line of analysis becomes the explicit concern of other theorists attempting to 
grapple with the significance of new media. Of course, ever since Marx wrote of a “means of 
mental production” (Marx & Engels, 1970/1932: 64), it has been possible to situate 
communicative technologies on either side of the base-superstructure model. Yet as Raymond 
Williams (1977: 97-9) points out, the concept of ‘mediation’ – which connotes a general 
process of communication, rather than the form or content of technical media – emerges 
within Marxist theory in response to the perceived shortcomings of this model. Building on 
this account, John Guillory (2010: 353-62) has recently suggested that some of the divisions 
within Cultural Marxism can be traced back to the uptake of the mediation concept, and in 
particular, to the way that it impacted upon the project of ideology-critique.  
With Frankfurt School theorists such as Theodor Adorno, ‘mediation’ becomes the 
name for a theoretical task that seeks to wrest a possibility of change from the culture industry 
and its reified image of totality (see Arato, 1982: 199-204). But for those on the French New 
Left, such as Guy Debord and Jean Baudrillard, the modern apparatus of cultural mediation 
has to be understood as nothing less than the basis for an entirely new order of historical truth 
– the real unreality of the spectacle, or the hyperrealism of the simulation machine. Standing 
Marx on his head, these theorists argue that the realm of appearance has effectively replaced 
that of production, giving rise to a ‘base-less’ regime of representation: “The spectacle is 
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capital accumulated to the point where it becomes image” (Debord, 1994: 24, emphasis 
omitted); and yet at the same time, it is “in the sphere of the simulacra … that the global 
process of capital is founded” (Baudrillard, 1983: 99). With the advent of mass media, then, 
capitalism is transformed into a grand tautology.  
For both Debord and Baudrillard, the most profound effect of this new circularity is its 
(apparent) annihilation of history. However, in their respective accounts of the relation 
between media and capitalist history, each also gestures towards the impossibility of crisis 
under contemporary mediated capitalism. For Debord there remains an underlying tendency 
towards crisis, but the “compensating” efforts of state and spectacle have both neutralised and 
concealed this, effectively rendering the stability of the present as a permanent and 
impenetrable harmony (1994: 52-3). It is on these grounds that he describes the spectacle as 
the beginning of a “paralyzed history” (1994: 114) – i.e. one devoid of historical knowledge, 
and thus condemned to an “eternal present” (1998: 12); the spectacle effectively serves as a 
barrier to historical change, and to produce a ‘real’ crisis would require a form of 
consciousness that can somehow escape and then undermine its pacifying force. The 
impossibility of crisis therefore consists in the unreality of appearance, which keeps 
revolutionary figurations of history from propelling the historical process forward. 
Baudrillard expresses no such hope in restoring life to the motor behind history. Indeed, 
for him the motor has always been only a logic representation, and with its creation of a 
‘third-order simulacrum’ this logic has once and for all rendered history meaningless: “We 
come out of history in order to enter into simulation”, he declares (Baudrillard, 1985, quoted 
in Chen 1987: 72). In relation to crisis, the key point is that such events form grist for the mill 
of the simulation machine, which ceaselessly reproduces and recombines their virtual doubles 
in a way that robs the event itself of any substantive or determinate meaning (1983: 61-2). 
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Thus, it is not that crises are somehow prevented from occurring. Instead, it is that such 
events always appear already as an abstraction, and “only survive on an artificial 
effervescence of signs” which ensures in advance that their meaning will be exhausted (p. 71; 
cf. 1993: 36-43; 2001: 132-8).14 This is why for Baudrillard so many events ‘never 
happened’: the oil crisis of the 1970s, the Wall Street Crash of 1987, the Gulf War of 1991, 
etcetera; they never began, and therefore never now could have. Hence, it is with the reality of 
appearance itself that events are rendered unreal, and it is through the auto-referentiality this 
brings that crisis becomes impossible. 
1.3.3 New political economy and the social construction of crisis 
In his denial of crisis, Baudrillard announces both a thoroughgoing dematerialisation of the 
economy and the wholesale destruction of history by virtualisation. This is an extreme 
position that effectively replaces the relentless drive of a simple economism with the 
metonymic loops of an ‘implosive postmodernism’ (Chen, 1987). Somewhere between these 
two poles lies the new constructivist or cultural political economy, whose attempt at a via 
media consists in the assertion of a necessary interdependence between imagination and brute 
reality. In many ways this basic wager is already evident in the Marxist and Keynesian 
traditions, where ideologies and expectations are regarded as crucial to proper functioning of 
capitalism. However, an explicit concern with the nexus of ideas and materiality has become 
central to the more recent development of crisis theory. Although there are important 
differences between the various advocates of this approach, their shared conviction is that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 On the necessary abstraction of contemporary financialised crisis, see Allon (2009) and Srnicek (2011). 
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crises are privileged historical moments whose consequences hinge on the way they are 
construed and constructed by social agents. 
In contemporary IPE this line of analysis is typically taken up under the banner of 
constructivism.15 Echoing Debray, the central claim of these constructivists is that agents need 
simplifying ideas in order to overcome the uncertainty that comes with crisis. However, rather 
than tracing this uncertainty back to overdetermination, they argue instead that crises 
destabilise agents’ perceptions of their own self-interest. One of the first to develop this 
argument is Mark Blyth, who does so via the notion of ‘Knightian uncertainty’ (Blyth, 2002: 
8-10, 30-4; see also Knight, 1921; and Beckert, 1996). During moments of such uncertainty, 
Blyth argues, a return to stability depends upon the emergence of a shared diagnosis regarding 
the causes of crisis, which then forms the basis for subsequent efforts to identify and 
implement an appropriate institutional fix (2002: 27-45). More recently, attention has turned 
to the processes through which one interpretation of a crisis may come to prevail over 
another. For example, Blyth (2007: 761) himself has written on “inter-elite attempts at 
persuasion”, which he suggests are waged in the name of various “crisis-defining ideas”. 
Meanwhile, Leonard Seabrooke (2007a: 795) has argued that these inter-elite debates may be 
held to account by “everyday discourses constructed by mass public agents”. But for both of 
these ‘uncertainty constructivists’, the concept of crisis still performs two distinct functions: it 
designates an event that agents “interpret as necessitating change” (Widmaier et al., 2007: 
748); and yet it also entails the “processes of persuasion” that such events ignite, and which 
ultimately determine the very nature of the change they produce (p. 749). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 This singular epithet increasingly betrays a diverse range of theoretical approaches (see Broome, 2012). 
However, the pioneering literature on crisis forms a relatively coherent sub-branch that has since been described 
as an ‘agent-centred’ or ‘uncertainty-based’ constructivism (cf. Widmaier et al., 2007; and Abdelal et al., 2010). 
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A broadly similar use of the term can be found in the work of Colin Hay, whose 
theory of crisis emerges alongside that of Blyth during the late 1990s. However, in Hay’s 
approach – which he would later come to call ‘constructivist institutionalism’ (2006) – 
subjective indeterminacy becomes a basis for institutional change via more or less explicit 
reference to Marxist theory.16 Specifically, Hay (1999: 323-27) conceives of decisive 
subjective intervention as a contingent response to the objectively overdetermined failure of 
an economic regime. Before a crisis as such can be said to exist, he argues, the various 
contradictions that underpin systemic failure must be discursively recruited as “symptoms” 
and incorporated into a “meta-narrative of crisis” (pp. 333-5). But once such a meta-narrative 
does emerge, it opens up an uneven space of struggle between itself and other competing 
narratives, mapping-out a “discursively selective terrain” that privileges some constructions of 
crisis over others (1996: 261). The very constitution of a crisis moment is therefore itself a 
moment of crisis, and initial meta-narratives articulated in the media can be decisive in 
determining the nature of any subsequent institutional transformation. Crucially, though, this 
process need not yield major structural change, for just as contradictions can be recruited as 
symptoms of systemic failure, they can also be discursively negotiated in ways that save a 
model of development from wholesale de-legitimation (see Hay, 2011c). Structural change is 
therefore a non-necessary response to systemic failure, and its eventuation is ultimately 
contingent upon the construction of that failure as a crisis of pre-existing structures. 
More recently, Bob Jessop has sought to develop a ‘cultural political economy’ 
approach to crisis by situating Hay’s notion of discursive selectivity alongside his own notion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Hay moves from a sympathetic critique of the Regulation Approach to suggesting a point of synergy with 
Debray’s theory of crisis (cf. Hay, 1995; 1999). More generally, he draws heavily on later developments in 
Marxist state theory (e.g. Jessop, 1990b; see Hay, 1994). 
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of structural selectivity.17 Jessop’s framework defies simple summary, but within the context 
of the present discussion there are three key points that require emphasis. The first is that 
Gramsci’s account of hegemonic leadership provides a class-basis for the subjective 
interventions that crises require (see Jessop, 2004: 166-70; and 2007: 21-53, 101-39). This is 
implicit in Debray, increasingly less visible in Hay, and altogether absent in Blyth. The 
second is that the subjective indeterminacy of crisis is understood through the lens of 
complexity and systems theory (e.g. Rescher, 1998; Luhmann, 1995; see Jessop, 2007: 225-
45). Specifically, Jessop argues that the reproduction of an accumulation regime is always 
dependent on complexity-reducing ‘imaginaries’, which are what enable a subset of economic 
activities to be identified as an object of intervention or management (2004: 162-3; 2011b: 5-
7). However, once the contradictions that these and other activities produce are construed as 
symptoms of systemic crisis, efforts at complexity-reduction lose their unity and there is a 
proliferation of competing imaginaries.18 Finally, the third point is that the eventual 
determination or resolution of such a crisis is seen to hinge on the emergence of a ‘master 
economic imaginary’ (Jessop, 2008: 83-4), whose role is to coordinate and lend structural 
coherence to the visions and strategies of key economic agents. For Jessop this occurs through 
the evolutionary mechanisms of selection and retention, which each possess both semiotic and 
material dimensions (2004: 164-5; 2011b: 7-10; see also Jessop & Sum, 2006b). Crises are 
therefore moments of struggle during which agents vie to remake social relations from within. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Jessop develops these concepts within the context of his ‘strategic-relational approach’ to state theory, but 
both have now assumed a central place within the broader ‘cultural political economy’ project he is developing 
with Ngai-Ling Sum (cf. Jessop, 2007: 21-79; and Jessop & Sum, 2006b; Forthcoming). 
18 The indeterminacy of crisis therefore stems not from overdetermination or complexity itself, but from the 
multiplicity of ways in which complexity might be reduced (see Jessop, 2011b: 5-7, 11-4). 
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1.4 Historical imagination and the new crisis theory 
As Koselleck (2006: 373-5) points out, the modern concept of crisis serves more as an 
expression of the historical imagination than a means of investigating it. Yet within 
contemporary political economy, the concept acquires a degree of reflexivity with respect to 
this process. Specifically, in both its constructivist and cultural political economy variants, the 
new crisis theory sets out to grasp how an ongoing event comes to be understood and 
responded to as a particular kind of crisis. In so doing, it turns the historicity of crisis into a 
puzzle that is solved by the agents of history themselves. However, by seeking to situate the 
subjective interventions of these agents within the objective conditions of a specific 
conjuncture, it ends up neglecting what is truly historical about the intersubjectivity of crisis – 
namely, its dependence on a repertoire of past events or processes that can lend meaning and 
significance to those of the present. Recent developments do suggest a more or less explicit 
acknowledgement of this lacuna, but the reflexivity of historical imagination remains a 
dimension of crisis that theory has yet to fully explore. 
1.4.1 The function of the past within the new theories of crisis 
The first key point to make is that a function for the past is already implicit in the new crisis 
theory. This is clearly illustrated by the dual claim that each of the three approaches make 
regarding the nature of crisis episodes. On the one hand, they are potentially transformative 
thresholds through which an economic system might pass and emerge out of anew. Yet at the 
same time, both the constitution and the traversal of such a threshold is shaped by the 
subjective interventions of key political and economic agents. The logical implication of this 
is that a distinctly historical variety of interpretive practices are required in order to for a 
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crisis to even exist, let alone be managed or resolved.19 However, to date such practices have 
only been theorised in a limited and impressionistic manner. Most strikingly, very little 
attention has been paid to how past crises figure within the debates that accompany the 
outbreak of some turmoil in the present. But if what is really at stake during such moments is 
the place that an emergent event might occupy within history, then appeals to previous and 
seemingly similar or affiliated events are likely to perform an important range of interpretive 
functions. Moreover, if an event can be interpreted as a particular kind of crisis in one present, 
then there is no reason why it cannot be reinterpreted as another kind of crisis in a later 
present. 
The relative neglect of these points reflects the path-dependent history of crisis theory 
itself, whose development has been shaped by the field-specific parameters of inherited meta-
theoretical debate. Take uncertainty constructivism. Generally speaking, constructivism has 
risen to prominence within IPE by modelling its initial challenge on that of its older sibling in 
IR (for a more nuanced account, see Abdelal, 2009; and Broome, 2012). In theoretical terms, 
this has involved justifying its right to exist through increasingly banal debates over old 
dualisms, such as those that pit agency against structure, interests against ideas, and ideas 
against materiality (see Blyth, 1997; 2003; and Widmaier, 2003: 62-5; 2004a: 435-7). These 
discussions were clearly part of an attempt to engage the dominant rationalist tradition by 
distinguishing constructivism from more radical postmodern approaches.20 But one 
consequence of this strategy has been an empirical bias towards topics that are more easily 
tractable in methodological terms, and this in turn has produced a cloud of relative silence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Each approach differs in terms of what it is that necessitates and empowers the subjective interventions of 
these agents, but all emphasise the centrality of these interventions to the constitution and resolution of crisis. 
20 Although the focus of meta-theoretical debate has since shifted, its argumentative thrust remains much the 
same – namely, that constructivism has something to offer rationalist and materialist approaches (see Widmaier 
et al., 2007: 750-3; and Abdelal et al., 2010). This mode of engagement and its promise of a middle-way mirrors 
the eventual fate of constructivism in IR (cf. Price & Reus-Smit, 1998; Barder & Levine, 2012).	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around the reinterpretation of the past events (where two or more presents are in play). 
Indeed, so far the closest that uncertainty constructivists have come to addressing this silence 
is an admission that “intensified debate over the meaning of contemporary events often 
fosters reinterpretations of past wars and crises” (Widmaier et al., 2007: 755). What remains 
to be asked is precisely how the interpretation of past crises might interact with attempts to 
establish the meaning and significance of a crisis in the present. 
The story of constructivist institutionalism is a somewhat different one. Although Hay’s 
approach is initially informed by and aimed at a predominantly Marxist literature, its later 
development takes place through reference to a set of more general debates surrounding the 
theory and practice of political analysis (see Marsh & Stoker, 2002/1995; Hay, 2002; and 
Gofas & Hay, 2010). In many ways these debates are simply different versions of those that 
accompany constructivism in IPE. However, within the discourse of British political science, 
the dichotomy of positivism and interpretivism occupies a unique position, serving to 
organise other more specific debates regarding the relation of structure to agency and interests 
to ideas (e.g. Finlayson et al., 2004). Consequently, Hay’s new institutionalism has 
increasingly been presented as a path between and beyond this dichotomy (Clarke, 2009; see 
Hay in Finlayson et al., 2004: 142-9; and Hay, 2011b).21 Yet by fixing attention on the 
context in which crisis narratives are deployed, this framing device has served to marginalise 
those questions relating to how such narratives are developed. For example, in his landmark 
article on the crisis of Keynesianism in Britain, Hay describes ‘the Winter of Discontent’ as 
“a discursive key to a collective mythology [that is] seemingly appealed to, and conjured, in 
each wave of industrial unrest” (1996: 253). But rather than return to this recursive aspect of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Of course the social construction of interest remains crucial to Hay’s approach, but the emphasis is now on 
grounding this process within a specific institutional conjuncture (see Hay, 2004; and 2011a). 
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crisis narration, his subsequent empirical research has proceeded instead in linear fashion to 
later stages in the life course of British capitalism, where the performative force of an idea or 
narrative can once again be grounded within a specific conjuncture (Hay, 2001; 2011c). 
Hence, what is perhaps the most uniquely historical aspect in Hay’s account of crisis narration 
remains underdeveloped. 
Finally, the cultural political economy approach has had a very different development. 
Rather than operating within the parameters of IPE or political science, its advocates have 
explicitly sought to draw on a pre-disciplinary tradition, bringing together a wide range of 
different perspectives (see Jessop & Sum, 2001). But despite this wilful eclecticism, the 
avowedly Gramscian core of the project has meant that all of its theoretical imports have 
effectively been filtered through a base-superstructure distinction, becoming different tools in 
an ultimately singular quest to think the dialectic of discourse and materiality. This is 
reflected in Jessop’s continual emphasis on “making the cultural turn without falling into soft 
economic sociology” (Jessop & Oosterlynck, 2008: 1155; see also Jessop, 2004; and Jessop & 
Sum, 2006b).22 Of course, such an approach does not rule out a role for practices of historical 
interpretation within the discursive negotiation of crisis. However, it does mean that the 
‘ontological depth’ of the present becomes an overriding theoretical concern. Consequently, 
even though Jessop suggests that economic imaginaries are developed and deployed through 
“productively vague stories that connect past, present, and future” (2008: 83), most of his 
theoretical energies have been directed towards the structural functions and contingent uptake 
of these imaginaries (rather than the diagnostic practices through which they might acquire 
their prescriptive content). In this way, the debates surrounding Marxian theory and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 This notion of ontological depth reflects the role of critical realism as a theoretical underlabourer for the 
cultural political economy project (see Jessop, 2002; and Fairclough et al., 2004). 
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philosophy have performed a similar function to those around method in both political science 
and IPE, effectively keeping the past from the present in the social construction of crisis. 
1.4.2 Invoking the past, interpreting the present 
If the interpretive function of the past initially appears as an underside to the new crisis 
theory, then in recent years it has been brought closer to the surface. Specifically, where 
before the ‘historicity of understanding’ figures as a neglected corollary of existing theoretical 
frameworks, it is now more or less explicitly implicated in the logic of a crisis moment.23 This 
occurs in slightly different ways within each sub-branch of the new crisis theory. In the case 
of the two constructivisms, the interpretive function of the past is revealed indirectly through 
their respective responses to the crisis of the 2008. 
In order to see this, recall how Hay observes that the ‘Winter of Discontent’ is a 
narrative of crisis that is “seemingly appealed to, and conjured, in each wave of industrial 
unrest” (1996: 253). Although he does not go on to develop this insight in his subsequent 
work, in response to the recent crisis he himself looks back to the events of the 1970s: 
It is hardly surprising that the winter of 2008-2009 has seen the return to the public 
discourse of crisis in Britain after thirty years. Yet, beyond this accumulation of 
economic and political contradictions, the two moments look very different. And 
they do so … for one simple reason: the absence of an alternative economic 
paradigm capable of constituting the present crisis as a crisis. (Hay, 2009: 51) 
In this passage, Hay effectively suggests that the ‘non-crisis’ of 2008 can be understood 
without reference to practices of historical interpretation, even though he anchors this very 
point in a counter-analogy with the crisis of the 1970s (see also Hay, 2010; and 2011c). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The ‘historicity of understanding’ is a phrase I borrow from the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer (see 1965). 
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Consequently, the crises of the past figure as a kind of absent presence within his theoretical 
framework – that is to say, they serve as a resource for the theorist, who uses them to interpret 
the crises of the present, but they are simultaneously withheld from the subjects of theory, 
who are only permitted to think events through stories about presently existing paradigms. 
Hay therefore performs a kind of double-move, recalling his forgotten revelation in order to 
shore up a theory that has increasingly been structured around its exclusion. 
A similar absent presence can be detected in the recent work of Wesley Widmaier, who 
has sought to re-evaluate the crises of the early 2000s. In the wake of the Asian crisis, 
Widmaier repeatedly emphasises how contending theoretical frameworks have shaped the 
norms and practices of international monetary cooperation, identifying successive periods of 
Keynesian, New Classical and New Keynesian consensus (see Widmaier, 2003; 2004a). 
However, in response to the subprime crisis he has revised this story, recasting the previously 
stabilising influence of New Keynesianism as a form of ‘technocratic repression’, which he 
now suggests might actually have helped to generate the crises of late neoliberalism 
(Widmaier, 2010: 137-43). Once again, a practice of historical interpretation can be detected 
in the labour of the scholar – this time in the form of a revision rather than a recovery – and 
yet it remains conspicuously absent from the substance of their analysis. Of course, unlike 
Hay, Widmaier does explicitly seek to effect a change in the body of constructivist theory, but 
the irony is that he ends up mirroring the kind of political psychology he ascribes to 
policymakers, revealing the co-constitution of past and present through the very exclusion of 
such a phenomenon from his discourse. In this way, both branches of constructivist crisis 
theory have disclosed the theoretical repression upon which they have been built.  
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In the case of cultural political economy, there are signs that the interpretive function of 
the past is beginning to find a place within theory. Specifically, Jessop’s recent interest in the 
‘pedagogy of crisis’ (2011a) has brought with it a more explicit concern with the practices 
through which crisis episodes are interpreted. Thus far his primary innovation is to distinguish 
between learning in, about and from crisis (Jessop, 2011b: 14-6), which enables him to 
envision the learning process as consisting in chronologically-lagged moments that each entail 
distinct temporal horizons. More significantly, though, he begins to specify a place for past 
crises within this process: 
Lessons from the past are invoked in the course of both [sic] types of learning. 
This illustrates ‘historicity’, i.e., the use of history to make history or, put 
differently, the effort to define appropriate historical parallels as a basis for 
responding effectively to the crisis in real time. (Jessop, 2011b: 16, emphasis in 
original) 
Jessop’s move here is to include the kind of practice enacted by Hay in the discursive 
negotiation of crisis – i.e. ‘the effort to define appropriate historical parallels’. However, it is 
unclear whether the kind of reappraisal undertaken by Widmaier can or should be subsumed 
beneath such a characterisation of historicity. Jessop essentially focuses on the historicity of 
learning and its place within the discursive negotiation of crisis, but were the interpretive 
function of past events to consist in more than the drawing of lessons, then the long series of 
capitalist crises might serve as a different kind of input into historical process. In order to 
untangle this relation between the historicity of understanding and the appearance of a crisis 
episode, there needs to be a closer focus on the specific modes of historical interpretation that 
practical agents employ in the face of disorder. 
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1.5 Summary: Re-imagining crisis theory 
In his spacing of the crisis concept within time and history, Reinhart Koselleck reveals 
something of its peculiar relation to both temporality and historicity. Specifically, insofar as 
the modern concept is a means of exercising the historical imagination, there is virtually no 
limit to ways in which theory can imagine a relation between crisis and history. In political 
economy, this rich potentiality is clearly illustrated by a long and varied history of crisis 
theory. As an objective event, ‘crisis’ can signal a singular shock or a periodic process of 
adjustment; it can express a long-term tendency or its eventual culmination; and it can mark a 
transition between different institutional logics altogether. Meanwhile, as a subjective 
process, it can connote a profound uncertainty regarding the causes behind such events, or it 
can instead underline the apparent meaninglessness that comes with their cultural mediation. 
However, in the new constructivist and cultural political economy, the temporal ambiguity of 
the concept is radically foregrounded through an attempt to turn it into a tool for analysing 
how discrete moments are construed and constructed as crises. Indeed, if a crisis is created 
through its recognition as one, then the historicity of crisis becomes at least partially 
dependent on the form given to it by the agents of history. 
Yet at the same time, an enduring concern with forging a balance between the 
objective and subjective dimensions of crisis has prevented this new political economy from 
fully exploring the reflexivity of historical imagination and its place within the process of 
capitalist history. Most notably, the recollection and patterning of past crises has been 
conspicuously absent from existing accounts of how meaning is ascribed to an ongoing 
episode of economic turmoil, even though these are precisely the practices through which 
theorists themselves are able to identify an event as a particular kind of crisis. There are signs 
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that cultural political economy is beginning to turn this process into an object of inquiry, but 
in order to better untangle the relation between appeals to the past and efforts to interpret the 
present, theory must turn its attention to different possible practices of historical interpretation 
and the ways in which these might produce or manage the characteristic uncertainty of crisis. 
	  Chapter 2 
Crises of historical practice 
Historiography separates its present time from a past. But everywhere it repeats 
the initial act of division. Thus its chronology is composed of ‘periods’ … each 
‘new’ time provides the place for a discourse considering whatever preceded it to 
be ‘dead’, but welcoming a ‘past’ that has already been specified by former 
ruptures. 
– Michel de Certeau1 
In the previous chapter, the new political economy was shown to provide a place for 
figurations of history within the very dynamics of a crisis moment. But if this is the case, then 
the practices of historical interpretation that might generate such figurations are heretofore-
missing components of crisis theory. The purpose of the present chapter is to prepare the 
grounds for a remaking of crisis theory that would address this lacuna. In order to do this, it 
shifts its attention from the histories implicit in the concept of crisis to the idea of history 
itself. More specifically, it focuses on a string of controversies that have surrounded questions 
of historical method or practice within the modern human sciences. 
Much like ‘crisis’, the idea of ‘history’ brings with it a foundational and productive 
ambiguity. In his own attempt to provide a definition for the term, the Dutch historian Johan 
Huizinga begins by observing that its use has always implied at least two distinct referents. 
On the one hand, it is used to connote past events or phenomena – i.e. it refers to “something 
that has happened” (Huizinga, 1963/1928: 3). And yet on the other hand, it is also meant to 
capture the kinds of explanations that are offered for those phenomena – i.e. it simultaneously 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 (1988/1975: 4, emphasis omitted). 
Chapter 2 
	   48	  
refers to “the narration of something that has happened” (p. 3). Moreover, because there are 
various possible ways of developing such narratives, historical discourse is capable of 
producing quite different visions of history as a developmental or generative process (pp. 4-
7). But as Michel de Certeau points out, beneath this apparent variety is a shared and 
constitutive relation to the ruptures of the past, even if such a relation is effaced through the 
justifications that a particular form of historical discourse provides for itself. Or to put it 
differently, there is a function for past crises within all modes of historiography, and what 
really distinguishes one mode from another are the ways in which each negotiates its relation 
to the accumulated inventory of crises that precede it. 
In what follows, it will be argued that although such a function for the past is precisely 
what is lacking in the new crisis theory, modern historiography and the disciplinary ruptures 
through which it has taken shape do not yet provide adequate tools for approaching the nexus 
of crisis and historical imagination. This argument is developed in stages through a meta-
history of historical practice. It is not intended to be comprehensive, and it does not begin 
with the kinds of methodological questions that have animated so many prominent 
discussions of historical writing within the profession (e.g. Bloch, 1992/1954; Carr, 
1987/1961; Elton, 1969; Braudel, 1980/1969; Hexter, 1971; Jenkins, 1991; Fulbrook, 2002; 
cf. Lukacs, 1994/1968; Veyne, 1984/1971; Berkhofer Jr., 1995). Instead, it fixes its attention 
on the relation between historical imagination and historiography, focusing in particular on 
how practices of historical interpretation figure within different modes of historical writing. 
More concretely, the chapter begins with a theoretical discussion of historical writing 
and its relation to fiction, using this to draw out the possibility of an interpretive function for 
the past that is distinct from the one performed by historiography – namely, the kind of 
propaedeutic function indicated in Michael Oakeshott’s notion of ‘the practical past’. It then 
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moves on to discuss recent debates over history and narrative, arguing that even those 
theorists who identify a productive relation between historical discourse and its figurative 
referent stop short of exploring how imagined histories might serve as a practical resource 
within the context of a particular present. Finally, the concepts developed in these first two 
sections are used to map out the functions of the past provided for by contemporary 
international studies. Here it is argued that despite a great variety of self-consciously 
‘historical’ approaches, neither IR nor IPE afford an adequate sense of history to the subjects 
of their theory. It concludes by suggesting that in order to grasp the potentially productive 
power of the ‘practical past’, crisis theory must begin to make a place for the anachronistic 
within both its vision of history and methods of historical research. 
2.1 The fictions of history 
In the opening of Rainer Maria Rilke’s great modernist novel, The Notebooks of Malte 
Laurids Brigge, the eponymous protagonist passes a series of hospitals and is struck by the 
strangeness of death. Different deaths are there for the dying, he observes, recalling that of his 
grandfather, but die we all will. In the face of this realisation, Malte finds himself impelled to 
act: “I have done something against the fear. I have sat up all night and written” (Rilke, 
2008/1910: 11). Rilke too felt this impulsion, and in the novel that resulted, both he and his 
character find recourse to a range of childhood memories and historical sources, all of which 
figure as parts of his attempt to learn how to live in a new and uncertain age. In so doing, 
Rilke and Malte effectively provide an introduction to the two practices around which this 
chapter is structured – namely, historical writing and the evocation of the past in the present. 
More importantly, though, they also hint at the history-producing effects that each of these 
practices can have, and which underpin the case for an approach to crisis that would anchor its 
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method in an expanded and reflexive understanding of historical interpretation. As a 
preliminary step in the development of this argument, this section uses Michel de Certeau’s 
critique of historiography in order to distinguish between the functions of the historical and 
the practical past. 
2.1.1 Meaning and function in the writing of history 
For de Certeau, much like Rilke’s Malte, our relation to the past is borne of an obsession with 
death. Quite simply, because everyone knows they are going to die, they are forced to 
remember how life goes on in order to continue living. But because the past is forever gone, 
our attempts to recall and represent it are charged with an undercurrent of impossibility that 
ceaselessly threatens to throw us into meaninglessness (de Certeau, 1988/1975: 2-5). 
Historical discourse, therefore, should be understood in terms of its function – namely, its 
ability to produce “a society capable of managing the space it provides for itself” (p. 6). 
Meanwhile, historical writing is best characterised as an ‘operation’ that somehow negotiates 
a relation with its constitutive outside – i.e. the ungraspable Real of history – while at the 
same time appearing to do nothing of the sort (pp. 45-9). And finally, history as such is to be 
read as the product of precisely this kind of interplay between a representation and its non-
representational “underside” (p. 48). Hence, de Certeau’s basic critique of historiography 
consists in an attempt to reveal not just the production of histories by historians, but also the 
production of history by historiography. 
In methodological terms, this approach entails a focus on three distinct but related 
dimensions of the historiographic operation. First, there are the institutional arrangements that 
enable historical writing to occur, as schematised in de Certeau’s “combinatoire” of place, 
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labour and discourse (1988/1975: 57). Second, there are the situated acts of selection and 
exclusion, which, by determining the accepted “postulates of analysis”, enable the production 
of one kind of historical work rather than another (p. 68). And third, there are the ruptures – or 
encounters with the Real – which provide the discontinuities needed for forming chains of 
events through narrative (pp. 3-4). When taken together, these three dimensions enable 
‘history’ to be understood in more precise terms as an institutionally-determinate and 
necessarily productive kind of recording process, wherein specific modes of historiography 
endeavour to shore up their functional value, and historicity figures as both subject and object 
in this process. 
As Ian Buchanan points out, the corollary of this insight is not only that a culture is best 
understood through its response to an epistemological crisis, but also that the very nature of 
this response will set the parameters for its subsequent struggle against the Real of history 
(2000: 81-2). Within the context of the present argument, this is significant in that it provides 
the starting point for a meta-history of historiography. Specifically, if we invert Buchanan’s 
formulation, then de Certeau’s wager becomes that each mode of historiography will possess 
an underside, and that the precise form of this ‘other’ will reflect an epistemological 
movement that was undertaken in response to an earlier crisis. Moreover, if we follow this 
logic through another step, then the implication is that an epistemological crisis constitutes an 
opening through which we might glimpse the mode of relation between a discourse and its 
own historicity. And finally, if we complete the loop, then it is to the disavowals and 
displacements of these crises that we must turn in order to account for the changing 
appearance of historical discourse over time. 
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2.1.2 Modes of historiography and their historicity 
In many ways de Certeau already began to write a meta-history of Western historiography. 
For example, one crisis that he placed great emphasis on was the undoing of God’s Word, 
which he saw as providing a place for the initial emergence of historical discourse (de 
Certeau, 1984: 131-53). With the transition from an oral to a scriptural economy, de Certeau 
argues, the sacred text is no longer heard as voice, but is instead produced through the work of 
writing. Yet in their subsequent attempts to “redefine themselves without that voice” (p. 137), 
modern societies become unmoored and are left to float in the “vast sea of a progressively 
disseminated language” (p. 138). This new situation drives the subject to “set himself [sic] up 
as a producer of writing” (p. 138), transforming the subject of writing into a master, and the 
mastery of language into a new power: “that of making history and fabricating languages” (p. 
139). The discipline of history, therefore, emerges at a time when the fiction of Truth is 
revealed, and this is precisely why it establishes the idea of ‘facticity’ (or the colligation of 
individual truth statements), which is what enables it to substitute for religion. However, in 
order to continue performing this function, modern historians must disavow the origins of 
their craft – i.e. to remain authorised to speak in the name of the Real, they must bury the 
story of how they came to do so in the first place. The art of fiction is in this way the 
repressed other of history: it is the underside against which ‘Western historiography 
struggles” (de Certeau, 1986: 200), and that always threatens to resurface in the present.  
Within modern historical study, one such resurfacing can be discerned in the debates 
over objectivity and narrative that begin in the 1960s, and which evolve into what is widely 
construed as crisis of the discipline during the 1980s (for example, see Novick, 1988: Ch. 4; 
and Scott, 1989). De Certeau’s emphasis on the narrative dimension of historiography clearly 
Chapter 2 
	   53	  
contributes to this sense of crisis, and this will be discussed at greater length in a later section 
(§ 2.2.1). However, for the present purposes what is more significant is how he interprets this 
crisis as an abreaction to the discipline’s entry into science (de Certeau, 1986: 199-224). Put 
simply, de Certeau contends that these panics over objectivity emerge within historical 
science due to its inaugural denial of the letters, which effectively amounts to a formal 
disavowal of its earlier basis in fiction. This first move temporarily relegates fiction to the 
status of a “shameful and illegitimate” component in the writing of history (p. 219), but it is 
eventually undone by a later and seemingly affiliated controversy over the centrality of 
narrative to historical writing. De Certeau therefore sees in the story of fiction a privileged 
means for understanding the evolution of modern historical discourse. 
In keeping with this basic premise, Hayden White (2010) has recently sought to use the 
emergence of literary modernism in order to better understand the history of historiography. 
From the perspective of literary history, modernist novels are typically presented as an 
attempt to escape from the constraints of genre in order to better explore the vicissitudes of 
life amidst intellectual and industrial change (e.g. Childs, 2008: 37-98; see also Ayers, 2004). 
Their emergence is therefore usually taken to signify a crisis of form and its possible content, 
rather than a full-blown crisis of epistemology. However, for White both the birth and the 
legacy of the novel should not merely be read through reference to the events of history or the 
history of literature. Instead, he argues, they bear a crucial relation to the professionalisation 
of historical study that so intrigues de Certeau. 
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2.1.3 The historical past versus the practical past 
According to White, the entry of history into science – and in particular, the “exclusion of 
rhetoric from historiology” (2010: 9) – sends ripples through literary fiction because it robs 
historical study of its ability to speak to the present.2 At the centre of this argument is a 
distinction that Michael Oakeshott (1999/1983: 1-48) makes between two different kinds of 
past and their related uses or functions. On one hand there is ‘the historical past’, which is a 
past that is authenticated through the truth-procedures of the historian. For Oakeshott this past 
is an end in itself, and its discovery is properly motivated by nothing more than a desire to 
provide as full and objective a portrait of the past as is possible.3 Meanwhile, on the other 
hand there is ‘the practical past’, which consists in the loose or unexamined memory that 
people carry around with them. The function of this past is to guide or inform the decisions of 
individuals as they confront the dilemmas of an ever-changing present.  
Although Oakeshott originally draws this distinction in order to protect historical 
research from the degenerative effects of an instrumental attitude towards the past, for White 
it is this very attitude towards instrumentalism that is degenerative. Specifically, White 
suggests that a new quest to uncover the historical past, which promises to tell us of “what 
people in other times, places and circumstances have done”, effectively prevents historians 
from sustaining an earlier concern with the practical past, which might tell us “what we, in 
our situation, in our time and our place, should do” (2010: 11, emphasis in original). Or to put 
it differently, by setting out to see the past in objective terms, historical study becomes unable 
to see the present as history, thereby pushing the question of how to negotiate new social 
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3 Of course, for de Certeau this very idea of a purely deontological relation to the past is part of the operation 
that guarantees the functionality of historical discourse (see § 2.1.1). 
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realities beyond the boundaries of the discipline. It is for this reason, White argues, that 
radical new literary forms emerge. The historical novel, the modernist novel, the postmodern 
historical novel: all of these are so many attempts to question or supplement “the kind of 
knowledge about the past produced by the new cadres of professional historians” (p. 7).4 
Hence, with the exclusion of an explicitly practical function for the past within historical 
discourse, we also find the genesis of a displaced crisis in literature, wherein a new generation 
of novelists set out to explore how the past might once again serve “as a resource for social 
and cultural renewal” in the present (p. 13).  
At this point it is worth returning to the ‘story’ of Rilke’s Malte. As we noted, Malte’s 
fear of death drove him to write, and it was an appeal to the past that furnished him with much 
of his subject matter. But while Malte is usually seen to have failed in his attempt to become 
an artist, Rilke is not, and this is because he imagined a rich and gripping nexus of memory, 
facticity, and historicity. The next chapter will argue that an attentiveness to precisely such a 
nexus – which Oakeshott and White designate as ‘the practical past’ – offers a promising path 
through the impasse in crisis theory. As a preliminary step in the development of this 
argument, the remainder of this chapter provides a discussion of how the practical past has 
come to figure within contemporary historical theory and the historiography of world politics. 
2.2 Historical imagination and narrative discourse 
Before Huizinga offered his definition of ‘history’, G.W.F. Hegel had already asked what it 
might mean to use the term to connote both objective events and their subjective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 White briefly discusses each of these three forms, but see Hutcheon (1988) and Elias (2001) for a deeper 
analysis of postmodern fiction and its reinvention of the historical novel. 
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apprehension. Yet for Hegel, this double meaning was more than a “mere outward accident” 
(1956/1837: 60), and had to be grasped as nothing less than an expression of how events can 
only be historical when a subject of History is there to record and interpret them. Putting his 
philosophical system to one side, Hegel’s basic point here is that both a will and capacity to 
imagine something like history is part of what provides historians with their subject matter. 
But as modern historians have become more aware of their own reliance on narrative – which 
is how Hegel imagined historical consciousness to perceive itself – the ideal of objectivity has 
emerged as a focal point for debates over the nature of historical study. In what follows, 
successive debates over the historiosophical status of narrative are used to draw out an 
underlying preoccupation with the relation between imagination and truth or meaning in 
history. A place for the practical past is then identified within the new narrativist branch of 
historical theory. 
2.2.1 The story of history and narrative 
The story of history and narrative goes back a long way, and it has already been reconstructed 
in a number of important histories of historiography.5 Among those that focus on Western 
historiography, it has become customary to begin with Herodotus and Thucydides, whose 
works on the wars of Ancient Greece and Rome are seen as marking the birth of a distinctly 
historical form of writing. For example, in his recent book A History of Histories, John 
Burrow (2007) credits both with an emphasis on ‘inquiry’ that was lacking in the epic verse of 
Homer’s Illiad, and a purposive use of narrative that would set them apart from the later 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For example, see Barnes (1963), Burrow (2007) and Iggers et al. (2008). All three of these histories focus on 
historical writing in general, but the question of narrative figures prominently throughout each. For shorter 
discussions that deal specifically with the place of narrative within historiography, see Canary & Kozicki (1978), 
White (1987: 26-57), and Roberts (2001). 
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annalists and chroniclers of the Middle Ages. Quite clearly, Burrow’s own narrative works to 
produce a sense of progression or modernisation in the development of historical study. But in 
his emphasis on ‘truthful narrativity’ as a distinguishing feature of proper histories, he 
actually raises precisely the kind of question that has prevented historiography from achieving 
anything like a linear methodological trajectory – namely, that of what is truthful in historical 
narrative. 
In order to appreciate the productive force of this question, nominally discrete debates 
over the status of narrative must be grasped together and read through the enduring fact of 
their recurrence. Such a reading of course demands an attention to the various controversies 
that have surrounded the relation of narrative to history, but more importantly than this, it 
requires that these be approached as necessarily entangled intimations of an underlying 
reliance of history upon fiction (see § 2.1.1). In other words, it requires an extension of the 
story that de Certeau begins with the emergence of a scriptural economy, and which White 
supplements through his focus on a later crisis in literary fiction. Seeing as both writers 
emphasise an affiliation between these crises and the entry of history into science, the present 
discussion begins with the alleged father of modern historical science, Leopold von Ranke. 
Within the context of the late twentieth century, Ranke’s dictum – “to show what 
actually happened [wie es eigentlich gewesen]” – is routinely used as a shorthand for naïve 
objectivism in historical study (quoted in Hughes-Warrington, 2008: 294). To be sure, there 
has been much debate over both the translation of this phrase and the question of whether or 
not it is indicative of Ranke’s method (for example, see Iggers & Powell, 1990), but his 
emphasis on the privileged status of primary sources is clearly in keeping with a positivist 
view of the past. Moreover, insofar as Ranke laboured to undermine the speculative or 
transcendentalist philosophies of history that dominated Germany during the 1830s, he can 
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also be properly credited with advocating an empiricist approach to history. The more 
important point, however, is that Ranke’s aphorism is widely interpreted has having helped 
establish the idea that facts can somehow speak for themselves (cf. Carr, 1987/1961: 8f.; and 
Bann, 1984: 30ff.).  
And yet at the same time, Ranke’s use of narrative also opens him up to the charge of 
unwittingly affording too much scope to the influence of literary artifice. Most notably, in an 
influential polemic on The Situation of History in 1950, Fernand Braudel charges Ranke with 
having encouraged unduly “dramatic” representations of the past (1980/1969: 11). For 
Braudel and his later peers in the French Annales school, narrative is not simply an 
interpretive device unsuited to the science of history; it is also one whose deployment 
threatens to turn the study of the past into too narrow and superficial an exercise in 
storytelling, whereby key political figures and the events that punctuate their lives are treated 
as the sole determinants of historical process.6 Hence, even though Ranke is usually 
associated with an attempt to put history on objective grounds, the debate over his legacy 
clearly indicates how this attempt was itself reliant on a disavowal of its basis in fiction. 
Moving into Braudel’s present, it is important to note that his critique forms part of yet 
another attempt to put history on firm ground (only this time via new social-scientific 
methods). By the early 1960s this broad movement was bearing enough fruits for some to feel 
confident in announcing the ‘eclipse of narrative’, but before long others were equally 
comfortable celebrating its return or revival.7 Although the strands of thought responsible for 
this turnaround are various, they all stem from a new and explicit concern with function of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For similar critiques of narrative history from later Annales School historians, see the contributions of 
François Furet and Jacques Le Goff in Historical Studies Today (Gilbert & Graubard, 1972: 54-60; 337-58). 
7 According to Geoffrey Roberts (2001: 3) the apparent eclipse is “an illusory effect”, reflecting “the transitory 
prominence of certain schools and fashions within history (the French Annales school, various types of Marxism, 
quantitative history, the new social history in Britain, the United States, Germany and elsewhere).” 
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narrative in historical discourse. The first major discussions of this sort take place amongst 
Anglo-American philosophers of history such as W.B. Gallie (1964), Arthur Danto (1965) 
and Louis Mink (1966). Critical of the so-called ‘speculative’ approach – which follows the 
likes of Hegel in seeking to identify an overarching pattern and meaning in history – these 
analytic philosophers set out instead to “make clear the nature of the historian’s own inquiry” 
(Dray, 1964: 1). At the risk of oversimplification, the general thrust of these debates is to 
carve out a specifically epistemological function for narrativity within historical study.8 
Histories, they argue, take the form of narratives because these provide for a kind of 
knowledge that scientific method cannot. Or as Mink (1978: 143-4) would later have it, the 
narrative form is a ‘cognitive instrument’ that enables truth to be claimed for a configuration 
rather than a mere succession of events. On this view, narrative is neither the specious 
influence that Braudel rallies against, nor is it simply one among many possible and 
legitimate stylistic options facing the historian (as in Hexter, 1971: 1-14, 77-106). Rather, it is 
a necessary component in generating explanations befitting of distinctly historical events and 
processes. 
Outside of the analytic tradition, a different reappraisal of historical narrative begins to 
take shape in France and Germany. These new varieties of ‘continental’ philosophy can be 
subdivided into two distinct camps. On the one hand, there are what Hayden White has 
usefully described as those “semiologically oriented” theorists of narrative (1987: 31; see also 
p. 220, fn. 10). Drawing in unequal measure on the ideas of Friedrich Nietzsche and Roland 
Barthes, these predominantly French thinkers – such as Michel Foucault, Julia Kristeva, and 
Jean-François Lyotard – join the Annales School in questioning the neutrality of narrative 
histories, but go further than this by identifying a general ideological function that is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The anthologies of Gardiner (1959) and Dray (1966) provide a useful overview of this literature. 
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performed by narrative and its place within the discourse of history.9 On the other hand, there 
also emerges what White (1987: 31) has characterised as an “existentialist-
phenomenological” approach to narrative. This strand of thought – which finds its expression 
in the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur – begins with the human 
experience of time, and arrives at history by treating narrative as a mode of understanding 
uniquely suited the structure of temporality.10 In so doing, it effectively asserts an ontological 
reliance of history upon narrative. Such a claim is clearly stronger than the merely 
epistemological one made by the analytic philosophers, but it is also an inversion of the idea 
that narrative histories work to conceal the formlessness of their figurative referent (as in 
Barthes, 1997/1967). In this way, then, the widely observed return of narrative does not 
simply reflect the contradictory nature of Ranke’s project and that of historical science more 
generally; it is also responsible for a producing a variety of competing views on meaning and 
truth in the writing of history. 
2.2.2 The content of the narrative form 
Such a return already illustrates how the narrative form and modern historiography are 
complexly intertwined. However, in order to bring this insight to bear on the lacuna in crisis 
theory, a closer analysis is required of how such an intertwinement is conceived by the 
various new theorists of narrativity. Generally speaking, the debate over narrative shifts away 
from analytic philosophy during the 1970s and comes to draw more heavily from the so-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Although too complex for simple summary, this kind of argument exerts a significant influence over 
historical theory during the 1980s, and it does so primarily by casting narrative as a means of generating 
meaning and coherence when there properly is none. For an indication of the subsequent debates see Kellner 
(1987), Ankersmit (1989), and Jenkins (1997). Jenkins’ anthology also reprints short key texts on history from 
Foucault (pp. 36-8) and Lyotard (pp. 124-6). 
10 For useful introductory texts see Heidegger (2011/1924), Gadamer (1965), and Ricoeur (1976). 
Chapter 2 
	   61	  
called continental tradition, focusing in particular on the relation between time, narrative, and 
historical consciousness (see Klein, 2011: 35-58; and Lorenz, 2012).11 As a way into this now 
voluminous literature the present discussion focuses on the contributions of Hayden White 
and Paul Ricoeur. The rationale behind this decision is that while both White and Ricoeur 
either draw upon or work-within the semiological and hermeneutic traditions, each also 
develops their views via an engagement with the earlier analytic philosophers of history. 
In Metahistory (1973), Hayden White brings the tools of literary criticism to bear on the 
writings of nineteenth-century thinkers such as Burckhardt, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Ranke. The 
basic conclusion that he reaches – and for which he is still perhaps most well known – is that 
these writers enact a ‘poetics of history’, wherein their works figure as a culturally bound but 
fundamentally productive exercise in historical imagination (pp. 1-42; see also 1978: 81-
100).12 Or as White puts it: “a historical narrative is not only a reproduction of the events 
reported in it, but also a complex of symbols which gives us directions for finding an icon of 
the structure of those events in our literary tradition” (1978: 88, emphasis in original). 
However, from his 1966 essay on ‘The Burden of History’ (reprinted in 1978: 27-50) all the 
way through to those written during the 1980s, he places great emphasis not simply on the 
function of narrativity within historical writing, but also on the necessarily fictional 
representation of reality implicit in all narrativised histories. 
For example, in his The Content of the Form (1987), White repeatedly argues that 
although past events, structures and processes may indeed have really existed in one present 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This shift is clearly illustrated by the themes that animate the anthologies of Dray (1966) and Ankersmit & 
Kellner (1995). 
12 In order to make this argument White develops a formal typology that emphases the reliance of narrative 
histories on interdependent “modes of emplotment, argument, and ideological implication” (1973: 29). On the 
reception of his work both within and beyond the historical profession, see Kansteiner (1993), Vann (1998), and 
Ankersmit et al. (2009). 
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or another, a narrative is something that can only be imposed upon them through the same 
kinds of techniques that characterise the labour of the poet or the novelist (pp. 66-8, passim).13 
Moreover, it is precisely such a narrative form, he argues, that enables us to endow a series of 
factual statements about the past with a distinctly historical meaning and significance (pp. 23-
5, 44-6). In developing this point, White endorses Mink’s suggestion that to narrativise is to 
extract a configuration from a succession, yet he also supplements this with a quasi-
Nietzschean affirmation of history as sublime and formless chaos (pp. 58-82).14 Specifically, 
while for White such “chaos is our lot” (1978: 50), historical narratives emerge and persist 
because they present “a solution to a problem of general human concern, namely, the problem 
of how to translate knowing into telling” (1987: 1). Hence, insofar as the apparent coherence 
of history hinges on the ability of historians to tell plausible stories, the past is something they 
are impelled to invent rather than simply uncover. 
Paul Ricoeur more or less follows White in observing the structural unity of fictional 
and historical narrative. However, for Ricoeur – who explicitly works within the 
Heideggerian tradition – the significance of such a unity is that it reveals how narrativity is 
fundamentally rooted in our being ‘within-time’. This point is perhaps most fully developed 
in Volume I of Time and Narrative (1984), where he uses the ideas of Aristotle and Saint 
Augustine in order to draw out an intertwinement of experiential and historical time through 
narrative (see pp. 52-87).15 Such an approach does entail an appeal to the consoling effect of 
plot on minds confronting worlds, but where White sees narrative as a kind of meta-code that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 This is why Andrew Norman (1991: 120-2) has described White’s narrativism as ‘impositionalist’. 
14 White in fact quotes Schiller in order to develop this notion of the historical sublime, but he immediately 
observes that the same words “could have been written by Nietzsche” (1987: 69; see Nietzsche, 1997/1874). 
15  He also deals with the relation of narrative to time and history in two early essays (see Ricoeur, 1980; 
1981). 
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covers over the meaninglessness of history, Ricoeur instead finds a ‘healthy circle’ between 
time and narrative that is properly constitutive of history.16  
In one respect, he argues, plot is something that allows us to experience time as 
something other than a series of unrelated instants – that is to say, in both sequencing and 
configuring these instants, it “provides a transition from within-time-ness to historicality” 
(Ricoeur, 1980: 178). And yet by virtue of this very function, plot is also something that is 
always-already in a process of development, and within which we necessarily find ourselves 
enmeshed: “Historicity … comes to language only so far as we tell stories or tell history”, but 
at the same time, “We belong to history before telling stories or writing history” (Ricoeur, 
1981: 294). What Ricoeur refers to as ‘emplotment’ is therefore not only a means for 
generating figurations of temporality as such, but also an act that refigures the time of the 
present within which human action must always occur (1984: 54-64).17 Hence, it is the 
coherence of life itself that hinges on our ability to view the present through the lens of 
narrative time, and this is why even ‘non-narrative’ histories – such as those of Braudel – can 
be shown to rely upon operations of quasi-emplotment (see pp. 206-25). 
2.2.3 The form of the narrative content 
Despite their differences, what both White and Ricoeur underline is the interpretive 
interdependence of events disjoined by chronological time. This is a correlative of their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For a broader discussion of narrative temporality, see Cunliffe et al. (2004). Other prominent advocates of an 
ontological rather than merely impositional narrativism include David Carr (1986a; 1986b: 9, 52ff., 168) and 
Jerome Bruner (1991). 
17 Ricoeur follows Aristotle in using ‘emplotment’ to designate the general means by which narrative 
understanding is created. White also employs the term, but with him it refers more specifically to the kinds of 
meaning that a sequence of events can be given through their narrativisation – such as those typified by the 
modes of romance, comedy, tragedy, and satire (cf. Ricoeur, 1984: 31-51, 161-8; and White, 1973: 7-11, 29ff.; 
1978: 81-100; 1999: 27-42). 
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respective claims that narrative works to invest either history with meaning or time with 
history. In static terms, because narrativity entails the ‘grasping together’ of more than one 
event, all events contained within a historical narrative necessarily find their meaning in 
relation to one another. As a result, no one event can be made to fully determine its place 
within a narrative history. But in addition to this, the intrinsic discordance of time or history 
means that all narrative understanding is necessarily unstable – that is to say, a new 
occurrence can always destabilise old narratives by prompting what Arthur Danto has called a 
“retroactive re-alignment of the Past” (1965: 168). Hence, insofar as the narrative operation 
opens out onto a potentially endless series of such re-alignments, it also brings with it an 
infinite vista of possible histories. White and Ricoeur do begin to acknowledge this point by 
focusing on the different forms through which historical understanding might emerge, but 
both stop short of providing tools for analysing the specifically practical dimension to such a 
process. 
Take Ricoeur. In his Time and Narrative, it sometimes seems as though the content of 
the narrative form can explain its own emergence. However, by identifying a correspondence 
between plot and the structure of temporal experience, he already underlines how emplotment 
is deeply enmeshed within the practical world of human action (see Ricoeur, 1984: 52-87). 
Hence, the proper critique to be levelled at the early Ricoeur is that a certain kind of 
formalism – which sees him deal exclusively with completed works of history – ends up 
pushing to one side the question of what mediates the experience of time and the creation of 
narrative understanding. With the benefit of hindsight, this focus might perhaps be attributed 
to the intellectual climate of the time, because in his most recent and final book – entitled 
Memory, History, Forgetting (2004) – Ricoeur explicitly fixes his attention on what takes 
place between the perception of historical experience and the production of historical 
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narrative. As the title suggests, it is in ‘memory’ that Ricoeur finds this median level, and to a 
certain extent this move also reflects a broader trend in historical studies (see Klein, 2000; and 
Rosenfeld, 2009). However, unlike much of the recent work on memory and history, he 
begins with the object rather than the subject of historical memory, and is careful to 
distinguish between the cognitive and pragmatic dimensions of memory (Ricoeur, 2004: 5-
55). In this way, Ricoeur is able to restore an active searching and finding to the mnemonics 
of history that is lost in the much of the literature on collective memory.18 
This approach yields a range of insightful observations, but what is most noteworthy 
about these is that they all contribute to a more fundamental reappraisal of the historical 
event. For the early Ricoeur, “historical events do not differ radically from the events framed 
by a plot” (1984: 208), and all that marks them out from fictional ones is that their status as 
‘real’ is verified by the documentary truth-procedures of the historiographic operation. 
However, with the pragmatics of memory, historical events become the object of a perceptual 
process that entails an interface between social practices of memorisation on the one hand, 
and those of historical writing on the other (Ricoeur, 2004: 56-92, 234-92). Moreover, in the 
scope that each of these practices provide to recollection, the representation of past events – 
and indeed the very belonging of such events to history – comes to hinge on a complex 
dialectic of remembering and forgetting (pp. 412-56). Hence, where before the production of 
historical narrative is coterminous with both the labour of the historian and his or her 
configurational acts, it is now a broader process that brings together the making and recalling 
of histories by historian and non-historian alike. And finally, as Ricoeur himself eventually 
concludes, such a process can only ever end in one thing: “Incompletion” (p. 506). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For an elaboration of this critique and an indication its impact on the field of social or collective memory 
studies compare Olick & Robbins (1998), Kansteiner (2002), and Aksu (2009). 
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White arrives at a similar verdict only via a different route. As Wulf Kansteiner (1993) 
points out, White’s method in Metahistory does meet with criticism, but the more sustained 
challenge is directed at the apparent relativism of his conclusions. However, it is arguably in 
responding to this criticism that White begins to take flight from his earlier formalism. 
Specifically, during the 1990s, White is invited to comment upon whether his account of 
historical writing implies that the Holocaust might just as legitimately be given a comedic 
meaning as opposed to the tragic one with which it is typically associated (see Friedlander, 
1992). His response is to underline the inescapable contingency of both the historical 
imagination and the forms through which it makes meaning (see White, 1999: 27-42). An 
event such as the Holocaust, he argues, is not exceptional in the sense that it either 
intrinsically possesses a particular kind of plot-meaning, or that it somehow presents an 
absolute limit to representation as such. Instead, it is unique because it partakes of a new and 
distinctly ‘modernist’ kind of historical reality, wherein the very nature of the event 
undergoes a decisive transformation (p. 39; see also 'The Modernist Event', reprinted in 1999: 
66-86). For White this change is twofold. On the one hand, social modernisation and its 
attendant upheavals breed an order of event whose “nature, scope, and implications” are all of 
kind that “no prior age could even have imagined” (p. 69) – that is to say, these are events that 
fundamentally belong to the twentieth century. And yet on the other hand, these same 
upheavals work to rob such events of any determinate place within the discourse of history. 
For example, with the advent of mass media, occurrence itself is exploded into a mosaic of 
images, thereby divesting the event of any immediate belonging to either chronology or the 
real (pp. 72-4). 
Taken together, these observations lead White to conclude that the elusive ‘truth’ of the 
modernist event might best be approached through its experience or perception, and that this 
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in turn would require a departure from those realist modes of representation that prevail 
during the nineteenth century (pp. 39-42, 81-2). However, any kind of historical writing that 
privileges the perception of contemporary events clearly also invites a more substantive 
revision of ‘the event’ as a category within historical theory. White’s own attempt at such a 
revision is organised around Freud’s notion of trauma, which he uses in order to draw out 
what he sees as a distinctly historical form of recognition. Specifically, he suggests that: 
… a significant historical event will be recognized by its double occurrence, the 
first time as an intimation of a possibility of meaning and the second time as an 
“expletion”, a filling out or a fulfillment of what was only implicit or, to use a 
psychological term, latent in the earlier event. (White, 2008: 28, emphasis in 
original) 
As the ending to an essay this raises as many questions as it answers. In suggesting that a 
properly ‘historical event’ might be defined by its apparent return in some later present, White 
implies that its place within history depends upon an affiliation between two events being 
transformed into a retrospective foretelling of one by the other. In so doing, he hints at a kind 
of deep narrativity that is more or less intrinsic to the historical event. However, he clearly 
stops short of asking any questions about how different social actors might arrive at or 
construct the affiliations upon which an event’s apparent return would be premised (see pp. 
28-30). Moreover, the interpretive and representational practices that would transform a mere 
affiliation into a return or ‘double-occurrence’ are also missing his from analysis. Hence, 
although White does move towards defining the historical event in terms of its recognition, 
the process through which this recognition might emerge remains unaddressed. 
Of course this is precisely where the ‘practical past’ should come into play, but in his 
discussion of that concept White suspends the question of the historical event, returning 
instead to the plane of writing and the history of historiography (see § 2.1.3). In so doing, the 
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interface between appeals to the past and efforts to interpret the present is left unexamined, 
even though each of these processes clearly implicates the other. Ironically, then, White’s 
own concern with the historical past comes at the expense of exploring the potentially 
productive function of the practical past. Conversely, while Ricoeur’s turn to the mnemonics 
of history does indicate a range of practices that might be involved in the retrieval and re-
emplotment of historical events, his theorisation of these takes place almost exclusively at the 
abstract-general level. This is not a problem per se, but such a register of discussion does 
preclude an analysis of those concrete-complex processes through which recollective and 
historiographic practice might interact to produce an ongoing and contested emplotment of 
contemporary events. In summary, then, both White and Ricoeur take historical theory to 
precisely the point where the theory of crisis has been found wanting – i.e. they each 
underscore, albeit in more or less suggestive terms, how our re-imagining of the past might 
form part of an attempt to identify and negotiate the dilemmas of a particular present. 
2.3 History, historiography, and historicity in world politics 
While the ideas of White and Ricoeur become hugely influential amongst historians and 
within the humanities more broadly, they are much slower to penetrate the social sciences.19 
This is because from a social science perspective, causal explanation typically takes 
precedence over questions of meaning when it comes to analysing historical events (Bearman 
et al., 1999: 502). Insofar as the study of world politics is no longer limited such a 
perspective, the picture is somewhat more complex. Indeed, as the field has come to draw on 
a range of different disciplines, the problem of history and its place within international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Notable exceptions include Alker Jr. (1987), Lustick (1996), and Büthe (2002). 
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studies has emerged as a subject of debate in its own right.20 However, despite various 
attempts to grapple with the nature of historical understanding, the debates through which 
these efforts take shape effectively occlude any sustained engagement with the kind of 
anachronism at work in appeals to the past. The following two sections provide a brief 
analysis of this process by focusing on the status of ‘history’ within International Relations 
(IR) and International Political Economy (IPE). 
2.3.1 The deadlock of history in IR 
As R.B.J. Walker observes, “to begin with history … is to encounter problems that are usually 
encountered under the heading of the philosophy of history” (1993: 100). But by going on to 
lament the failure of IR to engage with these problems, Walker in fact helps to establish a 
schism which has defined discussions of history within the field ever since. Specifically, in 
operating against the backdrop of a general decline in analytic philosophies of history, those 
willing to take up Walker’s challenge have tended to draw from the so-called continental 
tradition of philosophy. This in turn has produced IR’s very own version of the ‘history wars’, 
wherein those concerned with historical ontology and its attendant meta-politics effectively 
speak past their positivist counterparts, who focus instead on questions of historical method 
and their implications for the conduct of scientific inquiry. 
Although the roots of this divide stretch further back, it is the critical interventions of 
Walker (1989) and Richard Ashley (1989) that open up a substantive breach between these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 For an indication of the various reversals, reorientations, and revivals through which the story of history and 
international studies has been rendered, compare Smith (1999), Elman & Elman (2001), and Hobden (2002). 
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two contending philosophical dispositions.21 In (neo-) realism, for example, both historicity 
and historiography are effectively subsumed beneath an isomorphic understanding of 
structure in history, enabling the past to be treated as a “laboratory in which to test … 
theoretical propositions about causation” (Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, cited in Smith, 1999: 7; 
see Waltz, 1979: 66-8; and Gilpin, 1981: 7, 230). Meanwhile, in its more historically sensitive 
forms, neo-liberal institutionalism goes so far as to count path-dependence among these kinds 
of theoretical propositions (as in Keohane, 1984), but remains wary of sliding into what 
Robert Keohane once described as “diversionary philosophical discussion” (1988: 382). For 
Ashley and Walker, however, the detour of philosophy is essential. Put simply, if history is 
nothing more than a sprawling intertext, “always in the process of being written and 
transformed” (Ashley, 1989: 281), then it is with the historicity of the present – broadly 
conceived as the contingent appearance of ‘sovereignty’ itself – which one must begin if they 
are to develop a properly historical understanding of world politics (see Ashley & Walker, 
1990: 368). Hence, while mainstream IR more or less denies the question of history for fear of 
philosophy, the field’s self-proclaimed dissidents effectively refuse to answer on it 
philosophical grounds. 
More recently, this divide has been reproduced in the positions developed by a second 
wave of contributors to the debate. On the one hand, there are the new deconstructionists such 
as David Campbell (1998) and Nick Vaughan-Williams (2005), for whom the ‘undecidability’ 
beneath meaning is once again reason enough to withdraw from the game of offering 
definitive accounts for historical events. Indeed, much like Ashley and Walker before them, 
these scholars see the apparent self-evidence of history as hinging on precisely such a search 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Generally speaking, debates concerning the place of history within IR reflect a deep-seated antagonism 
between those who adopt an objectivist stance on questions of historical ontology and epistemology, and those 
who draw instead from subjectivist philosophies of history (see Smith, 1999; Quirk, 2008; and Lawson, 2012). 
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for interpretive closure, which in turn must be exposed for what it really is – namely, a 
contingent and politicised masking of historicity by historiography. On the other hand, 
though, contemporary IR has been increasingly inundated with calls for a ‘return’ to historical 
sociology. Despite their various differences, these scholars all reject what John Hobson has 
described as a tendency towards “tempocentrism”, which “problematically flattens out 
international history … and thereby naturalises the present” (2002: 12, emphasis in original). 
However, they also typically go on to substitute one vision of historical truth for another, and 
in place of the timeless regularities or covering laws of neo-positivism it is now simply 
historicity – conceived here as the ‘milieu’ or ‘contextual constellation’ specific to a particular 
present – which historiography must somehow unravel in order to grasp the twists and turns 
of history (for example, see Hobson & Lawson, 2008: 430-4; and Lawson, 2012: 213-16).22 
Thus, where the dissidents’ refusal of history once met with denial, it now instead encounters 
a new drive to restore nuance and novelty to the truth of the past. 
Of course, this divide has by no means gone unnoticed, and there are signs of a growing 
dissatisfaction with its influence on the terms of debate. For example, Jonathan Isacoff (2002) 
and George Lawson (2012) have both criticised what they see as a dialogue of the deaf when 
it comes to questions of historical theory and method within the field. Somewhat ironically, 
though, even these interventions have served to reproduce the pathology at which they take 
aim. Specifically, while Isacoff may well seek to go beyond the perennial dichotomy of 
positivism and postmodernism, his recourse to a pragmatist philosophy of history effectively 
excludes his work from the kind of methodological synthesis proposed by Lawson, where it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 While the different branches of historical sociology defy simple summary, here I join Jonathan Isacoff in 
suggesting that – with the possible exception of those constructivist variants – these are all more or less in 
keeping with the tenets of positivism in the philosophy of history (Isacoff, 2002: 604, fn. 2). For useful attempts 
to map out the changing place of historical sociology within IR, see Hobden & Hobson (2002) and Hobson & 
Lawson (2008). 
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the philosophy of social science that acts as theoretical underlabourer.23 For the present 
purposes, what is important about this deadlock is how it has shaped thinking about historicity 
in world politics. If it is to matter at all, it is to do so as either a quality that is unique to a 
particular present, or as an immutable condition of flux. Consequently, the task of 
historiography is either to uncover the constitutive features of the past, or to help denaturalise 
the appearance of these in the present. Yet in order to take appeals to the past as a meaningful 
and potentially productive historical phenomenon, it would seem necessary to go beyond the 
idea of history as a string of linearly related presents and begin instead with what is 
anachronistic in their respective historicities. 
2.3.2 The poverty of historicism in IPE 
The story of history and IPE is somewhat different. Rather than beginning with history – as 
Walker succeeds in encouraging a generation of IR scholars to do – history more or less 
enters IPE through the backdoor. Poststructuralism is a comparatively late import to the field, 
and so it is within the growing ranks of heterodox IPE that rejections of ahistoricism first 
surface. These gestures are clearly motivated by a growing unease with the approaches and 
positions adopted in mainstream IPE, but the early advocates of a ‘new international political 
economy’ do not so much engage with these positions as go directly on to the task of 
developing something that might replace them (e.g. Murphy & Tooze, 1991). As a result, 
heterodox IPE becomes more or less united in its support for a very particular kind of 
historicism.24 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Tellingly, Lawson (2012: 205) only cites Isacoff for the latter’s critique of neo-positivism. 
24 For a concise discussion of ‘historicism’ and its various connotations, see Reynolds (1999). The version that 
comes to prevail in heterodox IPE follows Maurice Mandelbaum in emphasising how any phenomenon can only 
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Amidst the initial search for a new IPE it is Ronen Palan and Barry Gills (1994) who 
first raise the question of historicism in explicit terms. However, their call – which centres 
around the Braudelian concept of ‘conjuncture’ – is already issued within the context of 
fledgling research agendas, and so when Palan eventually publishes a second editorial on ‘The 
Need to Historicize IPE’ (Amin & Palan, 1996), a variety of responses are already implicit in 
the frameworks being developed. For example, there is the reinvigoration of world-systems 
analysis, which focuses on the shifting relations between different categories of labour and 
capital over time (Gills & Frank, 1990); there is the rise of the so-called Italian school, which 
follows Gramsci in exploring how such shifts are intertwined with situated struggles for 
hegemony (Gill, 1991); and there is the return to Braudel, which seeks to replace any 
overriding logic of capital with the multiple layers and rhythms of social time (Germain, 
1996). However, by virtue of their shared roots in critical political economy, those who take 
up the question of history more or less agree that to do so is to grapple with the specificity of 
the present as a context for social practice. And more significantly, this is almost universally 
taken to require a focus on the relations of structure to agency and ideas to materiality. 
Indeed, Amin and Palan’s early vision of a ‘historicised’ IPE – which calls for an 
approach “that assimilates the distinction between structure and agency, [in order] to account 
for the fixity and flow of social evolution” (1996: 211-2) – exerts an enduring influence over 
subsequent discussions within the field. Take the co-authored ‘Paths to a Historicized 
International Political Economy’, which is the most direct response to Amin and Palan’s 
intervention. In it Louise Amoore et al. (2000) upbraid their predecessors for reducing 
historicity to context or conjuncture, but they do not do so in order to reject the formers’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
be properly understood “by considering it in terms of the place it occupied and the role it played within a process 
of development” (Mandelbaum, 1974: 42, emphasis added; quoted in Langley, 2002: 17). 
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emphasis on structuration. Instead, they suggest that this basic orientation must be 
supplemented with a ‘reflective’ move that would focus on how agents perceive structures, 
and on how theory or even researchers themselves might play a mediating role in this process 
(pp. 60-6; see also Langley, 2002: 17-26). Meanwhile, in a different but related strand of 
debate, Randall Germain’s critique of the ‘new Gramscians’ draws on the history of ideas 
literature, shifting attention onto whether and how these kinds of theoretical mediations can 
be extracted from one context and put to use in another (cf. Germain & Kenny, 1998; and 
Morton, 2003; see also Skinner, 2002).  
In each of these responses, explicit emphasis is placed on historicity and the role of 
reflection or interpretation therein, but both reflexivity and historicity remain firmly 
entrenched within a conjunctural logic. That is to say, whether the interpretive leaps in 
question be those of the contemporary scholar or past master, each is treated as properly 
constitutive only of their respective presents. And with the eventual arrival of 
poststructuralism to IPE, this tendency only becomes more pronounced as earlier concerns 
with historical interpretation are effectively sublated beneath a new fixation with the 
materiality of discourse (as in de Goede, 2003; Laffey, 2004; Morton, 2006; Ryner, 2006; 
Germain, 2007; and Bieler & Morton, 2008). Historicity, in turn, becomes visible only 
through various attempts to establish its primary or determining elements within a particular 
present. 
While these debates clearly do engender a degree of theoretical discord, they are not as 
fractious as those that take place in IR, and this is because they are the almost exclusive 
preserve of scholars working within what Benjamin Cohen (2008) has described as the 
‘British school’ of IPE. Of course, Cohen’s hotly contested categorisation was intended to 
distinguish British scholarship from its more social-scientific American counterpart, and 
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within this latter branch of IPE the various approaches to history on offer more closely 
resemble those developed within mainstream IR.25 For example, these range from the 
ahistoricism implicit in regime theory and pluralist approaches to exchange-rate politics, all 
the way through to those attempts to bring econometrics to bear on specific episodes of 
international monetary disorder (cf. Keohane, 1984; Frieden, 1991; Eichengreen, 1995; and 
Simmons, 1997). The key point, however – and indeed surely the one that Cohen was aiming 
it with his ‘transatlantic divide’ thesis – is that these two literatures remain at a distance from 
one another, engaged not so much in a dialogue of the deaf as a relation of mutual neglect. It 
is in this way that the place of ‘history’ in IPE can end up following the same path as it does 
in crisis theory. Specifically, in much the same way as the axis of discourse and materiality 
keeps historicity from the debates over crisis, an attempt to situate these meta-theoretical 
categories within a specific conjuncture keeps anachronism from the debates over historicity. 
When grasped together with the deadlock of history in IR, it should come as no surprise that 
international studies has yet to even identify a potential for synergy between crisis theory and 
the pragmatics of historical interpretation. Simply put, to do so would require an altogether 
different approach to the practice of historical research. 
2.4 Summary: Re-imagining historical practice 
In his attempt to anchor historiography in psychoanalysis, Michel de Certeau provides a 
powerful lens for approaching the evolution of historical discourse. Specifically, insofar as a 
culture’s relation to the historical past is negotiated through distinct modes of historiography, 
then crises of historiographic practice provide a window onto the changing shape of that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 For a collection of the responses that Cohen’s intervention has prompted, see Phillips & Weaver (2011). 
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culture’s historical imagination. Within the modern West this window reveals a recurring 
struggle of historiography against fiction, wherein the latter repeatedly appears as a challenge 
or threat to the objectivity of the former. By the late twentieth century, the humanities are 
more or less in agreement that historical writing cannot help but follow literature in its use of 
the narrative form. However, views on the function of narrative do differ, and among those 
for whom it serves as more than a cognitive device, storytelling becomes the process through 
which history itself finds some semblance of coherence. Hence, with the arrival of narrative 
theory to history, the historical imagination is explicitly folded into what de Certeau 
conceives as the operation of historiography. Or to put it more directly, specific 
representational practices and the broader traditions through which these find meaning are 
both revealed as an input into the making of history (rather than the mere writing of it). 
However, despite this increasing reflexivity, a different and distinctly practical function 
for the past remains underexplored within the new historical theory. Specifically, even though 
the category of the historical event is itself recast as the product of an ongoing and potentially 
endless series of interpretive operations, the concrete practices through which this might take 
place have been considered only in cursory or abstract-general terms. Meanwhile, within the 
historiography of world politics, theoretical debates remain structured around an exclusion of 
the very idea that an event’s historicity might hinge on how different pasts are conjured and 
put to work within a particular present. Hence, in order to build the figuration of history into 
its theory of crisis, political economy must go beyond both contemporary historical theory 
and its place within the study of world politics. Indeed, the former must begin where the latter 
two break off, approaching the recollected past as a practical resource for those seeking to 
diagnose and negotiate the apparent pathologies of an unfolding present. The next chapter 
initiates such a shift by developing a quasi-historical framework for the analysis of crisis. 
	  Chapter 3 
Towards a history of real-time crisis historiography 
There are two ways of considering events, one being to follow the course of the 
event, gathering how it comes about historically, how it’s prepared and then 
decomposes in history, while the other way is to go back into the event, to take 
one’s place in it as in a becoming, to grow both young and old in it at once, going 
through all its components or singularities. 
– Gilles Deleuze1 
The last two chapters reveal a curious asymmetry between contemporary approaches to crisis 
and history. Narrative theory has successfully underlined how an event in one present can 
only find historical meaning when grasped together with those from another, but it has failed 
to adequately consider the diversity of practices through which this might occur. New theories 
of crisis do precisely the opposite: they focus on the diverse and contested practices through 
which an unfolding event is ascribed meaning, but they have yet to address the place of the 
past within this process. Or to put it differently, while the former’s concern with the historical 
past comes at the expense of properly addressing the question of the practical past, the latter’s 
preoccupation with practical imagination comes at the expense of addressing what is truly 
historical about the intersubjective constitution of crisis.  
From the perspective of crisis theory, the challenge is to explore the ‘intra-temporality’ 
opened up by an event and begin treating bouts of interpretive struggle as something other 
than linearly related presents in time. In order to do this, it must draw on the insights of meta-
history and approach everyday practices of historical representation as a potential input into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 (Deleuze, 1995: 170-1). 
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the intersubjective constitution and discursive negotiation of crisis. By now this much should 
be clear. But because the claims of White and Ricoeur are largely developed through 
reference to complete written works of history, they are not easily translated into the domain 
of crisis theory. Moreover, the means for effecting such a translation are not readily 
identifiable within the confines of international studies, where discussions of historical 
method remain blinkered by disagreement and consensus alike. Yet it is only after something 
like this takes place that political economy can even begin to grapple with the question of how 
appeals to the past might interact with efforts to diagnose or negotiate a crisis in the present.  
The purpose of this chapter is to begin the process of translation by developing a 
method that is able to locate history within the present. The first section takes up recent calls 
for a new kind of empiricism within IPE. It finds in these a useful starting point for the 
remaking of historical method, suggesting that the concept of the practical past can be 
operationalised by approaching it as a means through which the present is experienced as 
belonging to history. It also identifies the presence of the past as a promising entry-point into 
the experience of history. The second section then focuses on the more specific question of 
how best to analyse the historical experience of crisis. It begins by suggesting that an existing 
emphasis on the media and elite actors can be retained so long as a means for finding the past 
within their respective discourses can be developed. It argues that this can be achieved by 
going ‘back into the event’ of crisis and focusing on the practices of historical representation 
at work therein. It then introduces the two methodological constructs through which such 
practices will be explored – namely, those of the ‘global financial press’ and the ‘international 
policymaking organisations’. It ends by providing a brief outline of the empirical chapters to 
follow, which focus on the period of 2007 to 2009. 
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3.1 From historical theory to the experience of history 
In a recent article, Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan (2009) argue that IPE suffers from an 
impoverished conception of the relation between empiricism and positivism. Specifically, 
they suggest that a reduction of the former to the latter can be found within both mainstream 
and critical theory, preventing either camp from recognising empiricism’s ability to guide a 
process of reflexive theory construction. While the question of historical method is not taken 
up directly, Cameron and Palan usefully indicate a possible place for empirical observation 
within the development crisis theory. Moreover, their allusion to a forgotten strand of 
empiricism indicates a body of work that does in fact provide some signposts for research 
design. These points are developed over two sub-sections. The first uses Cameron and Palan’s 
intervention to help specify a relation between empiricism and imagination, locating the 
practical past within the experience of history. The second then uses this vantage point to 
identify some basic features of a methodology fit for the further development of crisis theory. 
3.1.1 Empiricism and historicity 
According to Cameron and Palan, IPE must come to terms with its false dichotomy of 
empirical observation and critical theory.2 They develop this point through a discussion of the 
place that David Hume and Gilles Deleuze afford to the imagination within empiricism. More 
specifically, they follow Deleuze in reading Hume’s empiricism “as a philosophy of the 
imagination not a philosophy of the senses” (Deleuze, 1991/1953: 110; quoted in Cameron & 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 “Unless this is recognized we find ourselves caught between two untenable positions, both of which we take 
to be non-empiricist. One … is that data and observation are so unproblematic we can accept them as real; the 
other … that data and observation are so problematic that we must dispense with them altogether” (Cameron & 
Palan, 2009: 123). 
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Palan, 2009: 118). The category of experience remains crucial to this empiricism, but unlike 
its more familiar positivist namesake, it does not assume that sensory perceptions somehow 
provide the knowing subject with an open window onto the world. Instead, what Cameron and 
Palan term ‘critical empiricism’ begins with the recognition that such perceptions become 
meaningful only when mediated by principles of association. As Deleuze puts it: 
[E]xperience for the empiricist, and for Hume in particular, does not have this 
univocal and constitutive aspect that we give it. Experience has two senses, which 
are rigorously defined by Hume, and in neither of the senses is it constitutive. 
According to the first, if we call “experience” a collection of distinct perceptions, 
we should then recognize that relations are not derived from experience. They are 
the effect of principles of association … And if we use the word in the second 
sense, in order to denote various conjunctions of past objects, we should again 
recognize that principles do not come from experience, since, on the contrary, 
experience itself must be understood as a principle. (Deleuze, 1991/1953: 107-8) 
So for Deleuze’s Hume, empiricism underlines how experience is itself produced through the 
relations that we imagine between phenomena. And while Hume may not go as far in this 
regard, Deleuze is very much alert to the mutability of these imagined relations, seeing human 
subjectivity as emerging through shifting principles of association, rather than the principles 
themselves being rooted in an eternal human nature (cf. Hume, 1999/1748: 102-17; and 
Deleuze, 1991/1953: 85-104). For Cameron and Palan (2009: 122-5), this is where the 
strength of critical empiricism lies: it holds the hope of providing theory with a glimpse of its 
participation in the very world that it seeks to apprehend, but in its insistence on the primacy 
of observation, it also provides a check on the hubris of theory, demanding that it continually 
measure itself against the ways in which people come to experience reality as a ‘world’ in the 
first place. 
This has important implications for how the subjects of history might relate to the past. 
So far, be it with de Certeau, Ricoeur, or White, this question has been addressed primarily 
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through the operation of historiography and its associated institutions. These are surely 
important inputs into the production of a historical consciousness, but their primacy in 
historical theory is precisely what makes translating the insights of meta-history into the 
domain of political economy and its new theories of crisis so difficult. A critical empiricism 
of the sort described above provides a means of overcoming this impasse by enabling a shift 
from the books of history to the experience of those events they represent. White (2008) 
initiates such a shift in his essay on ‘The Historical Event’, but he stops short of analysing the 
practices through which associations between events might be forged in the face of their 
immediate occurrence. Deleuze’s Hume can pick up where White breaks off. Specifically, if 
experience can be grasped as something produced through principles of association, then what 
is the experience of history if not a product of associations forged between events otherwise 
disjoined by chronological time? 
This formulation does overlap with the accounts of narration provided by White and 
Ricoeur, but it also enables a clearer relationship between the practical past and the historical 
imagination to be specified. In the way that White uses it, ‘the historical imagination’ refers to 
a time-bound set of literary and cultural traditions. These traditions are seen to shape the 
historical past by influencing how histories are written, and they are also attributed an indirect 
effect on the form of the practical past. Following Deleuze’s Hume, the historical imagination 
can now be defined instead as the development and application of associative principles to 
past events. This is a thoroughly practical imagination that foregrounds our relation to the past 
as something that is necessarily forged in response to a bombardment of sensory perceptions. 
It includes the kinds of associative principles that both Hume and White see at work in 
fictional or historical narrative, but it draws attention to their role in the very experience of a 
historical event. Or to put it differently, it enables the practical past to be approached as the 
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means through which a present is experienced as belonging to history. And crucially, insofar 
as an exercise of this historical imagination by definition cannot be grasped through a priori 
reasoning, its demands an approach that would take seriously some kind of index for the 
production of historical experience. 
3.1.2 Operationalising a critical historical empiricism 
While the question of history is already implicated in the tradition of empiricism just 
identified, its methodological implications are still only beginning to become the subject of 
discussion within historical study. Here two recent varieties of critical historical empiricism 
are used to draw out some basic principles for research design. The first is of these is provided 
by Frank Ankersmit (2005), who seeks to enact an ‘intellectual empiricism’ that begins with 
the experience of the past. Hanjo Berressem (2012) provides the second in his uptake of 
Deleuze’s invitation to a ‘transcendental empiricism’. 
In his book Sublime Historical Experience, Ankersmit rues the influence of linguistic 
theory over history, charging it with having prevented the category of historical experience 
from even being recognised as something worthy of investigation. But as he himself admits, 
this critique is a double-edged sword: 
Since experience has no voice of its own, since it depends on its mortal enemy – 
language – for its expression, we have remained deaf to it up until now and 
ignorant of how if determines our relationship to the past … it will be the difficult 
but challenging future task of the historical theorist to liberate the history of 
historical experience from the heavy and oppressive weight of (the historian’s) 
language and to unearth experience from the thick sedimentary strata of language 
covering it. (Ankersmit, 2005: 14) 
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Put simply, one must still go through language in order to understand the kinds of experience 
it mediates. This much is already implicit in Deleuze’s Hume. Yet Ankersmit’s attempt to 
take up this challenge involves two useful further steps. First, he suggests that regardless of 
how we choose to ‘unearth’ historical experience, it must be guided by a focus on how this  
“may come into being by a movement comprising at the same time a discovery and a recovery 
of the past” (p. 9, emphasis in original). That is, attention must be directed towards the 
question of how different past events or histories might form the basis for a production of 
historical experience in the present.  
Ankersmit’s second step is then to suggest that the production of such an experience is 
“a stage preceding all questions of historical truth and falsity” (p. 15, emphasis in original). 
What he means here is that an idea of the past can shape experience regardless of whether it 
meets the truth criteria of historical science. After and with Ankersmit, it is possible to 
envision an approach that would take everyday representational practices as an index for the 
production of historical experience. This would involve a focus on how such representational 
practices betray a particular discovery or recovery of the past, and an attempt not to assess the 
veracity of these representations, but instead to tease out the ways in which they enable a 
present to be experienced as belonging to one kind of history rather than another. 
Having identified a possible index for the production of historical experience, what is 
now needed is a starting point for empirical observation. The above already implies that we 
begin with the presence of the past, but where are we to look for this presence? Berressem’s 
recent article on ‘Crystal History’ (2012) is useful in this respect. In it he argues that 
Deleuze’s (1994: 68) later vision of a “transcendental empiricism” provides more signposts 
for the practical historian than is commonly recognised, and among these one that he singles 
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out is the importance of adopting an approach that is “radically site-specific and ‘ecological’” 
(Berressem, 2012: 215). He continues: 
[T]o work from within a tangle of local spaces and times means to work from 
within specific local milieus; from specific sets of local circumstances “where 
writing emerges as the mnemonic preserver of this initial condition by chance 
within the interconnections of things themselves”. (2012: 215-6; quotation from 
Serres, 2000: 149) 
Berressem grounds this point in an appeal to the thought of Michel Serres, which he deals 
with at greater length earlier on in the article, but within the context of the present discussion 
its message is clear: one cannot grapple with the production of historical experience through 
language by approaching such a process in general. In order to trace out an exercise of the 
historical imagination in real-time, one must instead begin with a milieu whose world of 
experience is already produced through an operation of associative principles. Or to put it 
more simply, empirical observation must begin with a theoretically identified institutional 
sphere of some kind. 
Taken together, these points gesture toward a kind of historical methodology that would 
differ from much that has gone before. For example, such an approach would reject the idea – 
typical of narrow empiricism – that observation can reveal the ‘laws of history’, deeming this 
the height of theoretical hubris. It would also put to one side any search for the ‘truth of the 
past’, because no matter how nuanced such a search may be, it invariably ends up overlooking 
the possibility of a equally significant reappearance of that past within a later present. It 
would even differentiate itself from a properly empiricist genealogy, whose attempts to 
unearth ‘the history of the present’ also tend to bury the presence of the past (Bennett & 
Connolly, 2012: 170, en. 27). Instead, a critical historical empiricism would begin with the 
presence of the past, adopting a strategy of going ‘back into the event’; it would focus on a 
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specific milieu, asking how its inhabitants might come to experience that event as belonging 
to history; and it would it follow practice, using representations of the past an index for the 
production of this historical experience. By combining these attributes it would be able to 
serve as the vehicle for an exercise in reflexive theory-construction. 
3.2 From historical experience to the experience of crisis 
This thesis began by noting the ubiquity of past crises within debates over the financial 
turmoil of 2008. It then went to argue that crisis theory provides little assistance in going 
beyond the conventional wisdom that history has always been liable to use or abuse. With the 
outlines for a critical historical empiricism now in place, a research design fit for the further 
development of crisis theory can be identified. Broadly speaking, focus must be fixed on how 
representational practices bring past crises into the interpretive orbit of a particular present 
and enable it to be experienced as belonging to history. But an empirical exploration of this 
process still requires that both a time period and a specific milieu be decided upon. Moreover, 
a concrete method that would make such a process empirically tractable is also required. This 
section specifies both the scope and the methods that will form the basis for Parts II and III of 
the thesis. It begins by laying out the rationale behind a focus on the period of 2007-2009, and 
on the discourse of global financial elites. It then goes on to introduce the methodological 
constructs that are used to investigate this elite discourse, as well as the specific methods 
employed in this investigation. 
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3.2.1 Making space for time in the analysis of crisis 
If the aim of the empirical analysis to follow is the further development of crisis theory, then 
the existing assumptions and propositions of that theory must be built into the research 
design. As should already be clear, this is not so that these theories can be tested against some 
self-evident body of data. Rather, it is so that the crisis of 2008 might be used to shed light on 
what is implicit but also neglected within constructivist and cultural political economy 
approaches. Yet because the reasons for this neglect are in part methodological, a somewhat 
different research design is needed. Specifically, the relative emphasis on time and space must 
be inverted. 
The methodology of the new crisis theory privileges space over time. It does not set out 
to do so, but its diachronic approach ends up reducing time to a mere medium for crises and 
their discursive negotiation. This is a by product of the attempt to identify the causal influence 
of ideas over institutional change; focus invariably veers towards the interaction between 
differentially situated agents, and this obscures those temporal conjunctions that are required 
to experience an event as a crisis in the first place (§ 1.4 and § 2.3.2; see also Deeds Ermarth, 
2010). In order to counteract this tendency, the diachronic must be placed within the 
synchronic. This may seem paradoxical, but by relinquishing an attempt to follow the course 
of a crisis and instead going back into it, the diachronic aspects of historical representation 
can be approached as an integral dimension of crisis. Hence, the kind of questions that are 
needed do not take the form: ‘How have representations of the Great Depression changed 
since the global financial crisis of 2008?’ Instead, one must ask how past crises have been 
represented during the turmoil of 2008. 
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Of course, a strictly synchronic or static approach is not appropriate. This is because the 
episodic dimension of crisis as an idea means that experiencing an event as a crisis must itself 
occur over time – or to put it differently, there must be an iterativity to the exercise of 
historical imagination if the experience it produces is to be one of crisis (see § 1.1.1). For this 
reason the diachronic dimension of historical representation should be explored within a 
chronological ‘window’. In the empirical analysis to follow, this window will span from 
January 2007 to December 2009. This period has been chosen because it is short enough to 
allow an in-depth exploration of representational practice, but also sufficiently wide to capture 
what are conventionally understood as key stages in the evolution of the crisis. Specifically, it 
will enable practices of historical representation to be analysed during the onset of financial 
turmoil, as well as in the midst of crisis management efforts and the policy debates they 
prompt. These stages are theoretically implicated in constructivist and cultural political 
approaches to crisis, and so an empirical investigation must include them if it is to aid in the 
task of theory-construction.  
This is also the rationale behind a focus on the discourse of global financial elites. 
Within each branch of the new crisis theory, a slightly different response is given to the 
question of whose discourse matters. Uncertainty constructivism has traditionally emphasised 
elite actors, suggesting that their attempts to make sense of crisis are decisive in shaping any 
subsequent institutional change. This entails a focus on policymakers and technocrats 
operating from within different contexts, and an attempt to analyse the process of ‘inter-elite 
persuasion’ (see Blyth, 2007; cf. Seabrooke, 2007a). Meanwhile, constructivist 
institutionalism begins with an emphasis on the press, arguing that media narratives are 
crucial in shaping debates over the policy response to crisis (Hay, 1996; 1999). Finally, 
cultural political economy suggests that actors from a variety of different sites and scales take 
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part in the hegemonic struggle over crisis, including government officials, international 
technocrats, public intellectuals, journalists, and so on (see Jessop & Sum, 2006b). In order to 
keep open the possibility of contributing to any one these theoretical approaches, both policy 
and media discourse will be analysed. However, heeding Berressem’s counsel that an 
empirical approach be site-specific and ecological, focus is fixed on a small number of 
discursive spaces that can be plausibly construed as entangled. These are identified using 
Jessop’s (2004) discussion of the genre-chains that link together different spheres of 
economic discourse (see also Fairclough, 2006: 27-38). Specifically, the empirical analysis 
focuses on the public discourse of five policy-related organisations (referred to as 
‘international policymaking organisations), and the commentary of four specialist financial 
newspapers or magazines (the ‘global financial press’). 
The final key methodological decision is to bracket-off questions of causality, structural 
determination, or the relation between discourse and materiality. The reasons for this are 
hinted at in the discussion of diachronism provided above. Specifically, to trace the causal 
interaction between (extra-) discursive structures is a task in its own, which so far has 
prevented an exploration of how the historical imagination might produce different 
experiences of crisis. This is problematic because these different experiences of crisis might 
themselves be important to the kinds of institutional transformations that crisis theory seeks to 
understand. In order to address this oversight, the analysis of elite discourse undertaken here 
will focus only on how past crises figure within those historical representations that are 
produced between 2007 and 2009. It does not ask whether or how these representations 
influence a process of structural transformation, and it does not seek to explain them in terms 
of the structures from which they emanate. It does not even ask whether these representations 
are factually accurate in terms of their singular existential statements. Instead, it asks what 
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might be gained by leaving these questions to one side, at least as an initial step in the broader 
process of theory development. 
For these reasons, what follows should not be treated as a historical analysis of crisis 
that focuses on the role of representation therein. It is better to think of it as a history of real-
time crisis historiography, whose aim is to help uncover how portrayals of past crises might 
interact with one another and inform ongoing attempts to establish the meaning and 
significance of a crisis in the present. This quasi-historical approach is taken forward by 
focusing on the period of 2007 to 2009, and in particular on how past crises figure within the 
public discourse of global financial elites. This broad category of discourse is rendered 
empirically tractable through two methodological constructs, which are together intended to 
capture the ‘tangle of local spaces’ through which a particular experience of crisis is 
produced.  These are introduced in the following sections, as is the method used to find the 
past within the present. 
3.2.2 International policymaking organisations 
The first methodological construct that this thesis employs is that of the ‘international 
policymaking organisations’. It is used to grasp together five agencies that are implicated in 
the making of policies relevant to the workings of global finance. Each performs a different 
role in the policymaking process, and this reflects their institutional status as governmental 
ministries, independent technocratic bodies, international organisations, or club-based fora. 
These five organisations are the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the European 
Central Bank (ECB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the US Federal Reserve Bank 
(US FRB), and the US Treasury (US Treasury). 
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The reasons behind this selection are twofold. The first is to capture some of the variety 
through which financial policymaking and its attendant debates take shape. Only the ECB and 
the US FRB are comparable in their responsibility for monetary policymaking, but both send 
delegates to the conferences and workshops organised by the BIS, which acts as club for the 
world’s central bankers. Meanwhile, as the equivalent of a ministry of finance and economics, 
the US Treasury sends officials to attend meetings and vote in the proceedings of the IMF. 
Finally, both the IMF and the BIS undertake and disseminate research on the global economic 
outlook, offering expert opinions on the kinds of policies and regulations being pursued or 
enacted by each other and their respective members. Hence, when taken together these five 
organisations provide a way into the ‘tangle of local spaces’ through which global finance is 
managed. 
The second reason is more specific to the period in question. Because the financial 
turmoil of 2008 was triggered by a collapse in America’s housing market, its monetary 
authority the FRB enacted the first major policy responses. Its Treasury then provided the 
subsequent bailouts for those global banks registered within the US. There is therefore good 
reason to focus on these two organisations rather than the central banks of finance ministries 
of other nation states. However, because the complexity of global finance is such that its 
dynamics are not coterminous with national jurisdictions, there is also reason to focus on a 
broader range of organisations. Here the ECB is chosen on the basis that in addition to its 
monetary policymaking role, it is also responsible for regulating and supervising the world’s 
second largest integrated financial market. Meanwhile, the role of the BIS in coordinating 
efforts at international bank supervision has seen it thrust centre stage by debates over 
regulation during the crisis. Finally, the IMF has reassumed its role of lender of last resort to 
states that cannot afford the fire-fighting measures they seek to enact in response to crisis. 
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Thus, in addition to being theoretically implicated in the management of global finance, all 
five organisations have also been crucial to the conduct of such management during the crisis 
of 2008. 
Of course, a leap must now be made from the organisations themselves to a discourse 
within which practices of historical representation can be identified and explored. The 
approach adopted here is to focus on the public discourse of these organisations. This means 
that the their respective organisational cultures or internal processes do not figure as an object 
of analysis. Or to borrow and invert the title of a recent special issue, the aim is not to ‘see 
like an international organisation’ (Broome & Seabrooke, 2012); rather, it is to explore the 
shape of such an organisation’s ‘outward-looking face’. This is in keeping with the decision 
to annex questions of causality and focus instead on approaching representational practice as 
an index for the production of historical experience. Put simply, the question of interest is not 
whether a public pronouncement was subject to some prior process of internal debate; the 
pronouncement itself partakes in an intertext, and it is place of the past within this intertext 
that forms the object of analysis.  
Finally, of the various forms that these public pronouncements take, a decision is made 
to focus on speeches and statements made by senior officials from the organisations in 
question. The reasons behind this are again twofold. The first reason stems from a seemingly 
practical discovery – namely, that more technical forms of discourse do not provide much 
scope for an improvised (re-) discovery of the past. This is in fact a theoretically significant 
point, and it will be taken up again in a later discussion of economic historiography (§ 11.1.2). 
But for the present purposes, it should suffice to say that while all five organisations do 
publish policy documents, annual reports, or research papers, these are not examined, and this 
is because their very register tends to suppress the presence of the past. 
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The second reason for focusing on speeches and statements is that they are addressed to 
a range of different audiences, and frequently include comments relating to ongoing events. 
This enables them to serve as a real-time index for the kinds of historical representations that 
organisational representatives contribute to a wider discourse surrounding crisis. The kinds of 
representatives chosen for each organisation are indicated in the table below, as are the 
number of speeches or statements from these that are analysed. The corpus as a whole 
consists of 572 public pronouncements made between January 2007 and December 2009. 
Organisation      Type of representative/number of statements or speeches ∑ 
BIS      Management: 35 speeches 35 
ECB      President/Vice-Presidents: 86 speeches; Board Members: 78 speeches 164 
IMF      Management: 94 speeches 94 
US FRB      Board of Governors: 138 speeches 138 
US Treasury      Officials: 75 speeches; 66 statements 141 
 
 
Figure 3.1   Overview of corpus for the international policymaking organisations   (Source: Author’s own) 
The basic rationale for including speeches and statements in the corpus is that they in 
some way address the ongoing financial turmoil. A complete list of the texts that comprise 
this corpus can be found in the bibliography. However, a brief comment is warranted here on 
the obvious difference in the number of texts examined for each organisation. In particular, 
the number of texts included for analysis from the BIS is markedly lower than for any other 
organisation. The reason for this is that, as a club for the world’s central bankers, the BIS has 
both a smaller staff and public profile in comparison to the other organisations. Its core staff 
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also specialise in producing the kind of research reports that for reasons described above have 
been excluded from the present analysis. Yet this does not pose the problem it normally 
would, because there is no attempt to draw causal inferences about the relative power of 
pronouncements made by different organisations. Instead, the focus is on the form and 
content of those representations contained within their respective pronouncements. And given 
the roles of the BIS described at the beginning of this section, there is reason enough to 
explore its practices of historical representation regardless of whether there are a great number 
of them. 
3.2.3 The global financial press 
The second methodological construct that this thesis employs is that of the ‘global financial 
press’. In keeping with the approach outlined above, its purpose is to grasp together a small 
number of what can plausibly be construed as influential publications within the world of 
financial journalism. Specifically, the category is used to designate four publications that 
specialise in providing a steady source of information and commentary on global finance. 
These are The Economist (Economist), The Financial Times (FT), Forbes Magazine (Forbes), 
and The Wall Street Journal (WSJ). 
The basic rationale behind this selection is to capture how journalism mediates between 
financial market dynamics and their apprehension. Although all four publications are different 
from one another in a range of ways, each is based in a major international financial centre 
and has syndication networks that target other hubs of high finance. Their coverage is 
explicitly devoted to financial market developments and the various factors that might 
influence these, such as macroeconomic trends, shifts in public policy, and debates over 
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financial regulation or supervision. They all therefore address an audience of readers either 
involved or interested in the workings of global finance. Moreover, they provide a key link 
between these readers and the world of the international policymaking organisations, whose 
actions and pronouncements are reported and commented upon by financial journalists. In 
these ways, the four publications can together be taken as a realm of appearance through 
which an experience of finance is produced. 
Another reason for the selecting these publications stems from the differences between 
them alluded to above. These take a number of forms. Most obviously, there are notable 
differences between the four titles in terms of their format, nominal home nation, and 
frequency of publication. For example, while the Economist is a London based weekly 
magazine, the WSJ is a New York based daily newspaper (see table below). 
 Economist FT Forbes WSJ 
Home print edition UK UK US US 
Publication format Magazine Newspaper Magazine Newspaper 
Publication frequency Weekly Daily Bi-weekly Daily 
 
 
Figure 3.2         Differences between global financial publications   (Source: Author’s own) 
There are also important differences in terms of editorial policy and general ideological 
disposition. For example, while the FT is known to occasionally take a positive view of 
certain regulatory proposals, Forbes consistently espouses what is an explicit distrust of state 
intervention in almost all its forms. And although the Economist operates with a policy of 
anonymity, presenting its commentary from a position of carefully constructed editorial 
coherence, the WSJ includes regular and guest columnists whose views sometimes directly 
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contradict one another. These are important differences. But rather than posing some kind of 
challenge to research design, they are in fact potentially productive sources of variation. 
Specifically, because they may either enable or underpin quite distinct practices of historical 
representation, they together yield a corpus whose texts are more likely to produce new 
insights into the nexus of crisis and history. 
 In terms of the article selection, a deliberate focus is placed on comment or opinion 
pieces. The reason for this is similar – albeit far less interesting – to the one that underpinned 
the decision not to include research reports in the organisations’ corpus. Put simply, opinion 
pieces provide more space for the creative deployment of past crises than ‘hard’ or descriptive 
news articles do. This is not to say that the latter cannot contain elements of narrative 
discourse; rather, it is to make a decision informed by the aim of producing a corpus that 
contains as many discussions of past crises as possible. The table below indicates the types of 
articles that are focused on for each publication, along with the number of texts analysed 
within each category. The corpus as a whole consists of 1,085 articles published between 
January 2007 and December 2009. 
Economist Forbes FT WSJ 
 
Leaders = 154 
Briefings = 54 
Special Reports = 65 
 
_______   
∑ = 273 
 
Current Events = 43 
Fact & Comment = 71  
Columns  = 79 
                        
_______ 
∑ = 194 
 
Editorial = 82 
Editorial Comment = 191 
Column [Martin Wolf]  = 62 
Column [Gillian Tett] = 50    
 _______ 
∑ = 385 
 
Editorial = 36 
Commentary = 198 
 
      
_______ 
∑ = 234 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Overview of corpus for the global financial press    (Source: Author’s own) 
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The criterion used for including texts is again that they in some way address the 
ongoing financial turmoil. A complete list of the texts included in this corpus can be found in 
the bibliography, but what should already be clear from the table above is that the categories 
differ between publications in a way that reflects the idiosyncrasies of their respective 
formats. Also, in the case of the Forbes and the FT, editorial content is supplemented by the 
inclusion of regular columnists. The wager, however, is the same – namely, that through an 
analysis of the place that the past occupies within this body of texts, we might gain insight 
into the imaginary institution of historicity. 
3.3 Outline: Histories of global financial crisis, 2007-2009 
The empirical analysis is spread over the next two parts of the thesis. Part II focuses on the 
discourse of the international policymaking organisations, and Part III on that of the global 
financial press. In both cases the qualitative data analysis software NVivo8 is used as a coding 
and sorting device. It is used differently at each stage in a three-step procedure. 
First, a preliminary and manual reading of all texts is undertaken, enabling any 
reference to a past crisis to be coded no matter how that crisis may be named. This coding 
then forms the basis for a second round of reading, which focuses on those past crises that are 
revealed through step one to be the most frequently invoked. Here the first set of codes are 
supplemented with a second, which are used to sort references into categories – for example, a 
reference to the Great Depression that concerns monetary policy, financial regulation, or 
international trade. Finally, a third round of chronological reading organised through these 
codes is used to write a history of real-time crisis historiography.  
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Parts II and III are both prefaced by a short introduction. This includes a table that 
summarises the results from the preliminary reading. It also provides more detail on those 
themes through which the chronological reading is organised, as well as on the structure of 
the quasi-history to follow. Part IV reflects on what these quasi-histories might reveal about 
the crisis of 2008, and then goes on to develop some new analytical categories for crisis 
theory. 
 
	  Part II 
Past crises and the international policymaking organisations 
We are all, together, writing the history of crisis management as we speak. 
– Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB1 
It was on Tuesday the 7th of October 2008, at the inaugural World Policy Conference in 
Evian, that Jean-Claude Trichet issued these words to an audience of finance ministers, heads 
of state, policy experts, and senior officials from international organisations. Only a day 
before, Angela Merkel had announced the rescue of one of Germany’s biggest banks, and a 
mere day later, Gordon Brown would announce his plan for the recapitalisation of British and 
UK-based financial institutions. Trichet therefore spoke amidst a frantic search for policy 
solutions, and his words underscore the novelty of these efforts at crisis management. 
However, in his commentary on such initiatives, Trichet finds recourse to a range of prior 
crises, and many of these appear in an entirely new light. The ‘writing’ to which he refers is 
therefore, in an important respect, also a rewriting. It is the contours of this rewriting that 
form the focus for the following chapters. More concretely, they focus on how various past 
crises have figured within the pronouncements of the five international policymaking 
organisations. The results from the preliminary readings are summarised in the table below. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 (Quoted in Peel, 2008). 
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 IMF BIS ECB US FRB 
US 
TREASURY 
∑ 
1930s Great Depression 16 2 22 14 13 67 
1997-98 Asian crisis 14 7 22 6 6 55 
2001 dotcom crash 1 6 15 11 1 34 
Unspecified crises -- 1 13 8 10 32 
1970s OECD crises 2 3 19 2 -- 26 
1990s crises 3 6 9 4 3 25 
1990s Japanese crisis 3 4 8 7 3 25 
1997-98 other crises 2 3 2 9  3 19 
1980s S&L crisis 1 1 -- 12 2 16 
Pre-1930 crises 1 1 2 10 2 16 
Multiple crises 1 3 3 3 5 15 
1980s debt crisis 3 2 5 1 1 12 
1987 stock market crash -- -- -- 9 1 10 
1990s Scandinavian crises 2 - 1 -- 1 4  
1994-95 Mexican crisis 1 2 1 -- -- 4 
1992 ERM crisis -- 1 2 -- -- 3 
 
Figure II     Past crises mentioned by international policymaking organisations     (Source: Author’s own)2 
 
Quite clearly, the Great Depression is the most widely invoked past crisis during the 
2007-2009 period. Other episodes that frequently appear within the pronouncements of the 
international policymaking organisations include a string of more recent crises, such as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The table above records the number of different speeches in which the specified past crises are invoked 
during the 2007-2009 period, rather than counting the total number of times that they are mentioned in these. 
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developed-country crises of the 1970s, the Japanese crisis of the 1990s, and the Dotcom crash 
of 2001. Moreover, in addition to these prior episodes, we also find quite a large number of 
appeals to unspecified past crises. However, alongside the Great Depression, it is the Asian 
crisis of 1997-98 that serves as the other primary historical touchstone or reference point. 
Given the relative prominence of these two past crises, both will be discussed at length. But 
with regards to the other past crises, a different rationale underpins the focus of analysis. 
Specifically, a decision is made to focus on two other past crises that have each been invoked 
more by one organisation than any of the others. These are the crisis of the 1970s and the 
Savings-and-Loans (S&L) crisis of the late 1980s. 
In terms of their structure, each chapter adopts the same basic approach, which is to 
begin with a specific past episode and then trace how its meanings evolve through the 
temporal envelope of the 2007-2009 crisis. Chapter 4 begins by focusing on appeals to the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. It finds that although the 1930s are consistently invoked in 
ways that reveal the dangers of protectionism, these portrayals also co-exist with others that 
focus on different aspects of the period, and which in turn produce historical narratives and 
lessons that are not shared by all five organisations. Specifically, while the IMF uses the 
Depression to develop a story about the origins of multilateralism that is later taken up by 
three other organisations, both the US FRB and the ECB also use the 1930s to develop 
competing accounts of the relation between regulation and financial innovation. In addition to 
this, the Great Depression is also incorporated into a more specific debate over policy, with 
organisations drawing competing lessons regarding the proper use of monetary tools during 
both normal and extraordinary times. 
Chapter 5 then focuses on two different past episodes: the stagflation of the 1970s and 
the S&L crisis of the late 1980s. It finds that while a variety of organisations do turn to the 
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1970s, the ECB is the only one to do so frequently, and for it the episode consistently serves 
as a lesson in the enduring importance of inflation control. Conversely, although the US FRB 
is more or less alone in invoking the S&L crisis, its portrayals of that episode instead yield a 
diverse set of claims regarding issues ranging from crisis management to financial regulation 
and monetary policy. Finally, Chapter 6 focuses on appeals to the Asian crisis of 1997-98. It 
finds that while all five organisations do invoke the episode as a kind of historical turning 
point, it actually occupies this position within three distinct narratives. Specifically, while the 
Asian crisis is initially incorporated into a shared story about the shortcomings of domestic 
institutional arrangements, it is later recast by the ECB as the birth of a new and much-needed 
multilateralism. Meanwhile, in what eventually becomes another shared historical narrative, it 
is also cast by the FRB as a point of origin for the ongoing financial turmoil itself. 
 
 
	  Chapter 4 
The Great Depression of the 1930s 
The crisis of the 1930s is typically construed as a critical moment in the evolution of the 
world economy. Whether it is the expiration of British hegemony and the undoing of laissez-
faire, or the rise of Keynesianism and the birth of a new embedded liberalism, most scholars 
identify some kind of transformation that has had lasting structural impact (cf. Kindleberger, 
1973; Polanyi, 2001/1944; Trachtenberg, 1983; and Ruggie, 1982). In this way, the Great 
Depression is routinely presented and accepted as a historical event. But if a quality unique to 
the properly historical event is that it reappears in some other present (see White, 2008: 26-
30), then the relevant question to ask is that of exactly how the Great Depression reappears 
during the crisis of 2007-2009. More specifically, in what form and through which voices 
does it reappear, and what is the content of this form? This section takes up these questions by 
focusing on precisely how the 1930s have been invoked over the course of the crisis. 
As we have seen, the Great Depression has been the most frequently mentioned past 
crisis, accounting for almost 20% of the references to past crises made during the period in 
question.1 These references have been spread relatively evenly across four of the five 
organisations under study, suggesting that the event’s reappearance has been a general or 
widespread phenomenon. But as the column chart on the following page indicates, it is also 
possible to identify two broad sub-periods into which these references fall. First, there is the 
period running from early 2007 through to September 2008, during which references to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Between 2007 and 2009, the Great Depression is referred to in a total of 67 speeches: the ECB invokes it on 
22 separate occasions, the IMF on 16, the US FRB on 14, the US Treasury on 13, and the BIS on 2 (see Figure 
II). 
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Great Depression are occasional, although slightly more concentrated in mid-2008. And 
second, there is the period from October 2008 onwards, during which the references are more 
numerous and frequent, reaching a peak in mid-2009.  
 
Figure 4  References to the 1930s Great Depression, 2007-2009 (Source: Author’s own) 
 
Upon closer examination, it soon becomes clear that the majority of these new 
references consist in analogies with the scope and the scale of the Great Depression. The IMF 
is the first to draw the comparison in June of 2008, and it is soon followed by the US FRB a 
month later, but by the time the collapse of Lehman Brothers had begun to affect economic 
growth rates, many officials were opening their speeches by alluding to “the most severe and 
synchronised economic downturn since the 1930s” (Stark, 25 July 2009).2 Hence, rather than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For comments along these lines from the IMF, see Nsouli (26 June 2008), Sayeh (6 November 2008) and 
Kato (29 May 2009). For those from the US FRB, see Mishkin (2 July 2008), Bernanke (10 March 2009, 14 
April 2009, and 21 July 2009); and Tarullo (8 October 2009). For the US Treasury, see Monaco (2 February 
2009), Barr (15 June 2009 and 1 October 2009), and Wolin (24 September 2009). For the ECB, see Papademos 
(26 March 2009), Tumpel-Gugerell (6 May 2009, 19 May 2009, 16 June 2009, 21 September 2009 and 16 
October 2009), and Stark (8 June 2009, 25 July 2009 and 15 September 2009). For the BIS, see Caruana (29 
June 2009). 
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using the episode to draw specific lessons and/or write substantive histories, these references 
would at first sight seem to serve as a vague preface to technical policy discussion, wherein 
their primary function is to convey the sheer magnitude of the challenge facing policymakers. 
But to stop at such an inference would be to overlook how references of this sort are woven 
into discussions about crisis prevention, management and resolution. Moreover, whilst some 
such references do consist of simple (counter-) analogies with the scale and scope of the 
policy response to crisis, they still in fact occupy a crucial place within the arguments and 
narratives that are crafted by the international policymaking organisations. The remainder of 
this chapter provides an analysis of these basic patterns by focusing on three prominent 
themes within discussions of the Great Depression – namely, the relationship between 
monetary policy and financial stability, the role of international policy coordination, and the 
question of financial regulation. 
4.1 Price stability, financial stability and monetary policy 
The earliest references to the Great Depression are those that concern monetary policy, and 
right from the outset there are two opposing readings of the episode in this light. On the one 
hand, there is that offered by the US FRB, which suggests that the stock market crash of 
October 1929 was caused by the monetary tightening that preceded it (Mishkin, 17 January 
2007). This is a familiar reading of the 1930s that was first developed by Milton Friedman, 
and it is deployed here to counsel against the use of interest rates to pre-emptively deflate 
asset price bubbles (see Friedman & Schwartz, 1963). Thus, for the FRB, the experience of 
the Great Depression once again serves as a general lesson for policymakers about the 
dangers of monetary activism. On the other hand, though, the BIS deploys a portrayal of the 
1930s that yields an entirely different lesson for the conduct of monetary policy. Specifically, 
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only a day after the FRB’s appeal to the crash of 1929, the BIS recalls how this event was in 
fact preceded by a low rate of inflation (Knight, 18 January 2007). In so doing, it effectively 
uses the Depression of the 1930s in order to illustrate the potential shortcomings of a 
monetary policy regime oriented exclusively towards price stability. In its place, it argues, 
policymakers should instead begin using interest rates to pursue financial stability too. Hence, 
during the run-up to crisis in early 2007, the FRB and the BIS draw entirely different policy 
lessons from their recollections of the very same episode. 
Such references do persist throughout 2007, but it is as problems in the market for 
subprime mortgages begin to spill over into both US and global financial markets that they 
are taken up again with some frequency. During mid-2008, for example, the FRB uses the 
Great Depression to reiterate its earlier story about the monetary sources of the ongoing crisis 
(Mishkin, 15 May 2008). At around the same time, the ECB also enters the fray, offering a 
series of readings that hover somewhere between the two positions described above. Initially, 
its position is much closer to that of the BIS, for it effectively uses the episode to illustrate 
how price stability need not necessarily guarantee financial stability (see Smaghi, 4 April 
2008). The implicit lesson is therefore that monetary policymakers might do well to ‘lean 
against’ upward movements in asset prices. By the end of the 2008, however, it appears to 
have shifted closer to the position of the FRB. Specifically, much like its US counterpart, the 
ECB now also places its emphasis on the role of premature policy tightening in 1929, and 
adds to this another such move in 1936, which it suggests only delayed recovery further (see 
Smaghi, 25 November 2008; cf. Stark, 4 September 2009). In this way, then, as the crisis 
deepens around it, the ECB moves decisively towards a reading of the Depression that joins 
the FRB in underlining the potential fallout of any ‘misguided’ monetary activism.  
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Finally, in the immediate wake of the bailouts and co-ordinated interest rate cuts of late 
2008, the US Treasury joins the ECB by emphasising the damaging role of monetary policy 
during rather before the Depression. Specifically, it too uses the story of premature tightening 
in order to argue against a hasty wind-back of existing efforts at monetary accommodation 
(Geithner, 10 February 2009). The Great Depression is in this way embroiled in broader 
debate about the proper use of monetary policy. For the US FRB and then both the ECB and 
the US Treasury after it, expansionary activism is implicitly endorsed through references to 
premature tightening, while this itself is later used to underline the importance of sustaining 
rather than reining-back recent monetary bailouts. For the BIS, however, the 1930s are used to 
draw a more general lesson about the inadequacy of inflation-control, and to highlight the 
potential role for a counter-cyclical monetary policy in preventing future financial excesses. 
We will return to this debate in our discussion of the S&L episode, which the FRB also uses 
to address the question of monetary activism (see § 5.2). 
4.2 Trade, exchange rates and international cooperation 
Another theme that emerges through appeals to the 1930s is that of international cooperation. 
References of this sort appear as early as mid-2007, when the IMF cautions against a repeat of 
the “narrow nationalism that characterised the Depression era”, but given its timing this is 
clearly directed at stalled trade negotiations rather than various responses to global economic 
crisis (De Rato, 19 July 2007).3 The same could be said of the ECB’s intervention in mid-
2008, which uses the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 in order to illustrate the self-defeating 
effects of trade protectionism, and that of the US Treasury in early 2008, which also makes a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In mid-2007 a truly global crisis had of course yet to fully unfold. 
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similar point (cf. Smaghi, 15 May 2008; and McCormick, 25 February 2008). By late 2008, 
however, lessons of this sort begin being drawn in explicit relation to the intensifying 
financial turmoil. 
The first to do this is the IMF, which argues in October that economic nationalism was 
not just a consequence but also a cause of the depression, going on to stress the importance of 
a multilateral response to the ongoing crisis (Strauss-Kahn, 13 October 2008). The US 
Treasury and the ECB soon follow suit, focusing primarily on tariff-barriers (cf. Sobel, 2 
December 2008; Smaghi, 9 December 2008); and by mid-2009 the 1930s are being routinely 
employed in the service of free-trade principles.4 Thus, it would seem fair to say that the crisis 
of the 2007-2009 does not appear to have triggered any shift in how these organisations view 
the trade issues of the 1930s. In keeping with classic narrative accounts of that period, the 
Depression seems to have functioned to undermine the idea of protectionism and protect the 
idea of open markets.5 Paraphrase that 1960s pop hit and the technocrats’ chorus might ring a 
bell: ‘What the world needs now, is trade, sweet trade’. 
Elsewhere it is possible to observe more subtle practices of historical interpretation at 
work. For example, at the same time as they speak of trade barriers, both the ECB and the US 
Treasury – along with the IMF – also focus on the role of competitive currency devaluations 
during the 1930s (cf. Smaghi, 6 April 2009; Strauss-Kahn, 23 April 2009; and Geithner, 31 
May 2009). And whilst these too are linked to conventional lessons about the errors of 
economic nationalism, they also feed into a different set of lessons and stories about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 More than any other organisation, it is the IMF that continues to invoke the 1930s in this way. For example, 
see Strauss-Kahn (23 April 2009, 23 September 2009 and 6 October 2009). 
5 For example, see Kindleberger (1973) and Temin (1989), which both place great emphasis on protectionism 
and the drying up of world trade as a driver of economic collapse. Interestingly, such general and 
undifferentiated accounts of a “slide into protectionism” have been challenged by recent studies that emphasise 
cross-country variation in both the timing and the form of such trade-related measures, as well as question their 
relative contribution to the collapse in world trade (Eichengreen & Irwin, 2010; see also Madsen, 2001). 
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international cooperation and policy coordination. In December of 2008, for example, both 
the IMF and ECB interpret recent financial sector developments through the lens of the 
1930s. The IMF, on the one hand, depicts the recent rush to provide deposit guarantees for 
financial institutions as a classic ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policy (Lipsky, 17 December 2008), 
while the ECB instead stresses a lack of trust between different financial systems and the 
effect that this is having on trade finance (Smaghi, 9 December 2008).6 But what both end up 
doing is engineering a kind of historical short circuit between the trade protectionism of the 
past and the financial protectionism of the present. Put simply: If the former did not work, 
then why should the latter? 
The effect of this short-circuiting is to augment traditional conceptions of international 
policy collaboration. Through a celebration of the unprecedented measures enacted in the face 
of crisis, the notion of economic multilateralism in fact undergoes a profound transformation 
at the hands of the international policymaking organisations in general, and the IMF in 
particular. Rather than simply a question of tariffs and exchange rates, it becomes more 
explicitly linked to the domains of monetary, fiscal and even financial sector policy; and 
rather than simply a task for the established clubs and Bretton Woods institutions, it is now 
also entrusted to new fora like the G20. There are two key steps in this process. 
The first of these involves recruiting novel policy responses in a counter-analogy with 
the 1930s. This begins in October 2008 with the IMF praising the use of unorthodox 
measures, and emphasising the need keep nationalist reflexes at bay (Strauss-Kahn, 13 
October 2008). It then goes on to argue in December – along with the ECB – that these might 
need to be coordinated in order to be effective (Lipsky, 17 December 2008; cf. Smaghi, 9 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For the IMF’s later comments on this subject, see Strauss-Kahn (7 February 2009) and Belka (24 March 
2009). 
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December 2008). By early 2009, its position crystallises into a call for “a coordinated global 
response” (Strauss-Kahn, 7 February 2009). And as crisis-response efforts continue to 
develop, more and more of its references to 1930s – along with those of the US Treasury and 
FRB – contrast that episode with the comprehensive cooperation of the present.7 Coordinated 
interest-rate cuts, central bank liquidity swaps and simultaneous fiscal stimulus packages – all 
of which are unprecedented, we are reminded – are in this way taken to signify a new form 
(and content) of cooperation. 
The second step then involves using these new cooperative measures to rewrite the story 
of multilateralism. The first such efforts are made by the US Treasury, and while these 
consistently involve depicting the Great Depression as the justification and motivating force 
behind the creation of the Bretton Woods system, these focus almost exclusively on the 
lessons learnt about competitive devaluations and tariff wars (see McCormick, 5 February 
2008; and Sobel, 2 December 2008). By mid-2009, however, ‘green-shoots’ of recovery 
prompt a search for the origins of what is seen to be a new and apparently effective paradigm 
for crisis-response and management. Interestingly, it is the IMF that takes the lead here, re-
reading the 1930s as the moment in which its present-day purpose first emerged: 
One of the key lessons of the Great Depression was that a lack of cooperation and 
a retreat to isolationism can make things dramatically worse … The IMF was born 
in Bretton Woods, forged in the furnace of this multilateral idealism, and endowed 
with a mandate to oversee the global financial system and to act as a lender of last 
resort to members with balance of payments needs … It stands right at the heart of 
macroeconomic and financial sector policy coordination … Over sixty years later, 
although the contours of the world financial system would be unrecognizable to 
the Bretton Woods delegates, the IMF remains as central as ever. But it took the 
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression for this to be made manifest. 
(Strauss-Kahn, 23 April 2009) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See Strauss-Kahn (15 May 2009), Geithner (31 May 2009), Lipsky (26 June 2009), Kato (3 July 2009), 
Bernanke (15 September 2009), and Geithner (6 October 2009). 
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It then goes on, as we have seen, to celebrate the unprecedented degree of policy 
coordination that has been undertaken. But in addition to this, it also goes on in later months 
to link this to the ascent of the G20, which it now depicts as central to the success of global 
governance going forward: 
In the face of crisis, countries came together to face common challenges with 
common solutions, focusing on the global common good … This collaboration 
encompassed more countries than ever before in history – showing us that in our 
modern globalized world, responsibility for the economic policy agenda can no 
longer rest with a small club of countries. The crisis heralded the ascent of the G20 
– a group that includes the dynamic emerging economies – as the leading vehicle 
of multilateral cooperation. (Strauss-Kahn, 23 October 2009)8 
In this way, then, the Great Depression and the global downturn that began in 2008 no 
longer appear as unrelated presents in time. They have become events in the same series. In 
fact, the narrative that emerges in late 2009 has a quasi-Hegelian tone. The 1930s are depicted 
not simply as the trigger for the creation of the International Monetary Fund, but also as the 
birth of the multilateral spirit more generally; and ongoing attempts to forge a more extensive 
and inclusive form of international economic cooperation are taken to signify nothing less 
than the ongoing evolution of that spirit. This theme will be taken up again in our discussion 
of the Asian crisis (§ 6.2). 
4.3 Under-regulation, deregulation and financial innovation 
The final theme to emerge in discussions that invoke the 1930s is that of financial regulation. 
References of this sort first appear in March 2008 when the US Treasury, reflecting on the 
dilemmas posed by the collapse of Bear Stearns, comments of the Federal Reserve’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See also Strauss-Kahn, (15 May 2009, 23 September 2009, 6 October 2009, and 23 October 2009). For 
similar comments from the US Treasury, see Geithner (31 May 2009) and Geithner & Sobel (6 October 2009). 
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subsequent provision of liquidity to primary dealers. “[S]uch direct lending from the central 
bank to non-depository institutions”, it reminds us, “has not occurred in the United States 
since the 1930s” (Paulson, 26 March 2008).9 But rather than functioning as a mere counter-
precedent, the Glass-Steagall Act and the period it inaugurated are also woven into a number 
of different stories about the evolution of financial regulation. 
The first of these concerns the American regulatory system and is developed by the US 
Treasury. Shortly after the Bears Stearns rescue, the Treasury describes this system as a 
“patchwork” of federal and state level bodies that have been grafted on to a basic structure 
laid down after the Great Depression (Paulson, 31 March 2008). It then goes on to focus on 
the inadequacies of this system in terms of its emergency resolution procedures, arguing that 
the most recent crisis has revealed a lack of provisions for the support of non-bank financial 
institutions such as investment banks (see Paulson, 26 March 2009; and Nason, 28 April 
2008). Specifically, it suggests that there has been a revolutionary change in the nature of the 
financial system, and that this has left the Federal Reserve with “neither the statutory 
authority nor the mandate to anticipate and deal with risks across entire financial system” 
(Paulson, 19 June 2008).10 In this way, then, the Treasury identifies a kind of revealed 
regulatory shortcoming, which it in turn traces back to a failure of old Depression-era 
approaches to keep pace with changes in financial market practice. What remains unspecified 
at this point, however, is the cause of these financial transformations. 
In some ways, though, the cause is already implied, and it is financial innovation in the 
broadest sense. During early 2008, for example, the US Treasury reels off a list of symptoms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 A year later the ECB makes this same point, see González-Páramo (6 February 2009). 
10 The FRB makes some statements to this effect in early 2009, arguing that the failure of Bear Stearns and 
AIG might have caused a 1930s-style collapse, and that this itself justifies a review of existing emergency 
resolution procedures. See Bernanke (24 March and 14 April 2009), and Kohn (18 April 2009). 
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or characteristics of this new finance, citing “the diversity of market participants”, 
“innovation”, the “complexity of financial instruments”, the “convergence of financial 
intermediaries and trading platforms”, and a “global integration and interconnectedness 
among financial institutions, investors and markets”. (Paulson, 31 March 2008). But this is 
not so much a cause as an inverted deus ex machina, where the hand of God (read ‘financial 
innovation’) creates rather than resolves dramatic tension. In this vision, there is in fact no 
one behind the wheel, and the story of finance is one of a system that in facts drives itself. 
Hence, the Great Depression is invoked by the US Treasury as both an indication of how 
innovation outpaces regulatory frameworks, and as a means of underscoring the challenge 
posed to regulators by the ongoing financial crisis. Of course, this is not to say that the 
regulation-innovation nexus has not been explored at length elsewhere, both by the US 
Treasury and other organisations. Instead, the point is that those Treasury narratives that 
connect the Great Depression to the 2007-2009 crisis only use such a nexus to develop a 
general story of finance outrunning regulation. 
The second account of regulatory history to emerge through appeals to the 1930s, which 
is offered by the US FRB, goes somewhat further in addressing the question of innovation and 
change. Specifically, during mid-2009, the FRB also develops a history of the US regulatory 
system, but it does so by depicting key legislative events as the expression of broader 
historical processes, which it then links to the crisis of 2007-2009 via a series of historical 
representations. The crises of the 1930s, 1970s and 1980s in particular are crucial to this 
narrative, and the first key move involves forging a causal link between the regulatory 
response to the Great Depression and a subsequent era of financial stability. This is achieved 
by describing the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 – which confined commercial banks to 
traditional lending activities – as having “fostered a banking system that was, for the better 
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part of 40 years, quite stable and reasonably profitable” (Tarullo, 8 June 2009). Stagflation 
and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system are then presented as an exogenous shock that 
“buffeted” this system in the 1970s, producing “an increasingly tight squeeze on the 
traditional commercial banking business model” (Tarullo, 8 June 2009). This second move is 
premised on a claim that the rise of new savings vehicles and the growth of public capital 
markets effectively eroded the competiveness of this model, thereby prompting the industry to 
seek the removal or relaxation of Depression-era regulations. And then finally, the subsequent 
intertwinement of bank and non-bank activity is linked to a new regulatory emphasis on 
capital requirements, supervision and internal risk-management systems. This third key move 
occurs via appeals to the S&L and debt crises of the 1980s, which are presented as having 
helped to encourage this shift in regulatory emphasis.11  
One problem revealed by the 2007-2009 crisis, at least in this narrative, is that the 
regulatory system had served to create a group of large and leveraged investment banks that 
were not subject to prudential regulation. The other is that there had been no overhaul of 
financial regulation to take into account the impact of trading and capital markets on 
traditional banking. And both together, the FRB suggests, meant that the regulatory system 
was ill equipped to regulate systemic risk. The crisis of 2007-2009 is in this way interpreted 
as a crisis of under-regulation. However, a properly historical explanation of the 1970s 
‘shock’ remains absent from this narrative, just as a similar gap existed in the Treasury’s 
more general account of financial change. What exactly was it that had undermined the 
viability of the traditional commercial banking business model? If it was “technological and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 These latter two periods of turmoil, along with the links that are forged between them and the question of 
financial regulation, will be taken up again our discussion of the crises of the 1970s and the late 1980s (see § 
4.1). 
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business innovations”, then once again, the question left unasked is what might have been 
driving these (Tarullo, 8 June 2009). 
The third and final story about financial regulation, which is articulated by the ECB in 
late 2009, is the only one to address these questions. In order to do this, however, it 
completely reverses the relation between Depression-era regulation and competition or 
innovation. Specifically, instead of interpreting financial competition and innovation as 
phenomena that have intruded upon the post-Depression system of regulation, it interprets 
them as a symptom of that very system. That is to say, it reassesses the legacy of Glass-
Steagall in light of subsequent regulatory developments, effectively arguing that these were 
already built into it in the Act in the first place (see Tumpel-Gugerell, 21 September 2009; 
and Smaghi, 16 October 2009). Many of the same story elements are there – the increased 
reliance on non-interest income and use of new funding instruments by banks, the rise of 
securitisation and off-balance sheet vehicles, and the growth of the shadow banking sector – 
but their emplotment is ever so subtly and crucially different. Within this process, it is 
possible to identify four distinct but interrelated moves. 
First, the separation of banks and non-banks in the 1930s is depicted as having 
contributed to the under-regulation of the non-banking sector. Second, the higher profitability 
of the unregulated sector is interpreted as having pushed banks to enter into its business, 
increasing competition and reducing profits. Third, this development is presented as having 
created an incentive for the unregulated sector to innovate. And finally, this intersectoral 
struggle for profits is linked to the deregulatory drive that culminated in the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act of 1999. When grasped together, these four moves enable it to infer that “a 
downward spiral has been created”: 
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[T]he increased profitability of the financial sector over the years has encouraged 
lobbying for further deregulation of the industry, which then leads to still greater 
profitability and even more lobbying pressure. (Smaghi, 16 October 2009) 
Hence, for the ECB, the corollary of bank-regulation under Glass-Steagall was the under-
regulation of non-banks, and it is this unevenness that has underpinned financial innovation 
and banking deregulation since the 1970s. This ‘under-regulation’ is clearly quite different to 
the one we find in the US FRB and Treasury narratives. It does not simply refer to the 
shortcomings or gaps revealed in the US regulatory system, but also to the historical origins 
of deregulation and change, which it then links to the crisis of 2007-2009. In this way, then, 
the Great Depression in general – and its regulatory legacy in particular – in fact underpins 
two broad and competing historical accounts of the relation between finance and its 
regulation. 
4.4 Summary: The return of the Great Depression 
As 2008 drew to a close, Paul Krugman published a revised and expanded edition of his 1999 
book, The Return of Depression Economics. In it he provides an updated version of his 
original thesis – that the financial crises of globalisation resemble those of the 1930s, and that 
this demands a good dose of re-regulation and counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy (see 
Krugman, 2008). It is, in effect, a story about how technocrats and policymakers forgot 
Keynes. This section has sought to tell a slightly different story, focusing on how they have 
since ‘remembered’ the 1930s. A brief summary is in order. 
The return of the Great Depression is clearly apparent, and especially so after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in late 2008. It is invoked by a variety of organisational actors, 
and it is invoked in a range of different ways. On some of these interpretations there appears 
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to be broad cross-organisational agreement – such as those that concern trade, where almost 
all use the 1930s to illustrate the dangers of protectionism. On other facets of the ‘present-
past’, however, certain organisations take the lead – such as the IMF on cooperation, which 
crafts a narrative about the origins and evolution of multilateralism that is later reiterated by 
the US Treasury, the FRB and the ECB. And on other facets still, inter-organisational tensions 
emerge – such as those between the FRB and ECB on the US financial system, where the 
former uses the 1930s to explain the way innovation has outpaced regulation, and the latter 
instead uses them to explain how innovation has driven deregulation. And finally, the Great 
Depression also appears to be embroiled in a debate between the BIS and US FRB about the 
proper conduct of monetary policy during both normal and extraordinary times. 
	  Chapter 5 
1970s stagflation and the S&L crisis of the late 1980s 
The crisis of the 1970s, much like that of the 1930s, is routinely identified as a turning point 
in the history of capitalism. Although the precise timing of this transformation – as well as 
both its form and content – has been the subject of much debate, there is nevertheless a broad 
agreement that it marks both the demise of global Fordism, and the beginning of a shift 
towards neoliberal theory and practice (for example, see Lipietz, 1987; Glyn et al., 1990; 
Clarke, 1988; de Long, 2000; and Saad-Filho & Johnston, 2005). And yet during this most 
recent crisis, it has been mentioned regularly only by the ECB (see Figure II). Conversely, the 
S&L crisis has conventionally been understood as a problem of fraud that afflicted the US 
banking sector during the late 1980s, resulting in a wave of bankruptcies and a mild recession 
in the early 1990s (see Kane, 1989; and Pizzo et al., 1989). In the wake of the dotcom crash, it 
was reinterpreted as a forewarning of the dangers inherent to American financial capitalism 
(see Stiglitz, 2004: esp. Chs. 4 & 9; and Cox, 2004: 313), but even then, it did not figure as 
the kind of epochal episode that the 1970s did. And yet over the course of the 2007-2009 
period, the US FRB has repeatedly invoked it in its commentary on the ongoing crisis. 
When taken together, these trends raise the question of precisely how such recent 
appeals to past events relate to their respective and pre-existing histories. Or to put it 
differently: Is there any reason to believe that a substantive reassessment of the two episodes’ 
relative historical significance has been undertaken in light of recent events? And if there is, 
then what is the import of such a reassessment for the diagnosis and negotiation of the 
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ongoing crisis? In order to answer these questions, this chapter addresses each of the two past 
crises in turn, focusing on precisely how they have been linked to the present turmoil. 
5.1 The ECB and the crisis of the 1970s 
The crisis of the 1970s has been the seventh most mentioned past crisis during the period of 
2007-2009, but the ECB alone accounts for just over 70% of these references.1 As the column 
chart below indicates, these have been concentrated in three different sub-periods. First, there 
is an initial and early appeal to the episode during 2007, when the BIS and the ECB each 
make an isolated reference to the crisis of the 1970s. Second, there is a minor uptake of the 
episode during early early-to-mid 2008, with both the IMF and US FRB joining each of the 
above organisations. And third, there is a more pronounced uptake of the episode during the 
peak of the crisis in late 2008, after which the ECB begins to make more numerous and 
frequent references. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Between 2007 and 2009, the crisis of the 1970s is referred to on a total of 26 separation occasions. The ECB 
accounts for 19 of these; the BIS accounts for 3, the IMF for 2, and the US FRB for 2 (see Figure II). 
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Figure 5.1 References to 1970s OECD crises, 2007-2009 (Source: Author’s own) 
Interestingly, many of these references focus on the issue of inflation-control. At 
various different points throughout 2008, all four of the monetary organisations under study 
use the 1970s to illustrate the need to keep expected inflation anchored in order to prevent 
wage-price spirals.2 Both the ECB and the BIS also draw a related lesson about the need to 
devote monetary policy to the pursuit of price stability (cf. Knight, 18 January 2007; and 
Stark, 28 March 2008).3 The ECB also uses the 1970s to offer a range of other precautionary 
tales in a similar vein – never underestimate the structural effects of such a shock and 
maintain an excessively accommodating monetary policy stance (Smaghi, 30 March 2009), 
never respond to supply shocks by stimulating demand (Smaghi, 15 May 2008), and never 
bother trying to stimulate demand using monetary policy (Stark, 18 November 2008) – for 
history shows that all such efforts will only end in higher inflation and lower economic 
growth. It would thus appear that high commodity prices in 2007 and 2008 were enough to 
spur actors into re-rehearsing monetary policy orthodoxies. Moreover, the notoriously 
inflation-averse ECB has played the lead role in the process by reiterating the lessons it learnt 
while taming the ‘Great Inflation’ of the 1970s. But in addition to this rather straightforward 
recovery of prior and pre-constituted policy lessons, the events of the 1970s were also 
appealed to in ways that placed them within a longer sequence and configuration of crises. 
The first such process of emplotment that can be identified concerns the breakdown of 
the Keynesian consensus. Specifically, the ECB depicts the stagflation of the 1970s as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For example, see Warsh (21 May 2008), Smaghi (15 May 2008), Knight (12 June 2008) and Lipsky (9 
September 2008). 
3 For more such lessons from the ECB on the overriding importance of devoting monetary policy to inflation 
control, see Stark (15 April 2008), Trichet (13 July 2009) and Smaghi (16 October 2009). 
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moment in which discretionary monetary and fiscal policies were discredited and replaced by 
the idea and practices of independent central banking (see Stark, 18 November 2008). This is 
in line with the monetarist orthodoxy alluded to above, and the portrayal of the 1970s as a 
period during which “the illusions of Keynesianism” were smashed in fact only serves as a 
kind of narrative support for the more technical lessons outlined above (Smaghi, 15 May 
2008). 
The second plot, however, concerns the evolution of the global financial stability 
agenda. Specifically, as the crisis begins to emerge in mid-2007, the ECB enlists the 1970s in 
a story it tells about the rise of international cooperation. This process entails three different 
moves, and each of these involves relating shifts or step changes in patterns of cooperation to 
specific crisis episodes. First, the creation of the G7 is selected and emphasised as a response 
to the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in the early1970s. The G7 is then connected 
through the Mexican and Asian crises of the 1990s to the creation of the G20 in 1999. And 
then finally, the inception of the G20 is then linked to the forum’s subsequent success in 
facilitating a concerted policy response to the events of 2008-2009. Moreover, this historical 
narrative also serves as the basis for a broader argument about the need to sustain such 
cooperation going forward.4 Thus, in contrast to its story about the fall of Keynesianism, here 
we actually find the ECB involved in a simultaneous rewriting of both past and future. We 
will be returning to this narrative in our discussion of the Asian crisis, which turns out to be 
the more pivotal episode within the ECB’s account of international cooperation (§ 6.2). 
Finally, there is also a third plot that entails an appeal to the events of the 1970s. Instead 
of the ECB, however, it is the US FRB develops this, and its narrative stretches all the way 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For the early and late versions of this narrative, compare Trichet (29 September 2007 and 15 October 2009). 
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back to Great Depression of the 1930s rather than simply the stagflation of the 1970s. 
Specifically, the FRB depicts the crisis of the 1970s as the beginning of a 30-year period of 
financial deregulation, and this period is in turn connected to the crisis of 2007-2009 via the 
eventual repeal of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act in 1999’s Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Tarullo, 8 
June 2009). We have already encountered this basic figuration in our earlier discussion of the 
Great Depression, which in fact serves as the more crucial episode within this plot (see § 4.3). 
In specific relation to the status of the 1970s, though, we might say that as the role of 
securitisation within the ongoing crisis becomes clearer, the US FRB effectively reads new 
meaning into the way that banks and supervisors responded to the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods system. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that this is by no means the dominant 
interpretation of the 1970s that circulates within the 2007-2009 period. That particular title 
must go to the policy lessons about inflation-control that are drawn by the ECB. 
5.2 The US FRB and the S&L crisis of the 1980s 
The S&L crisis of the 1980s has been the eighth most mentioned past crisis during the period 
of 2007-2009, but the US FRB alone accounts for just over 70% of these references.5 As the 
line graph below indicates, these have been concentrated in three different sub-periods. First, 
there is the period running from mid-2007 through to early 2008, during which the US FRB, 
the BIS and the IMF each make a number of references to S&L episode. Second, there is the 
middle of 2008, during which only the US Treasury joins the FRB in referring to that 
particular crisis. And third, there is period running from late 2008 onwards, during which the 
FRB alone continues to invoke the episode. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Between 2007 and 2009, the S&L crisis is referred to on a total of 16 separation occasions. The US FRB 
accounts for 12 of these (see Figure 3.1). 
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Figure 5.2 References to the S&L crisis, 2007-2009 (Source: Author’s own) 
Many of these references to the S&L episode consist in simple historical analogies, and 
as is perhaps to be expected, the majority of these focus on housing markets and are offered 
during the early stages of the 2007-2009 crisis. For example, both the US FRB and the IMF 
compare emergent problems in the market for residential mortgage-backed securities to those 
that characterised the market for commercial mortgage-backed securities in the early 1990s 
(see Kroszner, 30 November 2007; and Singh, 17 March 2008). The US Treasury also draws 
a direct comparison between the two episodes, focusing on the number of financial institution 
failures (Paulson, 22 July 2008). But in each of these instances the organisational actors in 
question simply identify cross-case similarities, and stop short of using them to formulate 
policy lessons for the present.  
Meanwhile, when such lessons are indeed drawn, they tend to focus on questions of 
financial sector regulation and supervision. The BIS, for example, uses the episode to 
illustrate the role of liberal lending environments in exacerbating housing cycles, thereby 
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supporting those readings of the sub-prime crisis that emphasise careless and/or predatory 
lending practices on the part of mortgage originators (White, 30 September 2007). The US 
FRB focuses instead on the moral hazard created by its support for insured depository 
institutions, using the S&L crisis to illustrate the insufficiency of regulatory oversight alone, 
and arguing that it must instead be combined with the prompt closure of insolvent institutions 
(see Kohn, 21 February 2007; and Bernanke, 11 April 2007). And finally, there is the US 
Treasury, which uses the episode to draw a lesson about crisis management. Specifically, it 
suggests that the experience of the S&L crisis illustrates the importance of recognising losses 
and restoring balance sheets in a timely manner, rather than sweeping them under the rug 
(Lowery, 26 May 2008). In this way, then, the S&L serves as the basis for variety of different 
lessons regarding both the genesis and management of financial crises.  
But perhaps the most interesting feature of those discussions that involve portrayals of 
the S&L crisis is the way that this episode is incorporated into a set of broader stories about 
changes in financial sector and monetary policy. Once again, it is possible to identify three 
distinct processes of emplotment. The first of these concerns the US system of banking 
supervision. On a number of occasions during the early phases of the crisis, the US FRB casts 
the S&L episode as a turning point in the evolution of its approach to financial stability 
issues. Specifically, it depicts the financial institution failures of the late 1980s as the 
beginning of a new emphasis on bank capital requirements, linking these to the Basel Accord 
of 1988, the implementation of its reforms in the early 1990s, and the subsequent years of 
economic growth and stability (see Kohn, 21 February 2007 and 16 May 2007). In so doing, it 
effectively provides a general account of the dynamic interaction between regulatory 
approaches and episodes of crisis. 
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The second process takes up this same question but does so from the perspective of 
financial innovation rather than regulation. Specifically, during mid-2007, both the US FRB 
and the BIS link the S&L crisis to the practice of securitisation. However, each does so in a 
slightly different way to the other. For the FRB, the S&L crisis contributed to the rise of 
securitisation by ending the dominance of deposit-taking portfolio lenders in the mortgage 
market (Bernanke, 31 August 2007). For the BIS, though, it also marked the beginning of a 
sequence in which financial innovation drove deregulation (White, 30 September 2007). Both 
of these interpretations feed into broader plotlines about the role of complex securities and 
inadequate regulation in the crisis of 2007-2009, but they do not appear to have been 
sustained over time. Interestingly, those that focus on standards and codes do seem to have 
been somewhat more resilient, and this may perhaps be related to the ongoing prominence of 
pro-cyclicality and Basel II implementation in discussions about regulatory reform more 
generally.6  
Finally, the third distinct emplotment of the S&L crisis is one relates it to the issue of 
asset price bubbles. In late 2008, after the crisis has quite clearly spread beyond the confines 
the subprime mortgage markets, the US FRB enlists the S&L episode in a story it tells about 
monetary policy. Specifically, it suggests that the commercial and residential real estate 
bubbles of the late 1980s – along with a series of other similar episodes during the 1990s – 
had caused it to underestimate the disruptive capacity of such bubbles; and that recent events 
warrant a reassessment of the role that monetary policy can play in preventing them from 
developing in the first place (Kohn, 19 November 2008). Interestingly, this story is developed 
in the midst of a broader debate over asset price bubbles that we have already encountered in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For later examples of the S&L crisis being used in this way, see Duke (25 March 2009 and 15 June 2009). 
For its incorporation into the broader plotline about changes in US regulatory emphasis, see Tarullo (8 June 
2009). 
Chapter 5 
	   125	  
our discussion of the Great Depression, and the lesson that the FRB draws from this is in fact 
at odds with its earlier position about the dangers of monetary activism (see § 4.1). 
5.3 Summary: Old organisational stories versus new policy histories 
Returning to the questions that were posed at the beginning of this chapter, we are now in a 
position to offer a number of observations. Although a variety of organisations do invoke the 
crisis of the 1970s, the one that does so most frequently is quite clearly the ECB. Moreover, 
despite some interesting variations in the way that these actors interpret and deploy the 
episode, the dominant portrayals are those that serve as the basis for lessons about the 
enduring importance of inflation control. I suspect that this might tell us more about the 
history of the ECB than the way in which different organisational actors have used past crises 
to construct a history of the present. The one thing it can tell us about such a process, 
however, is that the events of the 1970s – despite their prominence in most economic histories 
of the twentieth century – do not seem to have been key episodes in these organisations’ crisis 
narratives. To the extent that they do appear in these narratives, they do so as markers for a 
crisis of Keynesianism rather than a crisis of capitalist accumulation more broadly. 
Conversely, even though the US FRB has been almost solely responsible for those 
references to the S&L crisis, its deployment of this episode has been far more varied. 
Specifically, in addition to serving as the subject for a variety of historical analogies, the S&L 
episode has also formed the basis for a series of different lessons regarding both the genesis 
and management of financial crises. Moreover, through its emplotment by the BIS and the 
FRB, it has also yielded more general accounts of the relation between financial innovation, 
crisis episodes, and regulatory change. Finally, through its incorporation by the FRB into a 
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story about the evolution of monetary policy, it also figured within broader debates on 
whether and how to deal with asset price bubbles in a pre-emptive manner. When taken 
together, these interpretive practices have produced a number of shifts in the historical 
meaning and significance of the events in question, and are in turn suggestive of the 
transformations that past crises can undergo during times of crisis. However, the S&L crisis 
remains a somewhat peripheral episode in the sense that it does not appear to have been the 
subject of sustained inter-organisational narration. 
	  Chapter 6 
The Asian crisis of 1997-98 
The Asian crisis is usually identified as the first global financial crisis of the post-Cold War 
world. Generally speaking, scholars at the time tended to interpret it in one of two ways. 
Either it was an expression of the dangers that capital flows pose to developing nations, 
suggesting that financial liberalisation must be approached with some trepidation, or it was a 
sign instead that developing nations needed to be made safe for capital flows (cf. Wade & 
Veneroso, 1998; and Haggard & MacIntyre, 1998). Both of these readings went on to shape 
policy debate in the years that followed, prompting broader arguments about the end of the 
Washington Consensus, and cementing Asia’s place at the heart of story called neoliberalism 
(see Gore, 2000; Hayami, 2003; and Sheppard & Leitner, 2010). But given the hasty 
amendments to that story undertaken since the crisis of 2007-2009, one has to ask whether the 
cement has come undone. Is the Asian crisis still a key chapter within this story, and if so, 
how does it sit in relation to other newly added chapters? This chapter takes up these 
questions by focusing on how the Asian crisis has been invoked over the course of the 2007-
2009 period. 
As we have seen, the Asian crisis has been the second most frequently mentioned past 
crisis, accounting for almost 20% of the references to past crises made during the years in 
question. And much like those to the Great Depression, these references have been made with 
some frequency by all five of the organisations under study, suggesting that the events of 
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1997-98 do continue to feature prominently in contemporary crisis narratives.1 But as the 
column chart below indicates, there are no immediately obvious patterns in the timing of these 
references. One might point to a concentration of references in late 2007 – which may be 
related to the ten-year anniversary of the crisis – as well as to something of a cluster in the 
second half of 2008, but the more interesting variations over time are quite clearly across 
organisations and themes. 
 
Figure 6  References to the 1997-98 Asian crisis, 2007-2009 (Source: Author’s own) 
At the outset it should be noted that the Asian crisis exhibits a remarkable polyvalence 
over the three years. The US FRB, for example, uses it in March 2007 to illustrate how 
uncertainty can reduce market liquidity (Warsh, 5 March 2007); and then later in that year, 
along with the IMF, as an example of how banking sector crises can adversely affect real 
economic activity (see Burton, 5 June 2007; and Kroszner, 6 September 2007). Meanwhile, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Between 2007 and 2009, the Asian crisis is referred to in a total of 55 speeches: the ECB invokes it on 22 
separate occasions, the IMF on 14, the BIS on 7, the US FRB on 6, and the US Treasury on 6 (see Figure II). 
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after the collapse of Bear Stearns, the BIS uses it to highlight the importance of sound risk-
management principles in times of financial innovation (Knight, 29 April 2008); and by early 
2009 is employing it as an example of how costly balance sheet cleaning can be, going on to 
make an argument about the need to earmark public resources for this purpose (Hannoun, 7 
February 2009). But amidst all this diversity, it is still possible to identify three distinct and 
overriding themes within discussions of the Asian crisis. The remainder of this section 
undertakes an analysis of these in turn, which are the relationship between domestic 
institutions and international capital flows, the changing form and content of global 
governance, and the origin of global economic imbalances. 
6.1 Domestic institutions versus international capital flows 
The first theme to emerge within discussions of the Asian crisis is the interaction between 
domestic institutions and international capital flows. References of this sort appear as early as 
January 2007, when the BIS invokes the Asian crisis in order to illustrate the potentially 
disruptive effect of hedge fund activity on emerging market economies (White, 19 January 
2007). At around the same time, the IMF begins to use the episode to draw a broad lesson 
about the risks associated with financial integration (De Rato, 22 January 2007); and then in 
September the ECB follows suit, focusing more specifically on the role of herding and 
contagion in propagating crises (Trichet, 29 September 2007). But rather than characterising 
these as risks inherent to mobile portfolio capital, all three organisations instead emphasise 
their co-dependence on various failures of domestic governance and policy.  
The BIS, for example, highlights the issue of banks’ liquidity and capital buffers, 
suggesting that higher loan-to-deposit and capital ratios would have made Asian banking 
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sectors less vulnerable to the various reversals that took place in 1997-98 (Hannoun, 21 
March 2008). Meanwhile, the IMF makes numerous references to more general “flaws in the 
banking and corporate sectors” (De Rato, 22 January 2007), and although it spends little time 
specifying what these were, it nevertheless suggests that they were “at the root of the crisis”, 
interacting unfavourably with a combination of open capital accounts, fixed exchange rates 
and low levels of international reserves (Burton, 16 May 2007; see also 5 June 2007). Finally, 
the ECB begins to place great emphasis on the issue of opacity, repeatedly characterising the 
Asian crisis as a crisis of transparency, and linking volatile capital movements to a lack of 
information about the positions of key private and public sector actors in the region.2  
These various domestic ‘failures’ may be diverse, but all are nevertheless compatible 
with one another. Moreover, they are also identically positioned vis-à-vis international capital 
flows. The following statement by the US Treasury, which joins the other three organisations 
in mid-2008, provides a succinct illustration of this logic at work: 
[T]he Asian Financial Crisis ten years ago demonstrated that a balance of 
payments crisis could become a banking crisis when there are fixed exchange rates 
and internationally mobile capital, providing valuable lessons about the 
importance of flexible exchange rate regimes. Openness to capital flows also 
requires cultivating regulatory regimes, institutions and policies that support 
stronger risk management, flexibility and adaptability. (Lowery, 26 May 2008) 
Capital mobility is portrayed as an immutable historical reality, and against this backdrop the 
various domestic arrangements under discussion become dangerous anachronisms.3 Capital 
flight, in turn, is rendered a mere messenger of domestic institutional shortcoming.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Trichet (11 September 2007, 29 September 2007, 14 April 2008, and 15 May 2008). 
3 Interestingly, this assertion comes against the backdrop of ongoing debates within the IMF about capital 
controls and financial liberalisation (see Chwieroth, 2010: Chs. 8-9). 
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Insofar as this is a story that was pioneered in the aftermath of the Asian crisis itself, it 
would appear that the lessons drawn then about the importance of ‘good governance’ and 
‘sequencing’ have not undergone any substantial revision. But this is not to say that those 
same lessons speak to the crisis of 2007-2009 with any great poignancy. In fact, the only 
organisation to bring them explicitly to bear on the present is the ECB, which in mid-2008 
portrays the emergent crisis as a one of transparency: 
The present turbulences have, once more, demonstrated that opacity regarding the 
stance of markets, financial instruments or financial institutions is a recipe for 
catastrophe. In the prelude to an episode of uncertainty and turbulence, absence of 
transparency inevitably triggers contagion and negative herd behaviour – we saw 
this at the heart of the Asian crisis, we very much also see it at the heart of the 
present episode. Transparency is essential both for financial instruments – 
sophisticated structured products, asset-backed securities, etc. – and for the 
financial institutions themselves. (Trichet, 15 May 2008)4  
This quite clearly involves a broadening out of the lesson initially drawn from the Asian 
crisis. Where opacity referred then to a weakness that afflicted the ‘under-developed’ 
financial sectors of the (semi-) periphery, here it is also identified in the hyper-developed 
financial sectors of the capitalist heartland.5 And whilst this no doubt reflects a belief that the 
crisis has its roots in Western financial sector practices, it also indicates at attempt on the part 
of the ECB to use established interpretations of a past crisis in order to strengthen this 
diagnosis. The effect of this is to transform the Asian crisis into the origin of a lesson whose 
second time has come. “We haven’t discovered many new things from the recent crisis”, it 
declares (Trichet, 26 September 2008). Instead, “in the financial markets of the industrialised 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For similar comments, see also Trichet (4 June 2008 and 18 July 2008). 
5 The world-systems terminology employed here is meant only to emphasise a shift away from the type of 
transparency agenda that prevailed in the aftermath of the Asian crisis. That earlier version, first elaborated by 
the IMF and US Treasury in late 1997, was underpinned by an unmistakable brand of West-East paternalism (see 
Hall, 2003).  
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world, we have exactly the same lessons to be learned [as Asia did ten years ago]” (Trichet 18 
July 2008). 
However, it is important to reiterate that this kind of practice is not widespread. The 
ECB is alone in suggesting that the one crisis has such clear affinities with the other, and 
although it is possible to observe other attempts to re-emplot Asia’s ‘crisis of governance’, 
these become interesting only when seen through the lens of global imbalances (§ 6.3). On the 
whole, then, while post-Asian crisis orthodoxies about domestic governance do seem to 
colour early interpretations of that episode, they do not appear to have been of great use to 
those making sense of events in late 2008.  Indeed, by early 2009, the version of the Asian 
crisis discussed in this section has disappeared almost entirely. 
6.2 Emergency financing, supervisory cooperation and international institutions 
Another broad theme to emerge through appeals to the Asian crisis is that of global 
governance. References of this sort appear as early as January 2007, when the IMF uses the 
episode to illustrate the need for an international lender of last resort, but given its timing this 
is quite clearly directed at allegations about the Fund’s waning relevance rather than any 
debate about the immediate need for emergency financing (De Rato, 22 January 2007).6 The 
same could also be said of the US FRB’s intervention in late 2007, which uses the South 
Korean rescue package to illustrate the Fund’s relative expertise in providing and/or 
facilitating such financing (Mishkin, 28 September 2007). By mid-2008, however, the Asian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In late 2007 the IMF faced considerable budgetary pressures, prompting it to layoff 15% of its staff in order 
to reduce operating expenses (see Broome, 2010: 45-6). 
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crisis is regularly being incorporated into broader discussions about cooperation and reform at 
the international level. 
The organisation at the forefront of this process is once again the ECB, which, as we 
have already seen, begins in late 2007 to craft a narrative about the evolution of international 
economic cooperation (§ 5.1). The Asian crisis functions within this in two distinct but 
complementary ways. Firstly, it is used along with the 1970s to illustrate a general lesson 
about the relation between globalisation, crisis, and international reform: 
It is obvious that the systemic changes we are observing in the world’s economic 
and financial system require systematic changes in the policy framework. The 
rules of the game need to adapt in order to keep pace with developments. This 
recognition is not new. It was felt already in the 1970s with the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods system. And it was felt very strongly in the aftermath of the Asian 
crisis ten years ago. (Trichet, 29 September 2007) 
What we find here is an implicit sequence of crises being used to depict the very process of 
history. Globalisation drives structural change, structural change creates new forms of global 
crisis, and new forms of global crisis reveal gaps in existing systems of international 
governance. Global stability, in turn, hinges on the adaptability of international institutions; 
and crisis prevention – to the extent that such a thing is even possible – becomes “a constant 
task that requires continuous scrutiny and effort” on the part of the international community 
(Trichet, 29 September 2007).7 Crisis and international reform are thus presented as two 
different sides of the same globalisation process. 
But secondly, and further to this, the Asian crisis is also used to mark a watershed in the 
globalisation of governance: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Paradoxically, in this schema, the task of ‘crisis prevention’ is at once both never and always the same: never, 
because each new solution always has its particulars; and always, because these solutions never actually solve 
the problem which prompts them – namely, the emergent properties of globalisation itself. 
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It is clear, this [Asian] crisis was not the first one … And it certainly was not the 
last one … But it was the Asian crisis that revealed a number of vulnerabilities in 
national and international financial systems and that led to an enormous reform 
agenda at the international level. (Trichet, 29 September 2007) 
Of course, we already know that the Asian crisis prompted calls for a ‘new international 
financial architecture’ (see Eichengreen, 1999; Noble & Ravenhill, 2000; and Vestergaard, 
2009). The point of interest, however, is that the various changes made in response to these 
calls are gradually re-interpreted as a foretelling of those that emerge through the crisis 
management efforts of late 2008 and early 2009.  
Take the issue of financial sector policy coordination. When looking back on the legacy 
of the Asian crisis, different organisations consistently emphasise the creation of the Financial 
Stability Forum (FSF) in 1999, but the way in which they do this changes over time. Initially, 
the ECB focuses on the Forum’s promotion of standards and codes (see Trichet, 29 
September and 20 October 2007). In so doing, it draws an implicit link between the Asian 
crisis and the idea of voluntary micro-prudential reform. But then in mid-2008, after the FSF 
presents its report on the ongoing financial turmoil, the ECB instead focuses on the 
membership and mandate of the Forum, pointing out that it was created in order to enable “a 
synthetic diagnosis of the state of global finance” (Trichet, 14 April 2008).8 Here we see the 
Asian crisis being linked to a new form of coordination under the FSF, rather than the 
substantive content of its early initiatives. At around the same time, though, the US Treasury 
also makes similar remarks (see Lowery, 3 March 2008; and McCormick, 16 April 2008); and 
by late 2008, the FSF is identified by both organisations as being at the heart of ongoing 
efforts to understand the multilevel interface between micro and macro-prudential risk (cf. 
Trichet, 14 October 2008; and Sobel, 2 December 2008). These efforts constitute a clear 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See also Trichet (15 May 2008 and 4 June 2008). 
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departure from the approach to financial regulation that the FSF pioneered in the aftermath of 
the Asian crisis, and yet they are nevertheless presented as a continuation of that earlier 
reform agenda. 
In this way, the Asian crisis is effectively retrofitted with new historical meaning and 
significance. Its pre-existing legacy is not effaced in response to the crisis management efforts 
of 2007-2009, but it is ever so subtly rewritten in order to incorporate subsequent shifts in the 
international agenda for regulatory reform. Indeed, after the FSF becomes the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) and assumes a more central role within the international regulatory 
system, the US FRB even draws a link between this new body and the Asian crisis by 
explicitly portraying the latter as a precursor to the former (Tarullo, 30 September 2009; see 
also Helleiner, 2010). Hence, rather than simply marking the emergence of a global agenda 
for domestic reform, the Asian crisis is now also seen to underpin the creation of an 
institution capable of one day envisioning a much more extensive kind of international 
supervisory cooperation. 
A similar process can be observed in relation to multilateralism more generally. In late 
2007, the ECB begins to portray the Asian crisis as part of a shift towards more inclusive 
forms of global governance. Initially this involves focusing on the creation of the G20 in 
1999, which it suggests was motivated by a post-Asian crisis revelation about the importance 
of emerging markets (see Trichet, 29 September 2007).9 But once the G20 becomes a key 
forum for discussing crisis response efforts in 2009, the ECB makes a second move, reading 
this new development back into the very inception of the G20: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For further statements to this effect, see Trichet (26 November 2007, and 25 February 2008). 
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While the G7 still have an important role to play, the financial crisis has confirmed 
the need to reinforce global governance at the level of a more inclusive 
international informal entity … the creation of the G20 after the Asian crisis … 
was an important step to involve the emerging economies more closely in the 
process of global economic governance. And I am therefore, in the present very 
demanding circumstances, in full accord with this strengthened role of the G20. 
The aspect that impresses me most about this emerging global forum is the 
virtually universal consensus on global economic issues that has been reached. 
(Trichet, 15 October 2009) 
Once again, this move does not fundamentally alter the overarching structure of the ECB’s 
cooperation narrative. Instead, what we see is the same basic narrative being extended 
forward in order to encompass the ongoing rise of the G20. But by depicting this development 
as an outgrowth of the post-1997 reform agenda, the Asian crisis is effectively recast as its 
harbinger. The unprecedented degree of policy coordination, the sustained dialogue on 
financial sector reform, even the attempts to address current account imbalances – all are 
taken to be signs of a new multilateralism, and all are traced back to 1997-98, for in revealing 
the scope of global interdependence then, it was the Asian crisis which gave the world 
economy the institution it would need to undertake these initiatives in 2008-2009.10 
Of course, it is difficult to say whether these processes of re-emplotment made a 
decisive contribution the two institutional changes in question – i.e. the renewed or increased 
prominence of both the FSF/FSB and the G20. One the one hand, it is true that these 
processes are chronologically posterior to some of the changes they seek to narrate, such as 
the creation of the FSB in April of 2009. On the other hand, however, they are also 
undertaken at the same time as the future functions of these two forums were being debated 
by the very organisations under study. To disentangle this quasi-causality would require a 
different method of research to the one presently being employed. What we can and should 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 On the role of the G20 in combating global payments imbalances, see Trichet (20 September 2007, 12 May 
2008 and 15 October 2009).  
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say with some certainty, though, is that the Asian crisis is apperceived as a key moment in the 
globalisation of governance, and that this bears some resemblance to what we saw in our 
discussion of the Great Depression (§ 4.2). There it was the IMF that took the lead, tracing 
these changes back to the birth of the multilateral spirit itself. Here it is the ECB, which 
instead presents the Asian crisis as a turning point within the broader process described by the 
IMF. Yet in both cases, what we see is a process of past crises being used to understand and 
justify new sites and modes of economic governance. 
6.3 Under-investment, over-saving and global imbalances 
The final theme to emerge in discussions about the Asian crisis is that of global imbalances. 
References of this sort begin to appear in early 2007, and they are sustained throughout the 
duration of the crisis as different organisations seek to (re-) emplot the unfolding sequence of 
events. But as time goes on there is a clear shift in the way that imbalances are traced back to 
the Asian crisis. To put it bluntly, stories about Asian under-investment become stories about 
Asian over-saving. 
Under-investment stories vary between organisations, but the basic idea is that the crisis 
caused a reduction in Asian demand for investment, generating a new and precarious 
constellation of global capital flows. The ECB is the first to draw such connections, 
suggesting in January that a lack of trust in Asian institutions after 1997 has served to 
discourage domestic investment in the region (Smaghi, 18 January 2007). It then goes on in 
March to depict the resultant capital outflows as a source of liquidity risk for advanced 
economies (Smaghi, 14 March 2007; see also Trichet, 1 June 2007). The problem for the 
ECB, therefore, is that underdeveloped Asian financial systems have transformed the West 
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into a net borrower, rendering it vulnerable to a cessation of capital inflows.  The IMF offers a 
broadly similar diagnosis in November 2007: 
In East Asia, while high saving rates have moved essentially sideways, there was 
an almost uniform drop in investment across the region following the Asian crisis. 
More recently, there are signs of a gradual investment recovery, and if this were to 
persist, it would help to alleviate imbalances. (Lipsky, 19 November 2007) 
Although it does not specify the cause of domestic under-investment in Asia, this under-
investment is still linked to the build-up of global imbalances. Moreover, just as we saw with 
the ECB, these imbalances are portrayed as an accident waiting to happen rather than one that 
is intertwined with already emergent financial market problems. 
The story begins to change in mid-2007, however, when the US FRB adds a new twist 
to the notion of under-investment. While still pointing to a decline in Asian investment 
demand after 1997, it interprets this as a driver of excess saving at the global level (Kroszner, 
16 May 2007). In so doing it effects two important changes. First, it shifts the emphasis from 
one side of the payments identity to the other, turning global saving into the focal point for its 
explanatory efforts. And second, it brings the relation between global imbalances and real 
interest rates into sharper relief, opening up a new channel through which the former might be 
seen to affect financial conditions in the West.  
These changes become more obvious in September when the FRB sets out to explain 
the emergence of a ‘global saving glut’. Without denying the importance of Asian investment 
restraint, it suggests that a number of post-crisis policies have positively influenced saving 
rates in the region, such as “a resistance to currency appreciation, the determined 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, and fiscal consolidation” (Bernanke, 11 
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September 2007). It then uses both saving and investment to account for the increase in Asia’s 
net desired saving after 1997: 
… the further expansion of the region’s net supply of saving in the past two years 
appears to reflect primarily an increase in desired saving by the emerging-market 
countries, whereas the previous increase in net saving also involved some decline 
in desired investment in East Asia after the financial crises of the 1990s. 
(Bernanke, 11 September 2007) 
Finally, the FRB links this excess of saving over investment to the build-up of current 
account surpluses in Asia, and suggests that these have put downward pressure on both world 
and US interest rates (Bernanke, 11 September 2007). Thus, while the under-investment story 
remains intact, it is now interwoven with a fledgling one about active over-saving and easy 
money. Crucially, this latter factor serves as a causal link between Asian governments’ 
response to their crisis and the recently revealed problems in developed financial markets.  
During late 2007, the BIS also picks up and develops this nascent story of over-saving. 
Following the FRB, it focuses on attempts by Asian governments to hold down exchange 
rates and accumulate reserves after 1997, but weak Asian currencies are now portrayed as a 
key factor behind the persistence of the US current account deficit; and the reinvestment of 
accumulated reserves is more explicitly linked to credit excesses in the West via the interest 
rate channel (White, 20 October 2007). This sets for stage for an additional move in early 
2008, when the BIS uses these policies to help explain the emergence of the US property 
boom: 
The strong increase in US net external liabilities in recent years had been reflected 
in a large decline in US households’ savings, which in turn was associated with the 
US housing credit bubble. On the financing side, Asian central banks had a rapidly 
growing pool of dollar reserves to invest each year … [these] were mainly 
invested in sovereign securities, reinforcing downward pressures on long-term 
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interest rates. Moreover … some central banks turned to ABSs and MBSs. All this 
helped fuel the US property boom. (Hannoun, 21 March 2008) 
For the BIS, then, Asian over-saving has generated both real and financial imbalances in the 
global economy; and these imbalances have served to undermine financial stability by 
fuelling a boom in US housing markets and the market for related structured products. 
Interestingly, as the crisis deepens over the course of 2008, other organisations follow 
suit and develop their versions of the over-saving story. The IMF, for example, reiterates the 
diagnosis of the BIS in September 2008, emphasising the new systemic importance of 
sovereign wealth fund strategies (Lipsky, 3 September 2008). Meanwhile, during the height 
of the crisis in November, the US Treasury makes a passing reference to under-investment, 
but goes on to join the FRB in emphasising on how Asian reserves have “flowed back into US 
financial markets, fuelling investment in housing and spurring financial innovation to increase 
yields” (McCormick, 12 November 2008). Finally, the ECB also links the Asian crisis to 
instability in the present, suggesting that net savings in the region after 1997 have contributed 
to a general under-pricing of risk in financial markets (Trichet, 13 November 2008). In this 
way, then, the initial story of Asian under-investment is gradually crowded-out by that of 
active over-saving. 
Once the dust from the crash has settled, however, the under-investment story is 
nowhere to be seen. Global imbalances continue to feature prominently in a host of different 
crisis narratives, but Asian investment restraint is no longer used to explain their emergence. 
The ECB, for example, squarely places the blame on Asian exchange rate policy: 
One of the lessons of the Asian crisis in the late 1990s … was that countries 
should either let their exchange rates float in order to avoid accumulating 
excessive external imbalances, or adjust their macroeconomic policies to ensure 
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consistency with their peg … The lesson that I would thus draw from the crisis is 
that those recommendations which were not implemented over the last decade 
should now be implemented. (Smaghi, 23 June 2009) 
Although two sets of lessons feature in this short passage, the second emerge through the 
emplotment of the first. That is to say, the Asian crisis is retrospectively identified as a missed 
opportunity, and its unlearnt policy lessons are transformed into root cause of global 
imbalances. The failure of Asian governments to address their earlier mistakes with exchange-
rate policy is therefore itself cast a driver of the ongoing financial crisis. 
The IMF also exaggerates its emphasis on over-saving during late 2009, but does so via 
a somewhat different emplotment of the Asian crisis. Specifically, in a moment of 
uncharacteristically frank self-critique, it suggests that Asian economies have since seen no 
other option than to use export-led growth strategies to insure against capital account shocks, 
given their earlier experience with external support and conditionality (see Strauss-Kahn, 2 
October 2009 and 6 October 2009). This is particularly interesting insofar as ‘outward-
orientation’ was one of the few developmental state practices to come away from the Asian 
crisis unscathed (see Hall, 2003; and Wade, 2003). Moreover, though, it also opens out onto a 
new story about alternatives to self-insurance and the role of the Fund itself in providing for 
these (see Lipsky, 20 October 2009).11 But for the purposes of our current discussion, the 
main point is that Asian crisis is once again linked to the crisis of 2007-2009 via active over-
saving rather than passive under-investment. In so doing, then, the IMF forms part of a 
broader interpretive shift on the part of the international policymaking organisations regarding 
the causal relation between the ongoing turmoil and Asia’s crisis some ten years earlier. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The new Flexible Credit Line, which was developed in response to the events of 2007-2009, represents a key 
plank in the IMF’s attempt to move away from its earlier emphasis on rigid ex-post conditionality (see Broome, 
2010: 46-51). 
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6.4 Summary: Rewriting the Asian crisis 
The status of the Asian crisis as an historical event is not in question. Indeed, its frequent 
invocation by different organisational actors during the crisis of 2007-2009 should be 
interpreted as a confirmation of this status. But at the same time we have also seen the Asian 
crisis itself take the form of a question, with its very meaning emerging as an object of 
sustained speculation. This has resulted in a profusion of different historical representations 
and narratives. It is possible to sort these into three broad categories. 
First, there are those historical representations that are stable over time and command a 
certain degree of cross-organisational agreement – such as those that concern portfolio capital 
flows – where we see almost all organisations use the Asian crisis in order to illustrate the 
importance of domestic institutional arrangements. There is some mention of risks inherent to 
capital flows, but the lesson about ‘good governance’ pioneered in the aftermath of the Asian 
crisis appears to have remained largely intact. Second, there are those stories that develop 
over time but do not acquire a cross-organisational voice. A case in point here is when the 
ECB almost singlehandedly re-interprets the Asian crisis as the birth of a new multilateralism. 
Other organisations do emphasise the creation of the FSF in 1999, but it is the ECB alone that 
uses the rise of the G20 to place the Asian crisis within a broader story about global economic 
governance. And third, there are those stories which develop over time and gradually acquire 
a cross-organisational voice – such as the one the US FRB pioneers about Asian over-saving 
– which we see reiterated by the BIS, US Treasury, ECB and IMF. The Asian crisis is, in 
effect, apperceived as a source of misguided Asian policies, which in turn have contributed to 
the housing market bubble in the US. 
	  Part III 
Past crises and the global financial press 
Journalism, so the adage goes, is the first draft of history. In 2008, the Financial 
Times had a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to report, analyse and comment on the 
most serious financial crisis since the Great Crash of 1929 ... It was a story tailor-
made for the FT. 
– Lionel Barber, Editor-in-Chief of the FT1 
In December of 2008, the FT published a special report that consisted in a selection of articles 
drawn from its coverage over the year past. The purpose of such an exercise was, Barber 
explained, to “offer readers an unfolding narrative, as well as a broader perspective on … 
[the] crisis”. However, that he chose to introduce the report in this way says more about the 
relation of his trade to both history and crisis than he had perhaps intended. The obvious and 
literal reading of his words is that the FT’s ‘first drafts of history’ might one day form the 
basis for later definitive histories of the crisis. Yet insofar as these drafts might entail new 
versions of old crises, they are at the same time already at least second or third drafts. 
Journalistic histories like Barber’s might therefore also be understood as an important input 
into the rewriting of capitalist history. The following chapters provide an analysis of the 
interpretive practices through which such a quasi-historical process might occur, focusing on 
how different past crises have figured within the coverage of the global financial press. The 
results from the preliminary readings are summarised in the table below. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 (Barber, 2008). 
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 FT Economist WSJ Forbes ∑ 
1930s Great Depression 47 80 46 62 235 
1990s Japanese crisis 29 50 14 7 100 
1970s OECD crises 11   24 18  31   84 
2001 dotcom crash 9 44 20 11 84 
1997-98 Asian crisis 20 26 18 5 69 
1980s-90s S&L crisis 4 12 17 9 43 
Multiple crises 8 13 10 2 33 
1998 LTCM crisis 6 18 6 2 32 
Other crises 6 15 5 5 31 
Unspecified crises 6 19 2 2 29 
1987 stock market crash 4 10 7 7 28 
1990s Scandinavian crises 4 18  4 1 27 
1980s debt crisis 3 9 6 4 22 
2002 corporate scandals 1 11 5 5 22 
Pre-1930 crises 3 13 2 3 21 
1990s crises 2 13 5 -- 20 
2000s other crises 1 11 2 5 19 
1994-95 Mexican crisis -- 1 2 3 6 
1970s non-OECD crises -- 3 -- 2 5 
1992 ERM crisis 3 1 -- -- 4 
 
 
Figure III         Past crises mentioned in the global financial press         (Source: Author’s own) 2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Once again, the summary table provided records the number of different articles in which the specified past 
crises are invoked, rather than counting the total number of times that they are mentioned within these. 
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Before delving into the timing and content of these historical representations, it is 
immediately apparent that the Great Depression remains the most widely invoked past crisis 
during the 2007-2009 period. Other key episodes include the Japanese crisis of the 1990s, the 
OECD crises of the 1970s, and the dotcom crash of 2001 (all of which do feature in the 
speeches of the international policymaking organisations, but none quite as prominently as 
they do here in the global financial press). In particular, the crises of Japan and the 1970s 
seem to have taken on a new importance. Conversely, the Asian crisis does not appear to be 
nearly as central to press coverage as it is to the pronouncements of policymaking 
organisations. 
In keeping with the approach adopted in Part II, past crises are analysed here in terms of 
how they are brought into the interpretive orbit of the present. However, rather than focusing 
on the most frequently invoked episodes and then tracing how these are incorporated into 
specific strands of discussion or debate, a somewhat different approach is adopted. 
Specifically, the circulation of individual past crises is explored through the strands of 
discussion or debate within which they figure. Hence, while Chapter 7 undertakes an in-depth 
analysis of appeals to the Great Depression, it does so by focusing in particular on those 
appeals that entail the idea of its recurrence. It finds that while the 1930s are consistently 
invoked in ways that purport to reveal the historicity of the ongoing crisis, these portrayals in 
fact produce an oscillation between different visions of historical repetition, which in turn 
underpin competing interpretations of the crisis as it unfolds. The remaining chapters then go 
on to explore on how past crises are incorporated into three broad and overlapping topics of 
policy debate. 
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Chapter 8 focuses on the question of crisis management. It finds that past rescues are 
initially used in order to establish the need for some kind of financial sector rescue, but that 
this soon gives way to attempts to draw more specific lessons about the design of bailout 
packages, and to assess the broader implications of such emergency initiatives. Chapter 9 then 
focuses on the question of policy activism more broadly, and on the debates surrounding 
monetary and fiscal policy in particular. It finds that past crises are first used to diagnose 
different monetary origins for the ongoing turmoil, and that these narratives then open out 
onto attempts to draw lessons for both the immediate and more long-term conduct of 
monetary policy. It also observes how the role of fiscal policy during prior crises is invoked 
as part of attempt to define the appropriate use of such tools in the present. Finally, Chapter 
10 focuses on how histories of structural change figure in debates over financial regulation. It 
finds that while various past crises are incorporated into stories about the present 
disorganisation of finance, only a few key turning points are used to grasp these together and 
assess both the contours and desirability of an ongoing shift in regulatory orientation. 
	  Chapter 7 
The idea of another Great Depression 
In the global financial press coverage of 2007-2009, the Great Depression does not simply 
return; it returns with a vengeance. It is by far the most frequently mentioned past crisis, 
accounting for approximately a quarter of all references to past crises during the period in 
question, and it is invoked more than twice as often as the next most prominent episode, the 
Japanese crisis (see Figure III). Moreover, these references are spread relatively evenly across 
all four of the publications under study, making it the most frequently mentioned crisis not 
just in aggregate but also at the level of each individual publication. The column chart below 
provides a breakdown of these references over time and by publication.1 
 
Figure 7  References to the Great Depression, 2007-2009 (Source: Author’s own) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Between 2007 and 2009, the Great Depression is referred to in a total of 235 separate articles: the Economist 
invokes it on 80 separate occasions, the FT on 47, Forbes on 62, and the WSJ on 45 (see Figure III). 
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In much the same way as we see with the international policymaking organisations, 
references to the Great Depression in the press are more numerous and frequent following the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. However, they reach their peak here in the 
final months of 2008, which is somewhat earlier than is the case with the policymaking 
organisations.2 The nature of these references is also far more varied in the global financial 
press. Some are familiar and will be examined at length in the later chapters – such as those 
that concern financial sector bailouts, monetary policy and financial regulation – but others 
we encounter here for the first time. 
Take the themes of greed and fraud, for example, which feature prominently in the 
wider press coverage of the 2007-2009 crisis. The Economist twice addresses these via an 
invocation of 1930s. First, in response to the emergent Bernie Madoff scandal, it quotes J.K. 
Galbraith and compares Madoff’s case to the “great swindles of the 1930s”, offering up a 
lament to the cyclicality of fraud in near-Minskyan fashion (Economist, 18 December 2008a). 
But then some months later, in response to the furore over the Royal Bank of Scotland’s 
golden parachute for Sir Fred Goodwin, it adopts an entirely different position, using the 
spectre of another Great Depression to criticise the practice of “banker-bashing”, which it 
describes as “getting in the way of saving the system” (Economist, 5 March 2009). 
What is interesting about these two arguments is not that they indicate the centrality of 
the 1930s to discussions about the role of greed and fraud in the 2007-2009 crisis. In fact, 
these are the only two instances in which such an explicit connection is made, and the past 
crises that feature most prominently in discussions of this sort are actually the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals of the early 2000s. Rather, they are interesting because they signal the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 These peak in mid-2009 (see Figure 4). 
Chapter 7 
149 
	  
involvement of the 1930s in a more fundamental debate about the historicity of the unfolding 
present. In effect, what we see in them is a shift between two different conceptions of crisis – 
cyclical capitalist crisis on one side, epochal crisis of capitalism on the other – where each of 
these imply their own distinct relation to history as a developmental process (see § 1.2). 
Hence, even as isolated appeals to the 1930s within the context of discussions about greed and 
fraud, they open out onto a broader set of arguments about exactly what kind of crisis the 
world was undergoing in 2008. As it turns out, these articles are in fact expressive of a wider 
oscillation between cyclical and epochal readings of the Great Depression, and competing 
visions of historical repetition feature quite prominently in the global financial press coverage 
of 2007-2009. The remainder of this section focuses on how these visions of repetition evolve 
over the course of the crisis. 
7.1 Visions of cyclical repetition 
To begin with, the 1930s are primarily used to support a cyclical reading of the emergent 
crisis. In mid-2007, for example, the Economist cites the response of American banker Leon 
Fraser to the 1929 crash: “Better to have loaned and lost than never to have loaned at all” (17 
May 2007j). In so doing, it asserts the enduring reality of a business cycle, depicting the 
ongoing housing market correction as the latest instalment in a long series of booms and 
busts. And then as fears of a painful correction mount, the FT comments on the increase in 
references to various other episodes within this series. Specifically, it observes that although 
“few pundits have attempted to suggest … a replay of the best-known drama of all – 1929”, a 
certain return of history is nevertheless underway: 
Chapter 7 
150 
	  
[T]he indifference towards the past is being replaced by a violent thirst for 
historical knowledge, as financiers reacquaint themselves with the unpalatable 
truth that almost every bubble is accompanied by a belief that innovation has 
changed the rules – a belief that typically proves to be false. (Tett, 26 August 
2007) 
Here we see 1929 invoked via reflexive counter-analogy rather than as part of a direct 
historical analogy, but the end result is the same: to present the ongoing crisis as 
fundamentally cyclical in nature. In the case of the Economist, 1929 is called upon to stand in 
for a more general type of recurrent crisis, whereas with the FT, its specificity is 
acknowledged but underwritten by an appeal to exactly the same kind of quasi-natural 
economic cycles. Both also make more or less explicit assertions about the pro-cyclical 
psychology of boom-and-bust.3 In this way, the crash of 1929 serves to emphasise the familiar 
and unavoidable aspects of the subprime meltdown, and rather than an especially unique 
occurrence, repetition is itself portrayed as something that just happens: again and again and 
again… 
This begins to change as the crisis deepens in early 2008. Following the rescue of Bear 
Stearns, some publications start drawing parallels with the 1930s as a specific and epochal 
crisis. First and foremost among these is the Economist, which identifies a string of 
similarities between the two episodes, focusing in particular on the scale of the asset bubble 
collapse (10 April 2008b), the extension of emergency support to an investment bank (15 
May 2008d), and the rate of decline in US house prices (3 July 2008c). It even goes on to read 
this last factor as symptomatic of a failing American capitalism (24 July 2008a). Meanwhile, 
the FT takes up the IMF’s latest description of the crisis – “the largest financial shock since 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The Economist pursues this line further in early 2009 when it compares the statements of Depression-era 
economist and failed investor Irving Fisher to those of former Citigroup head Chuck Prince, suggesting that they 
each effectively gave voice to a pro-cyclical bias inherent to the psychology of financial market participation (22 
January 2009c). 
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the Great Depression” – and situates this alongside extant threats of (geo-) monetary disorder, 
announcing the arrival of an important “turning point” in the management of the world 
economy (cited in Wolf, 22 April 2008). Rather than another in a long line of crises, then, the 
subprime meltdown is interpreted here as the potential return of a more virulent and 
historically significant strain of crisis. Certainty slides into speculation, and repetition starts to 
take the form of an open question: Again? 
However, this vision of repetition does not immediately take off, and for some months it 
remains latent or at least counterbalanced by the readings offered by Forbes and the WSJ. For 
example, in early 2008, Forbes repeatedly rejects comparisons to the 1930s as overblown, 
suggesting that these comparisons are themselves the product of a cycle in investor sentiment: 
Gloomy people are saying that we are in the midst of the worst financial crisis 
since the 1930s. They said the same thing in 1998. Bullish! You can’t find a time 
in the 20th century when, less than five months into a real global bear market, 
people were talking bear market and recession in any visible numbers. But they 
always talk disaster during corrections. (Fisher, 21 April 2008) 
Both publications also set about debunking such comparisons via direct counter-
analogy. For the WSJ, another 1930s-style depression would require a return to the “major 
policy blunders” of that era, which it suggests have yet to prove forthcoming (Roche, 14 
March 2008); while for Forbes, the lack of protectionism and use of expansionary monetary 
policy already signal the existence of a different policy landscape to that of the 1930s 
(Malpass, 21 April 2008). The WSJ also focuses on key economic indicators, pointing out 
that US mortgage delinquency rates are not nearly as high as they were in the 1930s (Berlau, 
20 September 2008); and both growth and employment figures not nearly as low (Becker, 7 
October 2008). This line of argument culminates in an article published by the WSJ at the 
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peak of crisis, entitled We’re Not Headed for a Depression. Within it, author and Chicago 
economist Gary Becker explicitly dismisses suggestions of an epochal crisis: “the crisis that 
kills capitalism”, he reminds us, “has been said to happen during every major recession and 
financial crisis ever since Karl Marx” (7 October 2008). In this rather extreme view, history is 
in no danger of repeating itself because history itself is nothing more than a repetition of 
cyclical ups and downs. Indeed, the only real danger is that governments might fail to 
recognise this and respond to these cycles in misguided ways. 
7.2 Visions of epochal repetition 
Although this reading of the crisis does not disappear entirely, the notion of benign repetition 
clearly gives way in late 2008 to fears about a new epochal crisis of capitalism. This is 
already apparent even at the level of vocabulary, where words such as ‘downturn’, ‘decline’, 
‘slump’ and ‘recession’ are quickly crowded-out by ones such as ‘crash’, ‘collapse’, ‘damage’ 
and ‘depression’, but it becomes even more obvious when one considers the object around 
which these words circulate – the idea of ‘another Great Depression’. Rather than supporting 
cyclical readings of the 2007-2009 crisis, references to the 1930s now emphasise their status 
as a specific and properly historical episode, bringing the weight of its many consequences to 
bear on the present in the form of various imagined futures. This occurs through two distinct 
but interdependent practices of historical representation.  
First, there are analogies with the scale and scope of the Great Depression. As we have 
already seen, the Economist begins drawing these in mid-2008 following the bailout of Bear 
Stearns, but after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in early September, the other three 
publications also join in and all four begin making numerous and frequent parallels with the 
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1930s. For instance, Forbes considers a massive consumer retrenchment in the US on a par 
with that of the 1930s (Shilling, 29 September 2008); and the WSJ focuses on the scale and 
persistence of US stock market losses, which it suggests are comparable only to those of 
December 1931 (Anonymous, 9 October 2008). Meanwhile, both the FT and the Economist 
emphasise the spread of the crisis beyond the confines of the US (Wolf, 7 October 2008; 
Economist, 23 October 2008b); and the WSJ identifies a threat of “global stag-deflation” that 
would see the macroeconomic dynamics of the Depression replayed on the world stage 
(Bremmer & Roubini, 23 January 2009). In these ways, analogies with the 1930s come to 
underline the potential significance of the emergent crisis, and the idea of historical repetition 
is well and truly transformed into a question. 
But in order for this question to be posed both in and to the present, the idea of epochal 
repetition must be invested with some kind of determinate content – exactly what might 
happen again? For this reason, in addition to analogies of scale and scope, we also find a 
series of historical representations that focus on the causes and consequences of the Great 
Depression. These are quite varied and will continue to feature in each of the later sections in 
this chapter. The discussion here will concentrate on those that are most explicitly linked to 
the idea of repetition – namely, those concerning issues of trade and political instability.  
References to trade first emerge in mid-2007, when Forbes uses the Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff Act of 1930 to illustrate the self-defeating effects of protectionism (see Malpass, 16 
April 2007; and Forbes, 2 July 2007). These remain relatively isolated references until mid-
2008, when both Forbes and the Economist begin applying this kind of lesson to various 
contemporary developments in trade policy, but it is not really until late 2008 that 
publications begin bringing them to bear on the financial crisis. The earliest and most basic 
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references of this sort simply assert the ongoing importance of keeping markets open: Forbes, 
for example, reiterates its claim that “The Depression was actually triggered by the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff” (Forbes, 10 November 2008); and the WSJ uses this same claim to underline 
the need to address stalled multilateral negotiations (Bush, 15 November 2008). Meanwhile, 
the Economist relates it to resurgent debates over the future of Anglo-Saxon capitalism, 
insisting that “The free movement of non-financial goods and services should not be dragged 
into the argument – as they were, to disastrous effect, in the 1930s” (Economist, 16 October 
2008). 
These references are soon supplemented by a range of subtle variations that relate the 
fear of a collapse in trade to different aspects of the crisis. The FT, for example, portrays 
global imbalances as a potential driver of protectionism, arguing that “if the surplus countries 
do not expand domestic demand relative to potential output, the open world economy may 
even break down”, adding, “as in the 1930s, this is now a real danger” (Wolf, 2 December 
2008; see also 6 January 2009 and 20 January 2009). The Economist focuses instead on 
possible transmission mechanisms, pointing out that global supply chains “could be disrupted 
by policies much less dramatic than the Smoot-Hawley Act” (Economist, 18 December 
2008b; see also 26 March 2009a). And finally, both the Economist and Forbes counsel against 
any complacency regarding a repeat of Smoot-Hawley, identifying proposed ‘Buy American’ 
provisions in the US stimulus package as an ominous harbinger of possible futures-to-come 
(Economist, 5 February 2009b; Forbes, 2 March 2009; and Shlaes, 30 March 2009). In all of 
these instances, fear of repetition is explicitly invoked, and it is underwritten throughout by a 
shared conviction – i.e. ‘we’ cannot afford to overlook the trade lessons of the 1930s. 
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An exaggerated version of this process can be identified in references to war and 
political instability. Once again Forbes takes the lead in mid-2007, arguing that “the Great 
Depression made possible the rise of Nazism and the Second World War” (Forbes, 18 June 
2007); but as the crisis deepens in late 2008, other publications begin to echo this reading of 
the 1930s in various different ways. For example, while Forbes continues to restate its case, 
using the legacy of Nazism to warn against a turn away from free and open markets in the US 
(Forbes, 10 November 2008), the FT instead invokes “Hitler’s rise” and “the horrors a 
depression might bring” in order to urge Congress to rethink its rejection of Paulson’s rescue 
plan for the financial sector (Wolf, 30 September 2008) – two potentially opposed views at 
least in terms of the roles they might wish to afford government (see § 8.3).  
Another common trope is to identify shades of the 1930s on the geopolitical horizon. 
This first to do this is the WSJ, which maps the threat of instability onto the present by 
comparing the leaders of contemporary “rogue states” to the “remorseless fanatics who rose 
up on the crest of economic disaster” during the Great Depression (Friedberg & Schoenfeld, 
21 October 2008). The FT performs a relatively similar manoeuvre in early 2009 when it 
characterises the crisis as another “grave threat to world stability and democracy”, pointing 
out how “revolutions often start as bread riots” (FT Editorial, 8 March 2009). And finally 
Forbes too joins in, emphasising the importance of an engaged and free-trading US by casting 
Latin American populism as the new threat to liberal-democratic capitalism:  
At that time [the 1930s] there was a region in play: Europe. A self-involved U.S. 
turned inward, allowing Mussolini and Hitler free rein. Today Latin America is in 
play, and Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez is waiting in the wings, ready to fill the post-
Castro vacuum. (Shlaes, 30 March 2009) 
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In each of these instances, the spectre of ‘another Great Depression’ takes the form of a 
potential slide into political instability and war. But as this last example clearly illustrates, this 
particular fear of repetition is in no way incompatible with that of another collapse in trade. 
Rather, because trade functions within these representations as a cause and war as a 
consequence, the one fear of repetition in some cases already implies the other. That is to say, 
while some references to ‘another Great Depression’ do not necessarily emphasise trade, 
those that do draw their force from an implicit link between protectionism and some set of 
outcomes deemed worthy of averting. Thus, while Hitler may well seem a more objectionable 
figure than either Smoot or Hawley, ‘Hitler all over again’ is a more exaggerated fear even on 
purely formal-logical terms because it takes us to the next link in the causal chain. 
Nevertheless, with lessons of both trade and war, we see the same basic process at work: by 
inserting the Great Depression into a chain of causal relations and then transposing this chain 
into the present, cause and effect become scrambled, allowing the latter to negate the former 
via an injunction to avoid a repeat of the past: Never again! 
7.3 Repetition averted, repetition resumed 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, these particular visions of repetition are not invoked with quite the 
same frequency once the crisis begins to abate in mid-2009. But rather than disappearing 
altogether, the idea of historical repetition persists and in fact continues to feature prominently 
in references to the 1930s. This is because the idea undergoes yet another process of change 
over the course of 2009. There are three specific developments that are worth highlighting 
here.   
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First, there is a shift away from the notion of imminent epochal repetition. This process 
can be traced as far back as late 2008, when all four publications start incorporating crisis-
response measures into counter-analogies with the 1930s, but it is not really until early 2009 
that these take off. Specifically, after the London G20 Summit in April, both the Economist 
and the FT begin to regularly emphasise the scale and scope of the various measures enacted 
by policymakers, suggesting that these may have reduced the likelihood of another Great 
Depression. The Economist, for example, speaks of “the biggest and most synchronized 
macroeconomic stimulus since the Second World War” (Economist, 2 April 2009a), while the 
FT adds “the most far-reaching socialization of market risk in history” (Wolf, 2009c). Both 
publications do go on to use these same measures to express concerns about the need for exit 
strategies, but the basic point is still reiterated throughout the latter half of 2009. The 
Economist puts it succinctly: “It has become known as the Great Recession…But an equally 
apt name would be the Great Stabilisation” (Economist, 17 December 2009b). ‘It’ of course is 
the crisis, which through sheer force of policy support is here seen as no longer worthy of its 
old epithet – “the next Great Depression”. 
Second, there is the emergence of a new variation on the idea of epochal repetition. This 
can be observed in references to protectionism, which begin to take on a different form as 
fears of another Great Depression subside. We still find the occasional reference to trade 
collapse as a ‘really-existing’ threat, but on the whole these are pushed into the past tense 
where they instead name a threat that ‘really-existed’ but has since been overcome. The 
Economist, for example, argues that although “trade has contracted by more in this crisis than 
it had at a comparable stage of the Depression … [there is] little doubt that the decline in trade 
has bottomed out” (Economist, 23 July 2009a). Meanwhile, even Forbes – which was the 
publication most critical of US trade policy – backs away from its earlier predictions of a 
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return to the 1930s, claiming that “[al]though Barack Obama is the most protectionist 
President since Herbert Hoover, we are not likely to pass another Depression-creating Smoot-
Hawley-like tariff bill” (Forbes, 16 November 2009c). 
This same change is also evident in references to war and political stability. These 
become far less common in late 2009, but when Forbes and the FT do revisit the theme their 
discussion is inflected with a palpable sense of relief. For Forbes this rests primarily on what 
it sees as a lack of “credible alternatives to traditional democratic liberal values”, which it 
suggests has kept the “ghastly ideologies” of the 1930s at bay (Forbes, 24 August 2009). 
However, in the case of the FT, this argument is incorporated into a much broader counter-
analogy with the early 1900s: 
The good news is that the world has not made mistakes as big as those that 
followed the noughties a century ago: thanks, partly to nuclear weapons, direct 
conflicts among great powers have been avoided; a liberal world economy has 
survived, so far; the lessons of the 1930s were applied to the financial crisis of the 
2000s, with at least short-run success … [and] While the movement towards 
democracy of the early 1990s has slowed, the number of grossly malign 
totalitarian regimes is now small, at least by the standards of the 20th century. 
(Wolf, 23 December 2009) 
Here, against a similar geopolitical and ideological backdrop to the one depicted by Forbes, 
we also find two explanations being offered as to why the crisis was not as deep as the Great 
Depression – first, “the open liberal world economy has survived …”; and then second, “the 
lessons of the 1930s were applied …” Each of these echoes the changes just observed in 
references to protectionism and crisis-response measures, but with respect to war the basic 
shift is the same as the one we see in Forbes. Specifically, the 1930s are used to illustrate how 
a threat to political stability was overcome, rather than to indicate the existence of any such 
threat in the present. 
Chapter 7 
159 
	  
Thus, in late 2009 we see a shift away from the idea of imminent repetition via general 
policy counter-analogies and more specific references to both trade and war. It is important to 
note, however, that what takes its place remains a vision of repetition, and that this new vision 
rests on a largely unchanged reading of the 1930s. With references to war, for example, there 
is agreement on what it is that might happen again – gulags, concentration camps, the end of 
the world etc. Meanwhile, with references to trade there appears to be agreement on how this 
might happen again, for a link between tariffs and the Great Depression is affirmed not only 
at the height of the perceived protectionist threat but also in its aftermath. The key difference, 
therefore, concerns when all of this might happen again. More precisely, then, what we see is 
a shift towards a vision in which repetition is latent rather than imminent.  
With this distinction in place we can now see the early references to trade and war that 
emerge in late 2007 as the beginning of a process through which visions of latent epochal 
repetition, based on hegemonic historical narratives, are called upon by actors in the global 
financial press and transformed into visions of imminent epochal repetition. Moreover, we 
can also understand the shift that occurs in late 2009 as a kind of becoming-latent, whereby 
fears of repetition are returned to the storehouse of History via counter-analogy and the use of 
past participles. And if we look back over the course of the crisis, we might now also observe 
that the idea of epochal repetition has moved through a series of different forms – ‘there could 
be, ‘there will be’, ‘there will not be’, ‘there has not been’. 
The third development worth emphasising here is the re-emergence of references to the 
1930s that invoke the idea of cyclical repetition. As we have already seen, these were 
crowded out in late 2008 when the crisis deepened and publications began turning to the idea 
of epochal repetition, but they were never abandoned entirely. In fact, during the months 
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following the Lehman bankruptcy, all four publications incorporate the 1930s into a 
contrarian and opportunistic reading of the business cycle on at least one occasion.4 In late 
2009, however, both Forbes and the WSJ return to this theme, retroactively rejecting the idea 
of another Great Depression and announcing the arrival of a new bull market.  
In August, for example, Forbes dismisses recent stock market dips by identifying 1935 
as the only bull market that did not encounter “some material indigestion within its first 
twelve months” (Fisher, 24 August 2009). Meanwhile, the WSJ focuses instead on the bear 
market trough of 1932, pointing out that “investors who had the courage to invest realized 
handsome long-term gains” (Stewart, 9 September 2009). In each of these instances, 
references to the Great Depression once again serve to emphasise the familiar and cyclical 
aspects of the now receding crisis. Thus, at the same time as we see a shift away from fears of 
imminent epochal repetition, we also see a parallel shift back towards the idea of natural 
cyclical repetition – the only difference is that this is now achieved by retrospectively 
identifying an inevitable upswing, rather than assessing the immediate prospect of another 
downturn. Indeed, one might even be tempted to say that cyclical conceptions of crisis and 
repetition are themselves pro-cyclical phenomena – prominent when economies are doing 
well, but not nearly so popular when things go wrong. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The FT and the WSJ, for example, ask whether markets might have reached a trough as they did in 1932 
(Wolf, 25 November 2008; Stewart, 28 January 2009); meanwhile, both the Economist and Forbes recommend 
buying stocks even with default rates at Depression-era levels (Economist, 4 December 2008a; Dreman, 8 
December 2008). 
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7.4 Summary: The 1930s as historical black mirror 
During the peak of the crisis in late 2008, the Economist began one of its article-sections by 
inviting readers to view “Smoot-Hawley in the rear mirror” (Economist, 16 October 2008). In 
effect, it sought to use a simple visual metaphor in order to bring the 1930s into the present 
and emphasise the dangers of protectionism. As we bring this chapter to a close, let us attempt 
to condense our thoughts into a visual metaphor of our own. Specifically, let us imagine that 
the very idea of ‘the Great Depression’ might function as if it were itself a kind of mirror. 
During the age of the Picturesque in the late 18th century, landscape painters across 
Europe used small black convex mirrors to reduce and unify the objects of nature under their 
gaze. Upon walks they would quite literally stop, turn their back on the scene that interested 
them, and look instead into their mirror, adjusting their position until they were confronted 
with an image they deemed beautiful enough to paint (see Maillet, 2004: 85-101).  In much 
the same way, during the crisis of 2007-2009, no financial journalist seems willing to wander 
far without an idea of the Great Depression at the ready, convinced that only these will enable 
them to bring the ‘whole’ of the present into view and deliver History over to language. Thus, 
at each and every stage of the crisis, we find publications turning to the 1930s in order to 
depict historical process.  
Of course, we also find a range of different Great Depressions being invoked. But rather 
than there being a stable relation between a specific publication and any one of these Great 
Depressions, what we find instead is that historical representations and images of the 
historical present co-evolve in ways that differ slightly from publication to publication. In 
order to capture the logic of this process, we might recall a specific variety of the black mirror 
known as the Claude Lorraine Glass. Rather than a single mirror, the Claude Lorraine Glass 
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describes a portable set of convex tinted lenses that tourists carried with them on walks 
through the countryside. Upon encountering a compelling scene, these walkers would 
experiment by looking at it through any one of their different coloured lenses, allowing them 
to “modify the weather and the luminosity of a day or a season in the space of a few seconds” 
(Maillet, 2004: 142). With Claude Glasses, then, one’s physical position and chosen lens 
interact to reveal the ‘truth’ of Nature, but they also shape the way this truth appears in the 
present. With the idea of the Great Depression, conjuncture and historical representation 
interact to produce an image of History in much the same way. While in late 2007 and late 
2009, 1929 and 1932 serve to render the crisis as a mere moment within a trans-historical 
business cycle, in late 2008 and early 2009, 1930 and 1939 instead present it as a properly 
epochal turning point. 
By way of summary, then, we might say that the 1930s are repeatedly invoked in ways 
that purport to reveal the historicity of the 2007-2009 crisis, and that these representations of 
the 1930s interact with the unfolding crisis to produce different interpretations of its 
historicity. However, we should stress that this does not simply implicate the 1930s in an 
ongoing process of historical (re-) interpretation, for it also indicates a relation between this 
process and the discursive negotiation of the 2007-2009 crisis itself. 
	  Chapter 8 
Histories of crisis management 
By providing the basis for divergent readings of the 2008 crisis, appeals to the 1930s 
effectively open out onto a range of debates about how governments should prevent and/or 
respond to crises. But rather than resting on portrayals of the 1930s alone, these debates in 
fact entail references to a variety of other past crises as well. In order to better understand how 
practices of historical representation feed into interpretive struggle in the present, we will now 
shift our focus onto how different past crises have been incorporated into specific policy 
debates within the global financial press. Over the following sub-sections these debates are 
sorted into three broad groups – namely, those that concern immediate crisis management 
efforts, those that concern policy activism more generally, and those that concern structural 
changes in the relation between finance and regulation. These groupings do of course overlap, 
but for both analytical and expository purposes I have chosen to treat them in turn. The 
present chapter therefore focuses on debates surrounding emergency policy measures in 
general, and those aimed at the stabilisation of financial systems in particular. 
During the crisis of 2007-2009, governments around the world introduced a raft of 
emergency initiatives, ranging from private sector-backed toxic asset schemes to full-blown 
bank nationalisations. Financial journalists commented upon these in great detail, and in 
discussing the various measures being enacted, they made extensive reference to the history of 
crisis management. Once again, the Great Depression stands out as the most frequently 
invoked past crisis, but in addition to it we also find appeals to other historical episodes such 
as the Japanese crisis of the 1990s, the Nordic banking crises of the early 1990s, and the US 
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S&L crisis of the late 1980s.1 The column chart below provides a quantitative breakdown of 
these references both over time and by past crisis. 
 
 
Figure 8         Main past crises mentioned in discussions of ‘crisis management’          (Source: Author’s own) 
 
As the chart clearly indicates, references to the history of crisis management cluster 
around key moments in the management of the 2007-2009 crisis. Specifically, they are 
concentrated in three broad time periods: (1) early 2008, following the rescue of Northern 
Rock and Bear Stearns; (2) late 2008/early 2009, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
and subsequent introduction of various state bailouts; and (3) mid to late 2009, following the 
London meeting of the G20. However, in addition to this general pattern, we also find a 
number of key differences between publications in terms of which past crises they most 
frequently invoke, and in how they portray crisis management efforts during these episodes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 During the period under study, the 1930s are mentioned in discussions of ‘crisis management’ on 55 separate 
occasions, the Japanese crisis on 32, the Scandinavian on 22, and the S&L on 13. In addition to these past crises, 
we also find references to the collapse of LTCM and the Dotcom crash, but these are much less frequent. 
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The remainder of this chapter explores the emergence and significance of these differences 
through a discussion of three themes: first, the basic rationale for financial sector rescues; 
second, the relative merits of different rescue strategies; and third, the broader implications of 
these for the future of the capitalist state. 
8.1 Banking on disaster 
As we have already seen, analogies with the scale and scope of the Great Depression begin to 
emerge in early 2008, and come to form the basis for fears of epochal repetition by the end of 
that year. But rather than concerning the dynamics of finance itself, these fears are in fact 
premised on a particular story about trade protectionism (§ 7.2). Alongside them, however, we 
find a range of other historical representations that specifically concern the financial sector 
and its risk of entering into crisis. Moreover, in asking after the state of capital, these also 
serve to raise the question of what capital might require of the state. 
Representations of this sort first appear in late 2007, when journalists start turning to 
past crises in order to assess the importance of the ongoing credit crunch. In August, for 
example, the WSJ invokes both the stock market crash of 1987 and the collapse of Long-
Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, but ends up settling on a comparison with the 
S&L crisis, which it suggests involved a similar combination of financial panic and ‘real’ 
economic problems. It then uses this analogy to emphasise the potential severity of the 
unfolding crisis, reminding us that the S&L crisis required “a massive bailout from Congress” 
(Stewart, 29 August 2007). However, for the time being, this does not yet amount to a call for 
any such a bailout in the present. Indeed, only a month later – and in response to the Northern 
Rock rescue – the WSJ once again invokes a string of past crises, but this time it uses the 
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Fed’s response to these in order to raise the issue of moral hazard. Specifically, it describes 
the “Greenspan put” of the 1990s as a form of monetary-policy bailout to reckless investors, 
and then uses this to warn against any provision of relief to subprime borrowers that would 
involve “rewarding foolish lenders” (Rattner, 20 September 2007). Meanwhile, in response 
the US Treasury-backed ‘super-conduit’ plan, the FT performs a similar gesture, comparing it 
to the Fed-led rescue of LTCM and asking whether the banks contributing assets to this new 
plan might in effect be “being bailed out of [their] lending errors with a murky form of 
innovative off-balance sheet financing” (FT Editorial, 15 October 2007). Thus, during the 
early stages of the crisis, the history of crisis management is primarily invoked in ways that 
focus on the damage that bailouts could cause, rather than the dangers their absence might 
pose. 
This begins to change in early 2008 when the deepening crisis prompts some 
commentators to start invoking the Great Depression. Specifically, we find the two UK 
publications using the 1930s to ask whether some form of targeted state intervention might in 
fact be necessary. The Economist, for example, suggests that problems in the US housing 
market “may yet justify dusting off Depression-era institutions, such as the Home Owner’s 
Loan Corporation, which bought and refinanced distressed mortgages” (14 February 2008b).  
Meanwhile, in the wake of the Bear Stearns rescue, both the FT and the Economist endorse 
the Fed’s extension of support to an investment bank by underlining the consequences of its 
failure to do so in the early 1930s (FT Editorial, 14 March 2008a; Economist, 27 March 
2008). But despite these mounting references to the Great Depression, the WSJ continues to 
express fears about the systemic implications of interventionism. Indeed, in contradistinction 
to the FT and the Economist, it uses the 1930s to question rather than justify the Bear Stearns 
rescue, arguing that the Fed’s use of an untested Depression-era statute “raises genuine issues 
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of moral hazard” (WSJ Editorial, 18 March 2008), and that its recent actions should therefore 
be seen as a major source of risk in themselves, even in the face of a 1930s-style balance-
sheet recession (Reinhart, 26 March 2008). 
We also find this same disagreement over Bear Stearns playing out through references 
to the LTCM rescue. On the one hand there is the WSJ, which comments approvingly on the 
markedly lower share-price in the case of the Bear Stearns sale, but nonetheless sees the Fed’s 
decision to provide guarantees on Bear’s securities as a new and ultimately more significant 
source of moral hazard (WSJ Editorial, 18 March 2008). On the other hand, however, we find 
the Economist arguing that the Fed’s rescue of LTCM was in fact a foretelling of the 
measures it would be forced enact by Bear Stearns some ten years later: 
The growing complexity of links between banks is the reason why Bear Stearns, 
an investment bank that may not have worried regulators had it failed 15 years 
ago, could not be left to collapse today. The manner of its rescue recalled the 
efforts to shore up LTCM, a hedge fund tied intricately into the financial system, 
in 1998. Bear’s demise also shows how the boundary between illiquidity and 
insolvency is fast dissolving. The bank was sold for a fraction of its book value ... 
Yet it is not clear whether it was insolvent ... By throwing open its discount 
window to investment banks, the Fed has tacitly admitted that the old rules no 
longer apply. (Economist, 19 March 2008e) 
Thus, through appeals to both the Great Depression and the LTCM rescue, we see the 
emergence of two different positions on the sale of Bear Stearns. For the WSJ, the Fed’s new 
commitments are a foolhardy expansion of its traditional crisis management role, but for the 
Economist, these are instead an appropriate response to the new and more fragile structure of 
financial systems after securitisation. Interestingly, the difficulty of distinguishing between 
illiquidity and insolvency – which is precisely what the Economist stresses in its argument 
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here – soon evolves into a key topic of discussion in relation to the management of the 
ongoing crisis.   
After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and in response to the subsequent step 
change in national rescue efforts, we find financial journalists invoking a range of past crises 
in order to address the question of how public money might be best deployed (§ 8.2). But 
before this – and during the peak of the crisis – all four publications actually use the 1930s in 
order to advocate or justify the recourse to state funds in more general terms. The Economist, 
for example, suggests that liquidity injections are unlikely to be sufficient in the face of a 
1930s-style banking bust, and that governments have no choice but to step into the breach and 
use “public funds to prevent a capital-starved banking system [from] dragging their 
economies down” (Economist, 9 October 2008e). The FT soon reiterates this point in slightly 
different terms, suggesting that references to the 1930s themselves indicate an end to policy 
denial on this very issue: 
Nevermind the (oft-quoted) suggestion that we are witnessing the worst stress 
since the 1930s ... while that talk might sound terrifying, it also contains seeds of 
real hope ... there is now a clear consensus among western policy leaders that ... 
liquidity concerns reflect genuine solvency and capital fears ... they also recognise, 
even in the US, that the only answer is to use taxpayers” cash to recapitalise banks 
in a systemic manner, instead of demanding central banks should solve the 
problem with ever-more creative liquidity tricks. (Tett, 13 October 2008) 
Meanwhile, the WSJ describes attempts by the US Treasury to purchase toxic securities 
from banks as “a step in the right direction”, arguing that the Fed had failed to recognise the 
difference between the ongoing crisis and that of the 1930s, effectively misdiagnosing the 
former as 1930s-style crisis of liquidity (see Carney, 18 October 2008). Even Forbes offers a 
tentative endorsement of public recapitalisation efforts, suggesting that without these the 
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crisis “would have crushed economies as severely as did the Great Depression” (Forbes, 10 
November 2008). Thus, from an initial position of scepticism in late 2007 – which was based 
on appeals to the US state rescues of the 1990s – we have now moved to one of shared 
approval: by the peak of the crisis, all four publications invoke the 1930s in ways that express 
their support for the introduction of emergency government initiatives. 
8.2 Bad assets and good rescues 
Alongside the shift outlined above, discussion also begins to turn towards the design of these 
initiatives; and as more emergency measures are introduced, we find a range of past crises 
being incorporated into debates about what a ‘good’ rescue package would entail. Among 
these, the Japanese crisis is by far the most frequently invoked, but over the course of 2008 
and 2009, it appears in a variety of combinations with other past crises. Upon closer analysis, 
this evolving web of historical representation is quite clearly implicated in the emergence of 
different positions on crisis management strategy. In effect, what we find are journalists using 
specific histories of crisis management in order to reveal the appropriate form and speed of 
government intervention in the present.  
This process can be traced all the way back to late 2007, when Japan is first introduced 
into discussions about crisis management. The two UK publications take the lead here, and 
from the very outset, they use the Japanese experience in order to reveal how not to deal with 
banking crises. The Economist does this first by focusing on the issue of bad loans. 
Specifically, in response to new revelations about banks” exposures to subprime-related 
assets, it invokes the “worrying lesson ... [of] ... post-bubble Japan”, where regulators delayed 
recovery by allowing banks to keep so-called “zombie” loans on their books (Economist, 8 
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November 2007). The way to avoid a Japanese-style slump, it then suggests, would be to 
force banks to recognise their losses and shed bad assets: “if the banks do not come clean, 
regulators should push them” (Economist, 8 November 2007). 
The FT soon takes up and expands upon this basic gesture, devoting an entire article to 
Japan’s Salutary Tale. Once again, it stresses the importance of forcing banks to reveal their 
losses quickly, but in addition to this, it also observes how “Japan only managed to rebuild its 
banking system when the government agreed to pour in billions of dollars in funds” (Tett, 1 
January 2008). Hence, the Japanese experience is now used to draw both positive and 
negative lessons for current policy; and the positive lesson indicates a non-market-based 
solution to the loss of faith in structured finance. As it happens, these two shifts prove to be 
quite important, for they effectively establish the parameters for all subsequent discussion of 
the Japanese rescue. In this particular instance, by focusing on the later more successful 
initiatives of Japanese policymakers, the FT advances the idea of using public money to 
support banks via direct injections of capital; over the course of the crisis, however, we find 
both kinds of lessons about Japan being used to promote or defend different strategies for 
state support. There are a number of key developments that are worth highlighting here. 
First, in the wake of Bear Stearns, tensions begin to emerge around the issue of 
recapitalisation. Immediately before the rescue, both the FT and the WSJ use the story of 
Japan’s “costly reluctance” in order to advocate swift public recapitalisation (see Tett, 13 
March 2008; and Wessel, 13 March 2008). But after the Fed’s sudden extension of support to 
the large US investment banks, the question of exactly how to recapitalise the financial 
system is addressed via references to a range of previous banking rescues. The first 
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publication to do this is again the Economist, which immediately draws a counter-analogy of 
response between the Japanese crisis and the Norwegian crisis of the early 1990s:  
Norway’s three biggest lenders were nationalised, but research by its central bank 
puts the fiscal cost at far less than in Finland or Sweden ... Norway probably 
avoided a worse fate by acting swiftly once it was clear that its biggest banks were 
insolvent. The obvious contrast is with Japan, where bad debts were left to fester. 
(Economist, 19 March 2008e) 
By invoking the Japanese crisis in this way, the Economist reiterates its earlier warning about 
the need for timely intervention; but by contrasting this with the success of Norway’s rescue 
strategy, it effectively raises the question of whether bank recapitalisation might be best 
pursued via programmes of temporary nationalisation. At this stage, however, it remains 
precisely that – a question – and the Economist actually ends up suggesting that securitisation 
has made this kind of approach more difficult to implement.2  
Soon after this, the WSJ also begins to invoke the Nordic experience of the early 1990s. 
But rather than Norway, it focuses on the case of Sweden; and instead of the eventual 
recourse to nationalisation, it emphasises the earlier introduction of more intermediate state 
initiatives. Specifically, after drawing a range of lessons from the so-called “Swedish 
solution”, it goes on to depict the Bear Stearns rescue as a potentially sufficient exercise in 
Swedish-style crisis management: 
As it happens, the U.S. already seems to be applying some of the key lessons from 
the Swedish crisis ... The U.S. stepped in quickly to prevent a financial-market 
freeze, took on a chunk of Bear’s bad debt and punished the bank’s shareholders. 
Such Swedish-style aggressiveness early on could help forestall the need for more 
government intervention in the future. (Perry, 7 April 2008) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Specifically, it emphasises the difficulty of tracing bad assets back to individual bank balance sheets, pointing 
out that “these days, the trouble lies as much in the financial markets as with the banks that trade in them” 
(Economist, 19 March 2008e). 
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In drawing such a comparison, the WSJ effectively suggests that Sweden’s primary lesson for 
the present concerns the “aggressiveness” of any initial confidence boosting measures, rather 
than the need for any subsequent more drastic interventions (such as the creation of a ‘bad 
bank’ to manage state-purchased assets, or the assumption of shares in banks receiving capital 
injections). Hence, unlike its UK counterparts, the WSJ does not immediately respond to the 
collapse of Bear Stearns by using past crises in order to consider more involved methods of 
public recapitalisation. 
As bank losses and write-downs continue to accumulate, however, this point of 
difference begins to weaken; and by early October, all four publications actually use at least 
one past rescue in order to advocate the adoption of a bad bank strategy. In mid 2008, for 
example, the WSJ uses the S&L crisis in order to float the idea of creating “a government-
sponsored agency for troubled mortgages”, recalling how the Resolution Trust Corporation 
had performed this function during the early 1990s (Whitehouse & Mollenkamp, 21 April 
2008; see also Hilsenrath & Gongloff, 14 July 2008). Meanwhile, following the fall of 
Lehman, both the Economist and the FT undertake careful analyses of how bad bank schemes 
have figured within past rescues, referring to their eventual success during the Great 
Depression, the S&L crisis and the Japanese crisis (see Tett, 19 September 2008; and 
Economist, 25 September 2008a). Finally, even Forbes makes a concession on this front, 
arguing that if the US government is already in the business of buying up toxic securities, 
then it should at least “consider setting up a new Resolution Trust Corp.” so that these might 
be “liquidated in an orderly way” (Forbes, 6 October 2008). Thus, in place of the earlier 
tension, we now find tentative agreement: at the peak of the crisis, all publications effectively 
endorse an approach to recapitalisation that would see governments purchasing and managing 
bad assets. 
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This agreement proves to be rather short-lived, however, and new tensions soon emerge 
over crisis management strategy. At root, these concern the perceived sufficiency of a bad 
bank plan. For Forbes, the need for such a plan is essentially premised on public money 
having already been committed to asset-relief. Moreover, its primary appeal is seen to consist 
in its ability to function as a kind of exit strategy from this earlier initiative (for example, see 
Becker, 7 October 2008). The creation of a bad bank is therefore presented as a second-best 
and conceivably definitive solution to the ongoing crisis. For the other publications, though, a 
bad bank is seen as unlikely to provide a silver bullet, and in the wake of Paulson’s initial 
$700bn plan, all three begin to argue for a more direct approach to recapitalisation. 
Interestingly, this shift is played out through familiar representations of two past crises.  
As we have already seen, during early 2008, both the Japanese and Nordic rescues are 
used to emphasise the importance of timely intervention. But as the crisis deepens, 
publications start to invoke these episodes in tandem, drawing more substantive lessons about 
bailout design. Specifically, what we find are comparisons between Japan and Sweden being 
used to advocate an approach to recapitalisation that is both decisive and comprehensive. The 
WSJ, for example, draws a counter-analogy between Sweden’s swift interventionism and 
Japan’s costly reluctance, using this contrast in order to prescribe a “one-time dose of 
corporatism”, wherein asset purchases would be combined with public cash transfusions and 
the government receipt of bank warrants (Phelps, 1 October 2008). Meanwhile, the FT makes 
the very same point via an analogy between the two rescues, emphasising how both 
eventually involved “putting money directly into the banks” (Tett, 8 October 2008). Finally, 
the Economist combines both of these basic gestures, overlaying an analogy of eventual 
policy response with a counter-analogy of speed: 
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The lesson of history is that early, decisive government action can stem the pain 
and cost of banking crises. In the 1990s Sweden moved to recapitalize its banks 
quickly and recovered quickly; in Japan, where regulators failed to tackle toxic 
debt, the slump lasted for most of the decade. The twist is that this credit crisis is 
deeper … and broader … Any solution has to be both more systemic and more 
global than before. (Economist, 9 October 2008h) 
Both the FT and the Economist also use these (counter-) analogies in order to pass 
judgment on rescue efforts in Europe and the US, portraying the former – which entailed 
direct capital injections – as more in keeping with the lessons of the Japanese and Swedish 
crises (Tett, 8 October 2008; Economist, 9 October 2008g). And soon after this, each also 
uses these same lessons in order to endorse the belated turn towards direct recapitalisation in 
the US (Economist, 9 October 2008h; FT Editorial, 10 October 2008). The practices of 
historical representation are therefore quite distinct, but their rhetorical effect is largely the 
same: namely, to situate direct equity infusions at the heart of a broader vision for crisis 
management strategy. 
The outlines of this vision, however, continue to take shape in the light of ongoing 
rescue efforts, and whilst the Japanese and Swedish episodes do remain important to the 
discussion, they figure within it in slightly different ways. Specifically, in late 2008, the WSJ 
devotes another entire article to the two rescues, using an extended counter-analogy in order 
to underline the importance of combining toxic assets plans with direct recapitalisation 
schemes (Cronin, 1 December 2008); but in the interim, both UK publications actually use 
these same two rescues to point towards the limits of ‘light touch’ recapitalisation. The 
Economist, for example, recalls how “the Finns and Swedes [actually] nationalised banks – 
and privatised them again later” (16 October 2008), while the FT argues that Japan shows 
how capital injections alone might “not [be] sufficient to heal the economic pain” (Tett, 17 
October 2008).  
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As the crisis develops, this issue of public ownership becomes a key point of tension 
between publications. Specifically, what we find is a range of new historical representations 
that focus more explicitly on the question of nationalisation. References to the Japanese and 
Swedish rescues do persist, but they no longer feature as prominently in discussions of crisis 
management. The only publication that continues to invoke the two episodes in tandem is the 
Economist, which reiterates its earlier call for swift and comprehensive intervention (see 15 
January 2009a; and 12 February 2009c). On one occasion, it does explicitly advocate a 
Swedish-style strategy of conservatorship (Economist, 26 February 2009d), but references to 
that rescue all but disappear by mid 2009. Meanwhile, although the UK publications do 
continue to invoke the Japanese rescue throughout 2009, these consist in generic references to 
‘delay’ and ‘political infighting’, rather than attempts to draw substantive lessons for bailout 
design (for example, see Tett, 17 March 2009; Economist, 26 March 2009b; and Wolf, 14 
April 2009). In effect, both episodes are effectively displaced by the Great Depression, which 
emerges as the key reference point in debates over state rescues. 
8.3 The rise of the state and/or the fall of capitalism 
As we have already seen, by late 2008, the Great Depression simultaneously functions as the 
basis for fears of epochal repetition (§ 7.2), and as an illustration of the need for some kind of 
state intervention (§ 8.1). But alongside these two developments, we also find a third one 
which sees the 1930s inserted into a story about the history of the capitalist state. Specifically, 
as various emergency measures are enacted in response to the prospect of another Great 
Depression, portrayals of that episode begin to reveal the ongoing crisis as a moment of 
pendulum-like reversal in the relation between state and market. Over the course of the crisis, 
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however, individual publications come to take rather different views on the necessity and 
desirability of such a reversal. What follows is a brief account and analysis of this process. 
The notion of historical reversal first appears in January 2008, when Forbes portrays the 
initial provision of relief to subprime borrowers as a turn for the worse in terms of policy 
orientation. Comparing this move to Hoover’s attempts to secure a voluntary freeze on 
redundancies and wage cuts in 1929, it suggests that the Treasury-backed plan “follows bad 
precedents made during the Great Depression” (Forbes, 7 January 2008). Forbes then 
continues in this vein as further crisis-response measures are enacted, casting both Hoover 
and Roosevelt as symbols of a more generic and recurrent form of misguided interventionism. 
In June, for example, it argues that the “myth” of a passive Hoover and an activist Roosevelt 
is skewing US electoral debates, and that Obama’s proposed policies risk repeating their 
respective mistakes not only on trade but also on tax and bailouts (Forbes, 30 June 2008). It 
also reiterates this same point in early September, describing Obama as a dangerous “Hoover-
FDR hybrid” whose activism would leave “the punitive power of natural economic forces … 
deadened and restrained” (Johnson, 1 September 2008). Thus, as fears of epochal repetition 
mount, Forbes suggests that a cyclical downturn might indeed be transformed into another 
Great Depression, but only via a reversion to 1930s-style interventionism. The WSJ adopts a 
very similar position in response to the bailout of AIG, arguing that the risks of “socialized 
finance” are clearly illustrated by “the record of the Depression-era Reconstruction Finance 
Corp.”, and that the only true route to recovery lies in a new bear market (Grant, 18 October 
2008).  
Both the Economist and the FT, which cast the initiatives of the US Treasury and 
Federal Reserve in a decidedly different light, soon invert this nascent vision of repetition. 
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The Economist, for example, explicitly rejects “predictions of a sea change towards more 
invasive government”, and argues that the deployment of public money should be seen as 
reducing the likelihood of a 1930s-style reversal: 
If Mr. Paulson and Mr. Bernanke have prevented a Depression-like collapse in 
output with their actions … then they may also have prevented a Depression-like 
backlash against the free market. (Economist, 25 September 2008a) 
Meanwhile, the FT directly counters the position taken by Forbes on Hoover and 
Roosevelt, characterising the US legislators who blocked Paulson’s Troubled Asset Relief 
Program as irresponsible liquidationists who “should realize that now is not a time for 
Hoovernomics” (FT Editorial, 30 September 2008). Of course, neither publication denies that 
a “redrawing [of] the boundaries between government and markets” is underway, and both 
acknowledge that the Depression was followed by precisely such a redrawing (Economist, 9 
October 2008g; see also FT Editorial, 13 October 2008a). The point, however, is that they do 
not interpret state rescues as another turn away from markets. Instead, they see them as the 
proper response to a recurring paradox: sometimes, bank failure means that government has 
no choice but to “Nationalise [in order] to save the free market” (FT Editorial, 13 October 
2008a). 
As the crisis continues to deepen, Forbes and the WSJ slightly soften their views on the 
need for government intervention. Forbes, for example, concedes that “emergency measures 
may have been necessary”, but still worries that these could create Washington’s “biggest 
power expansion since the New Deal” (Malpass, 10 November 2008). Similarly, the WSJ 
accepts that in exceptional circumstances, “radical government policies should be 
considered”, but still emphasises how “many … including several pursued by Franklin 
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Roosevelt during the Great Depression … can make things worse” (Barro, 4 March 2009). 
However, once fears of epochal repetition give way to extensive international cooperation, 
both publications return to a more unambiguous stance. For example, following the London 
meeting of the G20, the WSJ uses the 1930s to diagnose an ongoing and global process of 
historical reversal: 
The Depression put in motion an historic tension between public and private 
sectors ... After 50 years of public dominance, Reagan’s presidency tipped the 
scales back toward private enterprise ... [but for] Every waking hour of this 
economically liberal era, the losing side has wanted to tip the balance back ... The 
opportunity to achieve that goal finally arrived --- with the Great Recession of 
2009. (Henninger, 2 April 2009) 
Here, the Great Depression is portrayed not simply as an event that might repeat itself, but 
also as the origin of a tug-of-war between statist and pro-market forces.  Moreover, within 
this particular figuration, the crisis is revealed as an event through which statists are seeking 
to repeat the reversal they achieved in the 1930s (see also WSJ Editorial, 29 April 2009). 
Forbes performs a similar move in late 2009 when it once again compares current US policy 
to the New Deal, and then describes the latter as “a decade of contest between an ambitious 
public sector and a dazed private sector” (Shlaes, 3 September 2009). In this way, for Forbes 
and the WSJ, visions of epochal repetition mutate into explicit fears about another reversal in 
the relation between states and markets.  
Although both the Economist and the FT do start to identify some risks associated with 
new state powers and responsibilities, neither comes to question the necessity of their 
introduction in relation to the crisis of finance (cf. Economist, 28 May 2009c; and Wolf, 23 
December 2009). The idea of a ‘reversal’, therefore, continues to figure as a recurrent danger 
that accompanies state inaction, but now also serves to designate an outcome that has been 
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averted via timely intervention. In other words, for the UK-based publications, governments 
have helped saved financial capitalism from itself. This stands in stark contrast to the 
pronouncements of the US-based publications, which essentially suggest that if capitalism has 
survived the crisis, this has been in spite of misguided public actions, which now threaten to 
stifle the true private sources of recovery. Thus, for the first time, we actually find 
diametrically opposed representations of the 1930s being refracted through the same basic 
notion of repetition, producing a split within the global financial press on the future of 
capitalist state. We will return to this theme in our discussion of structural change and 
regulatory reform (§ 10.3). 
8.4 Summary: Re-opening the history of crisis management 
In the press coverage of 2007-2009, we find the history of crisis management being called 
upon to perform three distinct functions. During the early stages of the crisis, past rescues are 
used in order to assess the need for emergency state initiatives in the present. But as the sense 
of crisis deepens, we also find them being used to reveal the relative merits of different rescue 
strategies, and to identify the broader implications of these for the future of the capitalist state. 
Moreover, as we have now seen, each of these three functions entails quite distinct practices 
of historical interpretation. A brief recap of these is in order. 
First, in response to the bailouts of early 2008, the need for some kind of financial 
sector rescue is established via direct historical analogy. To begin with, the primary reference 
points are the US bailouts of the 1990s, and most publications use these episodes to draw 
lessons about the damage that an unnecessary or poorly designed intervention might cause. In 
the wake of the Bear Stearns rescue, however, a tension emerges as the two UK publications 
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begin to use these same episodes – along with the Great Depression – in order to identify the 
risks associated with state inaction. By late 2008, such analogies with the 1930s are 
widespread, and each of the publications uses these in order to advocate or justify public 
recapitalisation in general terms.  
Second, as agreement begins to emerge on the problem of insolvency, a wider repertoire 
of past rescues is brought to bear on the question of bailout design. Lessons drawn from the 
Japanese experience, which are initially invoked in relation to the issue of subprime loans, 
gradually open out onto a debate over the form and speed of recapitalisation; and within this 
debate, comparisons between the Japanese and Swedish rescues themselves form the basis for 
new lessons about crisis management. For example, while agreement on a ‘bad bank’ strategy 
is established through references to a range of prior successes, in the wake of the Lehman 
collapse, the Japan-Sweden comparison is used to emphasise the importance of combining 
such an approach with more drastic interventions, such as direct equity infusions. Hence, in 
the context of competing historical analogies, we find lessons being drawn from comparisons 
between different past rescues.  
And third, as these more drastic measures are enacted, their broader implications are 
assessed via competing visions of historical reversal.  Analogies with the Great Depression as 
an epochal event – which reach fever pitch in late 2008 – serve as the basis for a story about 
the history of capitalism, wherein crises produce pendulum-like swings in the relation 
between state and market. But within the global financial press, we find different readings of 
the 1930s being refracted through this notion of repetition, producing diametrically opposed 
views on the nature of ongoing crisis management efforts. For the US-based publications, 
they represent a 1930s-style backlash against the free market, but for the UK-based ones, they 
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represent an attempt to prevent this kind of backlash. Hence, in these competing views on 
historical reversal, we find a mode of emplotment that operates through (counter-) analogy.  
More fundamentally, though, each of these interpretive practices takes shape against the 
backdrop of rising references to ‘another Great Depression’ (§ 7.2 and 8.1). And if we grasp 
these developments together, then we can characterise 2008 as a moment in which fears of 
epochal repetition effectively reopen old debates over crisis management, enabling past 
rescues to generate diverse and competing positions on contemporary ones. 
	  Chapter 9 
Histories of policy activism 
Alongside this discussion of emergency measures, past crises are also incorporated into a 
series of debates over more routine forms of economic management. Specifically, within the 
press coverage of 2007-2009, we find a range of appeals to the history of policy activism, 
wherein various past crises are used to assess the role of monetary and fiscal policy in both 
the genesis and the management of the ongoing turmoil. The table below provides a 
quantitative breakdown of these references by policy domain and past crisis.1  
 Monetary policy Fiscal policy Combined 
Past crisis # % # % # % 
1970s OECD crisis 53 63.1 -- -- 53 63.1 
2001 Dotcom crash 46 54.7 3 3.6 49 58.3 
1930s Great Depression 28 11.9 19 8.1 47 20 
1990s Japanese crisis 8 8 20 20 28 28 
1980s-90s S&L crisis 6 14 2 4.7 8 18.6 
1998 LTCM 5 15.5 -- -- 5 15.5 
1997-98 Asian crisis 4 5.8 -- -- 4 5.8 
1990s Scandinavian crises -- -- 3 11.1 3 11.1 
 ∑ = 150  ∑ = 47  ∑ = 197  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The percentages for each past crisis refer to their frequency of appearance as a proportion of the total number 
of references to that episode. For example, 11.9% of all references to the 1930s entail a discussion of monetary 
policy and 8.1% deal with fiscal policy, yielding a combined total of 20% ([28 + 19]/235*100 = 20). 
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Figure 9.1   Main past crises mentioned in discussions of monetary and fiscal policy   (Source: Author’s own) 
 
Without going into the timing and the source of these references, it is already possible 
to a draw a number of basic inferences. First, it is clear that past crises are more frequently 
invoked in relation to monetary policy than fiscal policy. Second, although discussions of 
monetary policy do draw upon a wider repertoire of past crises, the most frequently invoked 
episodes within these are the crisis of the 1970s, the Dotcom crash and the Great Depression. 
And third, in discussions of fiscal policy, the majority of references are to the Japanese crisis 
and the Great Depression. Delving further into these basic patterns, this chapter explores how 
different histories of monetary and fiscal policy have been incorporated into specific debates 
within the global financial press. It begins by focusing on those over the relation between 
monetary policy and the emergence of economic instability, and then moves on to those 
regarding the appropriate monetary and fiscal response to the crisis. 
9.1 Tales of monetary excess 
As we have already noted, the past crises that figure most prominently in debates over 
monetary policy are those of the 1970s, the early 2000s and the 1930s. However, once the 
data are disaggregated over time, it becomes clear that references to the 1970s predominate 
during the earlier stages of the crisis. Meanwhile, references to the Dotcom crash stay 
relatively steady over the duration of the three-year period, and appeals to the Great 
Depression become more frequent after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in late 2008.2 As it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Dividing the three-year period into two halves (H1, H2), each episode features in monetary policy discussions 
with the following frequency: 1970s (33, 20); Dotcom (23, 23); and 1930s (8, 20). 
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turns out, this shift in emphasis reflects both a transition between different visions of 
monetary disaster, and the emergence of a new debate over the proper conduct of monetary 
policy. The remainder of this section outlines the preconditions for this development, while its 
precise dynamics are taken-up in the next two. 
 
 
Figure 9.2    Main past crises mentioned in discussions of monetary policy activism    (Source: Author’s own) 
 
To begin with, past crises are primarily invoked in relation to the issue of inflation. 
Specifically, over the course of 2007, all four publications use the history of monetary 
activism in order to identify the emergence of an inflationary threat. The first to do this is the 
Economist, which draws a link in March between the housing bubble and the Dotcom crash: 
The bursting of the stock-market bubble in 2000 led to a plunge in investment at 
American firms. To stave off recession, the Federal Reserve loosened monetary 
policy. Short-term interest rates fell to historic lows, propping up consumer 
spending, but also fuelling the housing bubble and sowing the seeds of today's 
upheaval. (Economist, 22 March 2007a) 
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Here, in what will later emerge as a key narrative, the Economist traces the subprime bubble 
back to the laxity of the Federal Reserve after the dotcom bust. But with consumer price 
inflation on the increase, it explicitly argues against a monetary response to the housing 
market upheaval, deeming it “too late to unwind [the] monetary policy of a few years ago”, 
and pointing out that to cut rates again would be to risk “compounding the error” (Economist, 
22 March 2007b). The pressing issue, in other words, is to contain the inflationary process 
unleashed in response to an earlier recession. 
At around the same time, Forbes begins to develop this narrative by combining it with 
an appeal to the 1970s.  Specifically, in addition to tracing inflationary pressures back to 
“Greenspan's mistaken monetary extravagance” (Forbes, 26 March 2007), it also draws a 
series of analogies between the then Chairman’s decisions and those of his more distant 
predecessors. In April, for example, it likens the Federal Reserve’s neglect of the exchange 
rate after 2001 to the “weak-dollar inflation” of the early 1970s, arguing that its refusal to 
raise interest rates has had the double-effect of boosting commodity prices and spurring an 
artificial boom in the housing sector (Forbes, 16 April 2007). It then goes on to extend this 
basic gesture, quoting Keynes on the dangers of “debauch[ing] the currency”, and warning of 
the “terrible morning-after consequences” that commodity and house price inflation are sure 
to bring (Forbes, 21 May 2007). Finally, it uses both of these episodes in order to construct a 
broader tale of monetary excess, arguing that the “global flood of liquidity” since the dotcom 
crash is a product of “printing-press-happy central banks”, whose actions in turn stem from a 
failure to learn the monetarist lesson of the 1970s (Forbes, 2 July 2007).  
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As mortgage troubles start to affect interbank lending, Forbes continues to make such 
associations,3 and the other publications begin to follow suit, emphasising the threat of 
inflation in various ways. The WSJ, for example, repeats the story about the legacy of the 
dotcom crash, arguing that it has left the Fed caught between “pleas for easy money” and an 
urgent need to address the related problems of “global dollar weakness” and “roaring” 
commodity prices (WSJ Editorial, 6 August 2007; see also 31 August 2007). It then relates 
this dilemma to the policy decisions of the 1970s, suggesting that by even considering 
monetary stimulus, “Washington is in danger of drifting back, almost unconsciously,” to the 
inflationary bias of that period (WSJ Editorial, 17 September 2007). Meanwhile, the 
Economist more explicitly invokes the lessons of the 1970s, using the “sorry story” of 
Chairman Arthur Burns to illustrate how “attempts to fine-tune the economy through cheap 
money” risk generating runaway inflation (Economist, 20 September 2007b). The FT remains 
somewhat more circumspect, deeming inflationary pressures to be “puny compared with the 
experience of the 1970s”, but it nevertheless identifies the sagging dollar and high price of oil 
as a primary concern for the Federal Reserve, even amidst the worries surrounding housing 
and banks (FT Editorial, 2 November 2007). In this way, then, financial journalists begin to 
establish a loosely shared story of policy-induced inflation. 
Alongside this, we also find a second tale of excess that is focused more explicitly on 
the issue of financial stability. Specifically, once foreclosures start to visibly impact upon 
financial sector activity, publications begin to develop a different history of monetary 
activism, wherein past episodes serve to reveal a pro-cyclical bias in recent interest rate 
policy. The first to do this is the WSJ, which responds to the rescue of Northern Rock by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For example, see Forbes (17 September 2007) and Malpass (26 November 2007). 
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invoking the monetary bailouts of the 1990s. “Starting with the 1987 stock market crash”, it 
reminds us, “Mr. Greenspan repeatedly provided massive liquidity when events like the Asian 
crisis or the dot-com hangover suggested a possible meltdown”; and to do the same again, it 
warns, would be to resurrect “the attendant potential such bailouts hold for long-term damage 
to the future pricing of risk” (Rattner, 20 September 2007). Even though the precise relations 
between crises are left unspecified, what we nevertheless find here is an association being 
made between easy money and excessive risk-taking. In effect, the very need to consider a 
monetary bailout in the present is implicitly affiliated with the legacy of prior ones, which are 
portrayed as having encouraged an under-pricing of risk in the financial sector. 
Before long, this quasi-plot is taken-up by the Economist, which develops a more 
detailed story about the pro-cyclicality of US monetary policy. Once again, the basic double-
move is to situate the dotcom episode within a series of policy-induced recoveries, and to 
identify a new source of financial instability in the very form of these recoveries:  
In 1998 turmoil in financial markets – including the collapse of Long Term Capital 
Management … helped persuade the Fed, then led by Mr. Greenspan, into three 
quick rate cuts that contributed to the dotcom bubble. Equally, the Fed’s slashing 
of rates in 2001-2003 did much to fuel an already warming housing market. These 
episodes gave rise to financial markets’ belief in the ‘Greenspan put’ – the notion 
that the central bank would always rescue tumbling markets. (Economist, 18 
October 2007c) 
In this account, however, the Economist is more precise in its enchainment of past crises, and 
also goes on to provide an explicit emplotment of the credit crunch in these terms. 
Specifically, it identifies three interrelated processes – first, that the Fed’s record for monetary 
bailouts gave rise to a belief in the so-called ‘Greenspan put’; second, that these expectations 
fuelled excessive risk-taking on the part of investors, including those banks investing in 
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mortgage-backed securities; and third, that the actual existence of cheap credit was crucial to 
the underlying boom in subprime borrowing. In this way, then, the Economist effectively 
portrays the crisis as “a crisis of central banking” (18 October 2007c), emphasising the 
financial fallout of prior monetary mistakes: “other factors contributed to the crunch”, it 
admits, “But whichever way you look at it, central banks kept interest rates too low for too 
long … [and] that is most true of the Fed” (18 October 2007l). 
 As the crisis progresses, the Economist reiterates and augments this story in various 
ways. For example, in early 2008, it suggests that the Fed’s asymmetric interest rate policy 
was premised on a lesson drawn from the Great Depression, emphasising Bernanke’s theory 
of the “financial accelerator” in particular (Economist, 19 March 2008b). It then goes on to 
suggest that “the resulting glut of liquidity” was central to the excesses of the banks, 
effectively enabling their ill-fated transformation into “debt machines” (Economist, 19 March 
2008h). Meanwhile, in October it performs a more of less equivalent move, this time 
suggesting that worries about “Japanese-style deflation” helped justify the Fed’s rates cuts 
after 2001, which it then links to both the “boom in adjustable rate mortgages”, and the surge 
in “risk-taking on Wall Street” (Economist, 9 October 2008a).  
More generally, though, this tale of monetary excess – which portrays pro-cyclical 
policy as a source of financial instability – is sustained throughout the duration of the crisis, 
finding expression via a broad and ongoing emplotment of the dotcom crash.4 Meanwhile, 
fears of inflation also persist into 2008, and our earlier tale – which portrays low rates of 
interest as a source of monetary instability – is clearly upheld by Forbes and the WSJ, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Although the Economist clearly takes the lead, during the later stages of the crisis, all three of the other 
publications craft this kind narrative on at least one occasion (cf. Wolf, 8 November 2008 [FT]; Taylor, 9 
February 2009 [WSJ]; and Taylor, 2 November 2009 [Forbes]). 
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make repeated appeals to the ‘forgotten’ lessons of the 1970s, and continue to draw 
comparisons with the weak-dollar inflation of that period.5 Hence, with the events of late 
2007, two different tales of monetary excess emerge, each of which imply their own distinct 
vision of disaster. 
9.2 Roadmaps to monetary rectitude, pt. I: Central banking in the present 
Alongside these competing visions, discussion also turns more explicitly toward the question 
of an appropriate policy response; and as central banks begin to slash interest rates, a range of 
past crises are incorporated into a broader debate over the conduct of monetary policy. 
Specifically, beginning in late 2007, we find a sustained and historically informed debate over 
the need for reflationary measures, which in turn opens out onto a reassessment of longer-
term monetary policy objectives. Although these discussions evolve in tandem, for the 
purposes of exposition, we address them here sequentially.  
First, on the issue of an immediate policy response: At least initially, publications 
invoke the past in ways which counsel against the hasty provision of monetary stimulus, and 
for the most part, this occurs via lessons drawn from each of the tales outlined above. Thus, 
on the one hand, we find a continued appeal to the history of policy-induced inflation. The 
Economist, for example, consistently depicts the 1970s as having revealed the importance of 
keeping inflation-expectations anchored, and suggests that the Fed’s laxity after 2001 has left 
it little room to loosen without setting these “adrift” once more (Economist, 18 October 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 During 2008, Forbes invokes the 1970s in this way on 10 separate occasions, and 5 of these fall under the 
second-quarter of that year (see Malpass, 21 April 2008; Forbes, 19 May, 2 June, 16 June, and 26 June 2008). 
Meanwhile, during this same period, the WSJ makes two such appeals (WSJ Editorial, 23 May 2008; and 9 June 
2008). Thus, almost half the spike in references to the 1970s visible in Q2 of 2008 represents an attempt to 
diagnose and criticise an inflationary-bias in US monetary policy (see Fig. 5.2.1). 
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2007f; cf. a–j; and 12 June 2008). The FT strikes a similar tone of caution in its discussion of 
commodity prices, wherein the 1970s repeatedly serve to underline the inflationary potential 
of attempts to ease the credit squeeze (see Wolf, 23 April 2008; 17 June 2008; 24 June 2008). 
Finally, both Forbes and the WSJ draw upon and develop their more exaggerated narrative, 
portraying rate cuts not simply as a continuation of the mistaken laxity that began in 2001, but 
also as the unmistakable harbinger of a return to 1970s-style stagflation.6  
Meanwhile, on the other hand, we also find more pointed reference to the fallout of 
prior monetary rescues. Specifically, publications use the so-called Greenspan put in order to 
underline the negative financial consequences of an unneeded or premature cut in the rate of 
interest. On a number of occasions, for example, the Economist derives explicit policy lessons 
from its story about the dotcom crash:  “if the world leaves the Fed to provide risk insurance 
for everyone”, it warns, “America’s interest rates will almost certainly be too loose for too 
long – just as they were in 2001-04”; and this, it goes on to infer, would only serve to “raise 
the odds of new asset bubbles” in the future (Economist, 14 February 2008b). At the same 
time, the WSJ writes disapprovingly of “the Bernanke reflation”, finding a clear indication of 
its consequences in the “credit mania” of the late Greenspan era (WSJ Editorial, 29 February 
2008). Similarly, Forbes also rails against the doctrine of the “Greenspan-Bernanke era”, 
blaming Greenspan for creating “the mother of all liquidity cycles”, and criticising Bernanke 
for seeking recourse in more of the same bad medicine (Hanke, 5 May 2008). In this way, 
then, both tales of excess identified in the previous section are effectively deployed as 
parables for the present, providing simple lessons about what happens when policymakers go 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Interestingly, within the space of a week, each does this via the televisual metaphor of a ‘rerun’ (cf. We’ve 
Seen This Movie Before – Forbes, 2 June 2008; and That Stagflation Show – WSJ Editorial, 9 June 2008). This 
figuration of repetition maps onto the visions of ‘historical reversal’ identified in § 5.1.3. 
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soft; and while these lessons do differ in important ways, their basic compatibility produces a 
general agreement on the need for monetary prudence. 
This begins to change as new developments shift attention from the cause of the bubble 
to the potential effects of its undoing. Specifically, alongside their exhortations to forgo or 
resist another round of reckless monetary easing, publications also start to use the Great 
Depression in order to gauge the cost of an unduly reluctant response to deflationary pressure. 
This process can be traced back to early 2008, when rising fears of epochal repetition prompt 
Forbes to explicitly reject comparisons with the 1930s:  with “today’s expansive monetary 
policy”, it argues, “[t]he best analogy … is probably pre-boom 2003, with the prospect of a 
near-term recovery and the risk of more inflation to come” (Malpass, 21 April 2008). The FT 
soon reiterates this warning of an inflationary recovery, but it does so via an affirmation and 
emplotment of the Great Depression analogy, casting aggressive rate cuts as a legitimate 
response to the prospect of 1930s-style deflation (FT Editorial, 26 June 2008). Thus, while 
unstable prices are still deemed a threat, they are here conceived as one that might work both 
ways – i.e. upward, in the form of inflation; or downward, in the form of deflation. 
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, we find a further shift in this direction, 
with fears of another Depression underwriting a tentative support for deflation-fighting 
measures. Almost immediately, the Economist demotes the risk of inflation, identifying a 
“scope to cut interest rates”, and stressing the potential costs of a failure to do so:  
Unless policymakers blunder unforgivably—by letting ‘systemic’ institutions fail 
or by keeping monetary policy too tight—there is no need for today’s misery to 
turn into a new Depression. (Economist, 18 September 2008) 
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The FT is also quick to downgrade its previous concern with inflation, describing the 
concerted provision of monetary stimulus as a “welcome move”, and using the 1930s to 
illustrate the importance of combining such measures with more focused financial sector 
initiatives (FT Editorial, 10 October 2008). For some time, though, the two US publications 
remain reluctant on rate cuts, reiterating and even extending their story about the financial 
fallout of monetary laxity. Forbes, for example, crafts a direct link between cheap money and 
ongoing bank failures, now benchmarking these against those of the Great Depression (see 
Forbes, 6 October 2008). Meanwhile, the WSJ identifies a kind of double monetary binge, 
comparing the credit mania of the Greenspan years to that of the 1920s (Carney, 18 October 
2008), and then casting Bernanke’s reflationary efforts as a misguided continuation of the 
policy responsible for creating that mania in the first place (WSJ Editorial, 24 October 2008).  
Yet by late 2008, fears of another Great Depression eventually prompt Forbes to recall 
the policy decisions of that period, and this produces somewhat of a turnaround in its position 
on the issue of monetary response. Specifically, while the WSJ remains critical of monetary 
stimulus, Forbes explicitly invokes the lessons of the 1930s, expressing its relief at the idea 
that “nobody will try to fight the recession by raising interest rates” (Dreman, 8 December 
2008). Then, some months later, it goes a step further, using an analogy with the 1930s in 
order to criticise the Fed’s attempt to do precisely this:  
Contrary to impression, the Fed has been tightening, shrinking its balance sheet by 
nearly $400 billion since December … Bernanke says he fears future inflation, but 
that's like those firefighters being afraid to cause water damage to the furniture. 
Right now we're in a bone-crunching deflation. Bernanke's actions recall those of 
the Fed during the early years of the Depression, when our central bank wouldn't 
ease in the face of a catastrophic contraction for fear of igniting German-style 
inflation. (Forbes, 30 March 2009, emphasis in original) 
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The Economist also goes on to identify a potential deflation of the “malign 1930s sort”, 
suggesting that central banks would do better to err on the side of inflation than to maintain an 
unduly tight stance (Economist, 7 May 2009a). Meanwhile, the FT observes a comparatively 
low level of monetary growth during the Depression, surmising that “this time the world is 
applying the lessons taken from that event by John Maynard Keynes and Milton Friedman” 
(Wolf, 16 June 2009).7 In this way, then, rising fears of deflation prompt publications to shift 
their attention from the crisis of the 1970s to that of the 1930s, enabling the latter episode to 
generate lessons about the importance of instituting an accommodative monetary policy in the 
present. 
9.3 Roadmaps to monetary rectitude, pt. II: Central banking in the future 
Alongside this shift, however, publications also begin to draw a second set of policy lessons. 
Specifically, via the question of an immediate response, discussion turns to the tools and 
objectives of central banks; and as various tensions between these are made manifest, 
publications start to incorporate past crises into a broader debate over the conduct of monetary 
policy. Interestingly, while the dotcom crash continues to serve as a key reference point, it is 
appealed to in ways that produce quite distinct visions for the future of monetary 
policymaking. There are three developments worth highlighting here. 
First: Both the Economist and the FT identify trajectories that warrant a widening of 
monetary policy objectives. This process can be traced back to late 2007, when the Economist 
begins to focus on the issue of asset-price bubbles. As we have already seen, from early on, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The lessons alluded to here are first, that a well-timed stimulus can help fight depression (Keynes, 1936); and 
second, that a mistimed tightening can serve to create or deepen it (Friedman & Schwartz, 1963). 
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the Economist develops a story about the consequences of the ‘Greenspan put’, but in 
addition to this, it also begins to narrate a more extensive transformation in the conditions of 
monetary policymaking. Looking back to the 1970s, it identifies three interrelated after-
effects: first, that globalisation has provided a new source of investment booms; second, that 
financial liberalisation has meant “fewer constraints on the forces that can cause booms to 
feed on themselves”; and third, that credible inflation-control has meant that “wages and 
prices might not rise to hold down demand” (Economist, 18 October 2007e). It then argues 
that these changes effectively warrant a reorientation of interest rate policy. Under the Taylor 
rule, it points out, “if inflation stays low, then central banks … may allow financial 
imbalances to build up” (Economist, 18 October 2007e); and in any subsequent provision of 
ex-post insurance, they may well create new bubbles, as the Fed did after the dotcom crash 
(see Economist, 18 October 2007). In light of this, it concludes, monetary authorities should 
not simply target inflation, but also consider using interest rates to “lean against credit and 
asset-price booms that appear unsustainable” (Economist, 18 October 2007e). 
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the FT derives a similar lesson from a story 
about macroeconomic imbalances. But rather than the 1970s, it is the Asian crisis that figures 
as an origin of transformation. Specifically, the FT portrays that episode as having prompted a 
“vast shift of capital” via precautionary reserve accumulation in the East (Wolf, 8 October 
2008). It then suggests that the resultant excess of savings was compounded by the dotcom 
crash, which reduced the level of re-investment in Western corporate sectors. Finally, it 
argues that each of these developments effectively served to hold down US interest rates, 
thereby enabling monetary conditions to fuel household borrowing and financial innovation. 
Hence, for the FT, the crisis reveals a series of linked dangers that traverse the boundaries 
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between both nations and sectors, and which require a more synthetic approach to economic 
policymaking:  
The crisis demonstrates that the world has been unable to combine liberalised 
capital markets with a reasonable degree of financial stability. A particular 
problem has been the tendency for large net capital flows and associated current 
account and domestic financial balances to generate huge crises … Lessons must 
be learnt. But those should not just be about the regulation of the financial sector. 
Nor should they be only about monetary policy. They must be about how 
liberalised finance can be made to support the global economy rather than 
destabilise it. (Wolf, 8 October 2008) 
Although the FT does not specify a precise role for monetary policy, interest rates are 
effectively situated between net capital flows and domestic financial balances, suggesting that 
central banks would need to somehow incorporate each of these into their reaction functions. 
In this way, then, it appears to gesture toward an even more expansive reappraisal of policy 
than the Economist.  
Before long, though, the Economist also incorporates the Asian crisis into its narrative, 
similarly emphasising the interactions between monetary policy, global imbalances and 
financial instability (Economist, 22 January 2009h). And in the months that follow, both 
reiterate their positions via a series of illustrative analogies. The FT, for example, predicts 
“epoch-moulding consequences” of the sort that the Depression produced, characterising the 
debates over of monetary policy as an early indication of this, and concluding, once again, 
that “[m]onetary authorities will need to be more concerned both about financial stability and 
global imbalances” (FT Editorial, 8 March 2009). Meanwhile, the Economist repeats its case 
for reacting to credit excesses and asset-price booms, pointing out how the crisis “began 
against the backdrop of price stability – as did America’s Depression and Japan’s lost decade” 
(Economist, 23 April 2009a). Thus, both UK publications tell a story about the revealed 
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inadequacy of inflation targeting; and on the basis of this story, each is able to argue for a 
substantial broadening of monetary policy objectives.   
Second: Through appeals to a somewhat shorter history of the crisis, the WSJ arrives at 
a similar lesson regarding financial stability. Much like the Economist, it is quick to identify a 
growing divergence between asset and commodity price movements, interpreting this as a 
legacy of the dotcom recovery (see § 9.1). But rather than an explicit widening of objectives, 
the WSJ initially uses this quasi-plot in order to argue for a more effective pursuit of price 
stability. In late 2007, for example, it suggests that the Fed’s mistaken laxity was due in part 
to a “misleading” measure of inflation, which “didn’t include an adequate account of housing 
prices” (WSJ Editorial, 17 September 2007). It then counsels against reflation on similar 
grounds, arguing that this would be to repeat the mistake of allowing policy to be guided by a 
“dubious measure of core inflation which excludes food and energy” (WSJ Editorial, 29 
February 2008). Hence, during the early stages of the crisis, the WSJ essentially draws a 
technical lesson for monetary policy, urging the Fed to undertake “a rethinking of its inflation 
measures” (WSJ Editorial, 17 September 2007). 
But as the crisis deepens, the WSJ starts to emphasise the distinctness of asset-price 
booms vis-à-vis consumer price inflation. Amidst growing calls for reflation, it continues to 
underline the importance of credible inflation control, invoking the 1970s as a lesson in the 
dangers of monetary pump priming (Reddy, 22 September 2008; see also § 9.2). But in 
addition to this, it also begins to criticise the Fed for a principled neglect of asset-price booms. 
In late 2008, for example, it takes aim at the idea in mopping up after burst bubbles, 
suggesting that this “Greenspan inspired conceit” actually helped enable the one in housing to 
reach such “swollen and grotesque maturity” (Grant, 18 October 2008). It then goes on to 
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make repeated and more explicit statements to this effect, and by late 2009, these serve as the 
basis for a pointed question regarding the management of asset-price bubbles: 
Mr. Bernanke was the intellectual architect of the decision to keep monetary 
policy exceptionally easy for far too long as the economy grew rapidly from 2003-
2005. He imagined a "deflation" that never occurred, ignored the asset bubbles in 
commodities and housing, dismissed concerns about dollar weakness, and in the 
process stoked the credit mania that led to the financial panic … How central 
banks can minimize, if not prevent, asset bubbles without inducing recessions 
would seem to be a subject for candid Fed debate. (WSJ Editorial, 3 December 
2009, emphasis added) 
Once again, the dotcom crash figures as the key moment in a now familiar tale of monetary 
excess. This time, however, that tale is used to point toward the potential benefits of an 
activist policy on asset bubbles. Indeed, the WSJ even goes so far as to re-emplot the dotcom 
recovery in this light, suggesting that its apparent speed gave credence to the view that 
“stability was overrated” (Wessel, 17 December 2009). In this way, then, it effectively 
concludes that the Fed should pay more attention to financial imbalances, emphasising in 
particular how it might use interest rates to “pre-empt bubbles before they burst” (Wessel, 17 
December 2009). Importantly, though, this is not coupled with a call to target global 
imbalances, and the WSJ in fact explicitly rejects the ‘savings glut’ thesis, deeming it a 
convenient alibi for the Fed’s mistaken policies (WSJ Editorial, 3 December 2009). 
Third: By incorporating recent events into a much longer monetary history, Forbes 
develops an argument for the stripping-back of policy objectives. As we have seen, from early 
on, it uses the 1970s in order to underline the inflationary character of the dotcom recovery (§ 
9.1), and in mid-2008 it starts to link this to the ongoing financial turmoil (§ 9.2). But in 
continuing to invoke the 1970s, Forbes also begins to narrate a more general crisis of 
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monetary activism. Its first key move comes in May, when it recalls the policy experiments of 
post-war Britain: 
From the 1950s through the 1970s ... both Conservative and Labour governments 
relied on boosting government spending and on printing more pounds to get the 
economy moving. Inflation would then erupt, the Bank of England would have to 
tighten up, and the economy would go into a slump  ... Greenspan's woes came 
about precisely because he lost sight of the Fed’s prime job: ensuring a stable 
dollar. In the late 1990s Greenspan inadvertently tightened up ... which 
contributed to the 2000-1 recession. When it became clear ... that the economy was 
skidding, Greenspan realized his mistake and started to reverse gears. But he 
stayed too easy, even when the economy was back on track ... With money easy, 
the already buoyant U.S. housing market began to go berserk ... (Forbes, 5 May 
2008, emphasis added) 
Here Forbes portrays the Bank of England’s interventions as a series of backfires. But in 
comparing these to the decisions surrounding America’s dotcom episode, it also identifies a 
return to the misbegotten policies of that earlier era. Specifically, for Forbes, the crisis should 
be related to a resurgent form of “governmental narcissism”, whereby the Fed has succumbed 
once again to an unwarranted belief in its ability to fine-tune the economy (Forbes, 5 May 
2008). “Bubbles do happen”, it concedes, yet they are routinely made worse by attempts to 
manage them, suggesting in turn that the Fed should refocus its everyday efforts on 
“preserving the integrity of the dollar” (Forbes, 5 May 2008). Hence, rather than providing a 
rationale for counter-cyclical interventionism, this nascent narrative serves instead to reveal a 
failure of that very practice.  
The second key move comes only a month later, when Forbes turns its attention to the 
Fed’s de facto exchange rate policy. Specifically, by portraying dollar-weakness as a potential 
source of stagflation, it starts to argue for a strengthening of the dollar via open market 
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operations. In the first instance, this involves drawing upon its earlier tale of excess, wherein 
the dotcom crash serves as the point of origin for a new bout of 1970s-style malaise: 
Right now the Fed is befuddled. It has pumped out plenty of new money, yet the 
credit crisis lingers and the economy is sluggish ... What Bernanke & Co. have yet 
to fathom, however, is that strengthening the dollar by removing the excess 
liquidity the Federal Reserve has created since 2004 will rapidly move the 
economy back on track ... The danger is that the Fed will put off a strong-dollar 
program ... If the Fed had made concerted and consistent efforts to curb the 
disease, we would never have had the economic stagnation and wild commodity 
speculation that occurred in the 1970s and early 1980s. (Forbes, 16 June 2008, 
emphasis in original) 
In addition to this, however, it also goes on to derive a more far-reaching lesson for 
monetary policymaking. Specifically, it argues that “the Fed should ... tell the markets what 
measurement they are going to use to guide monetary policy”; and suggests that the best such 
measurement would be the dollar price of gold (Forbes, 16 June 2008). So, alongside the 
failure of counter-cyclical interventionism, the crisis is also implicitly revealed as one of 
inflation targeting, which for Forbes indicates a need for some form of modern gold standard. 
In its view, though, this lesson has been obscured by Bernanke’s belief that “the old gold 
standard somehow caused and deepened the Great Depression” (Forbes, 16 June 2008). 
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Forbes goes on to reiterate and augment this 
narrative, enabling it to provide a more explicit vision for the future of monetary policy.  In 
November, for example, it repeats its declaration that a strong-dollar policy would have 
prevented the housing mania from reaching the proportions that it did; and once again, it 
bases this on a reading of the dotcom recovery as the beginning of a new 1970s. This time, 
though, it develops its portrayal of the 1970s, using it not only to underline the dangers of 
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“manipulating money”, but now also to reveal the closing of the gold window as another 
mistaken turn in monetary history: 
The 1970s were a decade of stagnation. The U.S. cut the dollar loose from gold, 
and other central banks gleefully followed suit. The results were three massive 
bouts of inflation ... now that we are finally effectively dealing with crisis, what 
should be done going forward? A formal strong-dollar policy essential … [and] 
the best barometer for monetary disturbances is gold. The Fed should tie the dollar 
to a gold price range of, say, $500 to $550. (Forbes, 10 November 2008) 
On this reading, the Federal Reserve should be given “a focused mission” that would see it 
concentrate on “keeping the dollar as good as gold”, and which in turn would help transform 
financial panics into “a once-in-a-century occurrence” (Forbes, 10 November 2008, emphasis 
in original). 
Forbes soon then grasps each of these elements together, crafting a century-long 
narrative about monetary mistakes. In December, for example, it again invokes the failure of 
monetary Keynesianism in Britain, and repeats its portrayal of the 1970s as a mistaken shift 
towards exchange-rate flexibility. At the same time, though, it also looks back once more to 
the interwar years, casting competitive devaluations as a destabilising force that contributed to 
the Depression, but which have since been misinterpreted as a case against fixed exchange 
rates (Forbes, 8 December 2008b). On these grounds, it is then able to link the intervening 
period of stability to the Bretton Woods system, and to identify its use of a gold anchor as a 
possible template for global monetary reform. Specifically, it proposes a new kind of 
decentralised gold standard, wherein the US would “conduct monetary operations to keep the 
dollar within a gold-price range … [and then] invite other countries to follow suit” (Forbes, 8 
December 2008b).  
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Finally, in a grand metaphorical gesture, it attempts to tie the very fate of the American 
economy to gold. Specifically, if the initial adoption of the gold standard “put the U.S. on the 
path to power and prosperity”, as Forbes suggests it did, then the subsequent shift to fiat 
money and exchange rate flexibility must be recognised as a senseless departure from 
“centuries of experience”: 
From the days of Alexander Hamilton to the 1960s it was an article of faith that 
the dollar should be strong and stable; [and that] this could be reliably achieved 
only by anchoring it to gold … In the 1960s the idea took hold that a flexible 
greenback could help generate perpetual economic growth … Alan Greenspan, 
who chaired the Fed for nearly 20 years, and his successor, Ben Bernanke have 
allowed the dollar to be treated like a yo-yo … If their central goal had been a 
steady value for the buck, those bubbles [in housing and commodities] would 
never have reached the sizes they did, and volatility in the financial markets would 
have been only a fraction of what it is today. (Forbes, 16 February 2009) 
The crisis, therefore, is revealed as an outgrowth of this wrong-turn, and the road to monetary 
rectitude must begin with a renewed commitment to a strong and stable dollar. Trying to 
achieve this “by controlling the money supply itself is hopeless”, it argues, and “nor are 
inflation indexes useful guides to monetary stability”; instead, what the Fed must do is target 
the market price of gold: “If it moves outside a certain narrow range, the monetary authorities 
should react by either tightening or loosening the money supply” (Forbes, 16 February 2009). 
Thus, while Forbes does join the WSJ in rejecting the so-called excess savings thesis, it 
nevertheless reaches a different altogether, advocating not an expansion but a narrowing or 
stripping-back of monetary policy objectives.8 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Forbes explicitly rejects this thesis on two occasions, characterizing it as “a strange theory of Ben 
Bernanke’s” (Forbes, 16 February 2009), which Greenspan has since sought to incorporate into his many 
“protestations” of innocence (see Forbes, 5 May 2008). 
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9.4 Fisco-financial fixes and fiascos 
In addition to this discussion of monetary policy, we also find a range of other references to 
the history of policy activism. Specifically, as the crisis deepens, past episodes are called 
upon in order to reveal an appropriate fiscal response to the ongoing financial turmoil. 
Generally speaking, the vast majority of these references are to the Great Depression and the 
Japanese crisis (see Figure 9.1).  However, once they are disaggregated over time, it becomes 
clear that a somewhat wider repertoire is drawn upon during the earlier stages of the crisis 
(see Figure 9.3 below). Moreover, while there is a dramatic spike in references to the 1930s 
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, these are gradually overshadowed by appeals to the 
Japanese crisis during mid-to-late 2009. As it happens, this broad pattern reflects both a 
disagreement over the promises of fiscal activism, and the emergence of a new question 
surrounding the design of exit-strategies. The remainder of this section identifies and 
discusses three key stages in the evolution of these debates. 
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Figure 9.3         Main past crises mentioned in discussions of fiscal policy activism       (Source: Author’s own) 
To begin with, past episodes are used in order to warn against a fiscal response to the 
crisis. Publications do invoke diverse histories, but during late 2007 and early 2008, each does 
this in a way that serves to underline the drawbacks or dangers associated with any immediate 
change in fiscal policy. On the one hand, both UK publications use the dotcom crash in order 
to express doubts over the scope for stimulus. The FT does this by emphasising how that 
episode coincided with a countervailing “spending boom” in the UK, which it then suggests 
has left the British government with “little room” to offset another US recession via similar 
means (FT Editorial, 9 December 2007). Meanwhile, the Economist focuses instead on 
America’s public finances, pointing out how the “the room for manoeuvre is smaller than in 
2001”, and arguing that the temptation to provide a stimulus – whether via expenditure or 
taxation – should be resisted until a long slump looks likely, and monetary easing truly risks 
creating inflation (Economist, 3 January 2008). Hence, both the FT and the Economist 
counsel against the pursuit of a 2001-style fix, but each do so by drawing a counter-analogy 
with the policy context of that earlier success.  
On the other hand, though, the initial move of the two US publications is to contrast this 
same fix with a series of fiscal fiascos. Forbes, for example, is quick to draw an analogy 
between the proposals of present day Democrats, who “want to let the growth-producing Bush 
tax cuts of 2003 expire”, and the actions of former President Hoover, whose “massive tax 
increase” during the Great Depression served to aggravate an already serious downturn 
(Forbes, 15 October 2007b). Meanwhile, the WSJ similarly recalls how the 2001 recession 
was aided by tax rebates, but goes on to contrast this with an appeal to the S&L and Japanese 
crises, where it argues that short term spending packages proved either slow or unable to 
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counteract the dynamics of balance-sheet recession (Gongloff, 11 February 2008). Finally, 
Forbes too invokes the Japanese episode, using it to develop its portrayal of the Great 
Depression. Specifically, after repeating its story of Hoover’s tax mistake, Forbes blames a 
misreading of Roosevelt’s subsequent pump-priming for an unwarranted faith in 
countercyclical spending, citing Japan’s “futile” experiments as a case in point (Forbes, 11 
February 2008b). In this way, then, both Forbes and the WSJ derive an asymmetric lesson 
from prior episodes of fiscal activism. Put simply, while cutting taxes looks likely to help 
alleviate the crisis, history is seen to suggest that boosting spending will not. Despite some 
key differences, though, all four publications are united in their initial opposition to an 
increase in government expenditure. 
This loose consensus proves to be short-lived, however, and following the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, a more explicit disagreement emerges over the shape of an appropriate 
fiscal response. Specifically, while both US publications continue to invoke the historical 
failures of fiscal activism – focusing in particular on the tax mistakes of the 1930s (cf. 
Ohanian, 8 October 2008; and Forbes, 27 October 2008) – the two UK publications begin 
instead to call upon the past in ways which recommend an immediate recourse to public 
expenditure. Take the Economist, which repeatedly refers to the crises of the 1990s in its 
discussion of fiscal policy. It is quick, for example, to revisit its earlier argument regarding 
budgetary constraints: 
When credit markets are dysfunctional, private demand is fading and confidence is 
weak, a fiscal jolt is a good option … True, stimulus increases short-term 
government deficits – but the fiscal damage from a prolonged slump would be 
greater still, as Japan showed in the 1990s. (Economist, 30 October 2008b) 
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Here, by invoking the “fiscal damage” associated with Japan’s lost decade, the Economist 
uses the yardstick of public finances in order to underline the likely consequences of a failure 
to cut taxes and/or increase spending. The notion of a government budget constraint is thus 
combined with a historiographic double move, which serves in turn to reveal fiscal expansion 
as a kind of ‘least-worst’ solution to the ongoing crisis.  
Meanwhile, through reference to America’s prior recessions, the Economist also revises 
its assessment of the more technical considerations incumbent upon US policymakers. In 
early November, for example, it explicitly rejects comparisons with the S&L recovery, 
pointing out how ineffective rate cuts have already rendered conventional monetary policy 
“muffled” (Economist, 6 November 2008b). Fiscal tools are thus identified as the only 
available means to offset a decline in private spending; and with an eye on the inferred effects 
of policy inaction – namely, “an even worse recession” – the Economist concludes that some 
kind of deficit-financed stimulus is indeed justified.  
This basic point is soon fed through rising fears of epochal repetition (§ 7.2), which lend 
an implicit and urgent content to the idea of an ‘even worse recession’. Specifically, during 
early 2009, the Economist draws a counter-analogy of scale with the dotcom bust – deeming 
“the need for stimulus … [to be] far greater than in 2001” – and then combines this judgment 
with an allusion to “what could be [the] deepest recession since the Depression” (Economist, 
8 January 2009a). Finally, against this backdrop, it goes on to reason that “with interest rates 
close to zero … fiscal policy must do the lion’s share” of the policy work. Thus, in the eyes of 
the Economist, it is only fiscal powers that are seen to stand between the present and the 
prospect of another Great Depression.  
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When taken together, these arguments indicate how the Economist effectively overturns 
its initial reservations regarding a fiscal response, providing a qualified but clear argument in 
favour of a comprehensive US stimulus package.9 Alongside this development, though, we 
also find a key interpretive shift on the part of the FT, which draws a new link between fiscal 
policy and geo-monetary order. Specifically, in response to growing calls for a US stimulus 
package, the FT begins to recall the international dynamics of the 1930s, using these in order 
to advocate a more coordinated fiscal boost. The earliest incarnation of this argument appears 
in late 2008, when the FT starts to emphasise the co-emergence of global imbalances and 
financial instability. As we have already seen, this story serves as the basis for its reappraisal 
of monetary policymaking (§ 9.3). But in addition to this, the FT also begins to relate it to the 
question of an appropriate fiscal response. Indeed, in its view, the crisis ‘endgame’ is 
irreducibly fiscal: 
On the one hand are the surplus countries. On the other are these huge fiscal 
deficits. So deficits aimed at sustaining demand will be piled on top of the fiscal 
costs of rescuing banking systems bankrupted in the rush to finance excess 
spending by uncreditworthy households via securitised lending against overpriced 
houses. This is not a durable solution to the challenge of sustaining global demand. 
(Wolf, 2 December 2008) 
Faced with such a macroeconomic configuration – and in the absence of creditworthy private 
borrowers – it sees a purposive global rebalancing as the only feasible solution. But in order 
to achieve such a rebalancing, it argues, policymakers must take the correct lessons from the 
1930s. Specifically, surplus countries must refrain from the beggar-thy-neighbour policy of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The Economist is relatively unambiguous on the need for fiscal stimulus to be supplemented by other key 
policy measures. In the references to the S&L and dotcom crises discussed above, it clearly stipulates that any 
stimulus should be accompanied by some kind of “long-term fiscal reform” (Economist, 8 January 2009a). 
Meanwhile, through subsequent appeals to the Japanese crisis, it also adds that fiscal stimulus will only succeed 
if combined with a comprehensive financial sector rescue plan (Economist, 12 February 2009c; see also § 5.1). 
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importing demand from the rest of the world, and seek instead to “expand domestic demand 
relative to potential output” (Wolf, 2 December 2008). At this stage, though, the FT remains 
silent on precisely how this is to be achieved, stipulating only that they must “willingly 
accommodate necessary adjustments by deficit countries” (Wolf, 2 December 2008).  
It is not long, however, before the FT addresses this ambiguity by reiterating and 
developing its diagnosis of the present. In early January, for example, it again invokes the 
experience of the 1930s, but this time it stresses the problem of relying on the US to rescue 
global demand. In order for such an approach to stand a chance today, it argues, the fiscal 
boost would need to be unsustainably large. And were such a massive response indeed 
enacted, demand would still continue to leak from the US to the large surplus countries, 
providing ample grounds for a perilous political backlash: 
Now think what will happen if, after two or more years of monstrous fiscal 
deficits, the US is still mired in unemployment and slow growth. People will ask 
why the country is exporting so much of its demand to sustain jobs abroad. They 
will want their demand back. The last time this sort of thing happened – in the 
1930s – the outcome was a devastating round of beggar-my-neighbour 
devaluations, plus protectionism. Can we be confident we can avoid such dangers? 
On the contrary, the danger is extreme. (Wolf, 6 January 2009) 
To ward off epochal repetition, then, both the US and the rest of the world need the spending 
power of the surplus countries. Interestingly, though, only some two weeks later, the FT 
supplements this point with its logical inverse, recalling the damage that the US inflicted upon 
itself (and the world) as a stubborn importer of demand during the early 1930s. Thus, for the 
FT, the lessons from the Depression are that the US should “sustain [its] exceptional fiscal 
and monetary measures in the short term”, while at the same time encouraging its “main 
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trading partners [to] make the necessary medium-term adjustments in their spending” (Wolf, 
20 January 2009).  
Finally, in March 2009, the FT redoubles this argument through reference to the failed 
London conference of 1933. Specifically, by alluding to the trade wars which that episode 
triggered, it emplots the upcoming G20 meeting as an epoch-making moment, and then 
identifies fiscal policy as a determining factor in the global rescue effort. “World demand is in 
freefall”, it declares, “Stimulus is necessary”, and those “surplus countries with the most 
leeway to increase domestic spending … are not yet doing enough” (FT Editorial, 8 March 
2009). A fiscal stimulus, then, is not only critical, but also must take the form of a coordinated 
and international boost in government expenditure. This could not stand in starker contrast to 
the position of Forbes, which continues to blame this kind of analysis for an unwarranted faith 
in counter-cyclical spending (Forbes, 2 February 2009a) and criticises the G20 for repeating a 
different set of mistakes first made at the conference of 1933 – namely, the failure to secure 
agreement on the issues of taxation and exchange rate stability (Forbes, 27 April 2009b). 
Hence, by the second quarter of 2009, there is a clear disagreement over the most appropriate 
design and scope for fiscal stimulus.  
This basic point of tension does persist into late 2009, but over the course of the year, it 
undergoes an interesting and subtle transformation. On the one hand, Forbes continues to 
warn against any increases in government expenditure, doing so through further reference to 
its history of fiscal fiascos. In August, for example, it invokes the “useless … if not 
damaging” initiatives undertaken by Japan during the 1990s (Forbes, 3 August 2009), while 
in September, it again recalls how “counter-productive” Roosevelt’s stimulus packages were 
during the 1930s (Forbes, 7 September 2009). On the other hand, though, the Economist 
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begins to turn its attention to the issue of fiscal consolidation, and in viewing past crises 
through this new lens, it comes to derive a slightly different set of lessons for policymakers. 
Specifically, by invoking both the failures and successes of prior exit-strategies, it is able to 
develop an argument against any immediate or hasty withdrawal of fiscal stimulus.  
The first key move comes in April 2009, when the Economist echoes its earlier account 
of the Japanese crisis. Once again, it uses that episode to underline how “prolonged economic 
weakness … [can do] … far greater damage to public finances than temporary fiscal 
activism” (Economist, 23 April 2009b; cf. 30 October 2008b). This time, however, it also 
goes a step further, inviting readers to recall how Japan inadvertently “snuffed out its recovery 
… by rushing to raise taxes” (Economist, 23 April 2009b). Activism, then, figures not simply 
as stimulus, but also as retrenchment, and the case for the former is now strengthened through 
reference to the failures of the latter. This is a significant shift because prior to this, such 
policy mistakes had only been invoked by the two US publications, and for each of these they 
had served to illustrate the dangers of fiscal activism in general, rather than those associated 
with the winding-back of any previously instituted initiatives.  
In the months that follow, the Economist continues in this vein, incorporating numerous 
and more specific references of this kind into its discussion of how to deal with mounting 
levels of public debt. For the most part, these still revolve around the example of Japan’s tax 
increase, but they are increasingly used to draw more explicit lessons for the design of exit-
strategies from stimulus. In June, for example, the Economist identifies a looming threat of 
sovereign-debt crises, but simultaneously contrasts this with the attendant risk of a policy-
induced recession in the near-term: 
Somehow, governments have to avoid such a catastrophe without killing the 
recovery by tightening too soon. Japan made that mistake when concerns about its 
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growing public debt led its government to increase the consumption tax in 1997, 
which helped send the economy back into recession. Yet doing nothing could have 
much the same effect, because investors” fears about fiscal sustainability will push 
up bond yields, which also could stifle recovery. (Economist, 11 June 2009a) 
Faced with such a dilemma, it concludes, fiscal consolidation must indeed be undertaken, but 
both its timing and composition must be carefully considered. On the one hand, “Japan’s 
experience … is a reminder that a rush to fiscal tightening is counterproductive, especially 
after a banking bust”; hence, “instead of slashing their deficits now”, “the rich world’s 
governments need to promise, credibly, that they will do so once their economies are 
stronger” (Economist, 11 June 2009b). On the other hand, though, when the time does come, 
fiscal authorities should avoid “incentive-dulling tax increases” of the sort that Japan 
introduced, opting instead for cuts in government expenditure (Economist, 10 September 
2009b). 
Finally, the Economist goes on to develop each of these points by coupling them with 
appeals to other episodes of fiscal consolidation. Roosevelt’s tax increase of 1937, for 
example, is recruited as further evidence of how “premature fiscal repairs” can jeopardise 
recovery, as “Japan rediscovered 60 years later” (Economist, 1 October 2009l). Meanwhile, 
Sweden’s “dramatic fiscal turnaround” after its banking crisis is used not only to illustrate the 
benefits of prioritising spending cuts over Japanese-style tax hikes, but also to indicate how 
“slicing a fine layer off the top of the whole budget” is preferable to “cutting it like a cake”, 
which it suggests would create adverse distributional and political consequences (Economist, 
1 October 2009b). Thus, by late 2009, the very same kinds of fiasco that were previously 
deployed by Forbes are effectively re-appropriated by the Economist, serving now both to 
underline the enduring necessity of fiscal stimulus packages, and to provide more specific 
lessons for the design of their eventual withdrawal. 
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9.5 Summary: Retro-activist policy histories 
In the press coverage of 2007-2009, we find the history of policy activism being called upon 
to perform three basic functions. During the early stages of the crisis, a few key episodes are 
used to establish a relation between monetary policy and the emergence of economic 
instability. Then, soon after this, a wider historical repertoire is called upon to reveal the 
shape of an appropriate monetary response to the crisis. Finally, towards the end of the period 
in question, a somewhat different set of episodes is used to determine a proper role for fiscal 
policy in the ongoing crisis-response effort. Moreover, though, each of these functions entails 
more or less distinct practices of historical interpretation, and it is through these practices that 
publications are able to arrive at conflicting conclusions regarding the promises of policy 
activism. What follows here is a brief recapitulation of this process and its key outcomes.   
First, in response to early signs of instability, publications use the history of monetary 
activism in order to help produce a diagnosis of the emergent crisis. To start with, it is the 
events of 1970s and the early 2000s that serve as the key reference points, and each of these 
episodes are emplotted in ways that reveal an ongoing process of policy-induced inflation. 
From late 2007 onwards, however, an alternative story begins to take shape as the dotcom 
episode – along with a string of other monetary bailouts – is used to reveal a pro-cyclical and 
financially destabilising tendency in recent US interest rate policy. In this way, then, past 
episodes are used to develop two different tales of excess, wherein the crisis is portrayed as a 
by-product of mistaken monetary laxity. 
Second, as interest rates are aggressively slashed by various central banks, past episodes 
are called upon to provide immediate lessons for the conduct of monetary policy. Initially, 
these lessons are drawn from the tales of excess outlined above, leading all four publications 
Chapter 9 
212 
	  
to underline the likely fallout of an unneeded or premature monetary stimulus. Each tale does 
provide a different account of how this fallout would find form, but agreement on its negative 
character produces unity with regards to the virtues of continued monetary prudence. 
However, as fears of financial collapse grow, attention begins to shift towards the Great 
Depression, and this in turn yields a reappraisal of what an appropriate monetary response 
would entail. By late 2008, analogies with the deflation of the 1930s are widespread, and 
three of the four publications use these to advocate the swift provision of monetary stimulus.  
Third, in addition to the monetary roots and immediate management of the crisis, 
publications also begin to focus on the conduct of central banking more broadly, using past 
episodes to map out new futures for monetary activism. Once again, the basic process 
employed is to derive lessons from a specific emplotment of past events, but here the 
intermediating function of analogies is less important, and there is far greater diversity in 
terms of the conclusions reached by each publication. Looking back to the 1970s and the 
Asian crisis, for example, both UK publications develop a narrative about the revealed 
inadequacy of inflation-targeting; and on the basis of this, each is able to argue for a 
substantial widening of monetary policy objectives.  The WSJ goes some way towards 
reaching a similar conclusion – using a story about the dotcom recovery to underline the 
importance of guarding both price and financial stability – but it stops short of suggesting that 
monetary policy should seek to address global imbalances. Meanwhile, by incorporating the 
crisis into a narrative that stretches across centuries, Forbes develops an altogether different 
argument, suggesting that monetary policy should seek only to preserve the value of money, 
and that one way to do this would be by targeting the dollar-price of gold. 
And finally, alongside these appeals monetary history, prior instances of policy activism 
are also used to help determine an appropriate fiscal response to the crisis. To begin with a 
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range of different episodes called upon, and despite some key differences, all four 
publications do this in a way that counsels against the pursuit of a fiscal fix. However, once 
the crisis deepens in late 2008, a split emerges over the question of government expenditure. 
Specifically, while Forbes and the WSJ continue to invoke the historical failures of fiscal 
activism during the Great Depression and the Japanese crisis, both UK publications begin to 
use these same two episodes in ways that recommend an immediate recourse to the public 
purse. The Economist, for example, uses the Japanese crisis to underline the fiscal costs of a 
failure to provide any sort stimulus, while the FT draws an analogy with the Great Depression 
that emphasises the need for a global fiscal boost. This split is then reinforced as the 
Economist uses the experience of Japan and Sweden to argue against a hasty withdrawal of 
fiscal stimulus.  
Grasping these developments together, then, we can identify a process of interpretation 
whereby recollected and retrospectively constructed histories produce a range of different 
lessons for monetary and fiscal policymakers. These histories do draw on a relatively small 
number of episodes, but they are nevertheless diverse in that they entail disagreement over 
whether specific episodes represent either successes or failures of policy activism. Moreover, 
on the basis of these divergent emplotments, even the same historical episodes prove able to 
produce competing lessons for the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy. 
	  Chapter 10 
Histories of structural change 
Finally, in addition to the debates over crisis management and policy activism, past crises are 
also incorporated into a series of discussions that focus more closely on the institutional 
architecture of contemporary finance. More specifically, we find a broad range of appeals to 
the history of structural change, wherein past crises are used to indicate a relation between 
present modes of regulation and the ongoing turmoil in financial markets. To a certain extent, 
this basic move has already been touched upon in earlier sections – such as in those on the 
financial implications of central banking practice (§ 9.2 and 9.3)  – but it is taken up here in 
more explicit relation to the question of financial regulation and its reform. The column chart 
below provides a quantitative breakdown of these references both over time and by past crisis. 
 
 
Figure 10            Main past crises mentioned in discussions of ‘structural change’           (Source: Author’s own) 
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As the chart indicates, such references do again tend to cluster around key moments in 
the evolution of the crisis, but they are also sustained into 2009 after reaching their peak in 
late 2008. Moreover, while much of the discussion in advance of this peak is anchored in 
appeals to the crises of the 1990s, throughout 2009 it is the Great Depression that serves as 
the primary reference point. Delving further into this basic pattern, this chapter explores how 
different histories of structural change have been incorporated into specific debates over 
finance and its regulation. It begins by focusing on those that concern the contribution of new 
technical instruments and procedures to the dynamics of financial instability. It then moves on 
to discuss attempts to relate the emergence or severity of these instabilities to existing 
regulatory frameworks. Finally, it undertakes an analysis of how the intertwinement of such 
histories is used to map-out various futures for financial regulation. 
10.1 Stories of financial disorganisation, pt. I: Dangerous axioms 
Some of the first histories of structural change to be developed within the press are those that 
concern the emergence of new financial techniques, and over the course of the crisis, these are 
repeatedly deployed in ways that stress the destabilising power of such innovations. A broad 
linkage is therefore established between a present undoing of finance and the very axioms 
through which it had previously come to function. This section provides an analysis of the 
interpretive practices through which such a linkage is established, focusing in particular on 
how past crises are able to produce competing accounts of the relation between securitisation 
and financial disorganisation. 
To begin with, the past crises that are most frequently invoked in discussions of 
financial innovation are those of the 1990s, and these are consistently employed in relation to 
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the process of securitisation. The earliest reference of this sort occurs in April 2007, when the 
Economist makes its first appeal to the history of derivatives. This entails two simultaneous 
figurations of the dotcom bust. On the one hand, it observes how “the equity bear market of 
2000-03 did not result in banking crisis, as it might have done 30 years ago, when derivatives 
were still rare” (Economist, 19 April 2007a). The dotcom crash is thus presented as an 
apparent vindication of financial derivatives and their promise to disperse risk. At the same 
time, however, it also suggests that the various new instruments which were developed in its 
wake – such as credit derivatives – have “yet to face a really bracing test”, flourishing as they 
have in a largely favourable environment of macroeconomic recovery (Economist, 19 April 
2007a). The same episode therefore also figures as a potential source of new uncertainties and 
excessive confidence in structured finance. Hence, through a kind of interpretive double 
move, the Economist is effectively able to both rehearse and question a pre-existing narrative 
of securitisation.  
As mortgage markets continue to worsen in mid 2007, the Economist begins to repeat 
this basic move, but it does so with new emphasis. In May, for example, it adds to its list of 
the shocks that have put securitisation to the test – now invoking the US stock and credit 
market crises of 1987 and 1998 respectively – but once again it undercuts the reliability of 
these tests through an appeal to the broader macroeconomic environment. Specifically, it 
emphasises how even during this earlier period, financial markets were already cushioned by 
“easy money and lashings of liquidity”, suggesting in turn that the true test will come when 
“those halcyon days come to an end” (Economist, 17 May 2007i). In addition to this, 
however, it also begins to develop its underlying counter-narrative of uncertainty. Regulators 
might “reckon that on balance the growth of [derivative] markets has been a good thing”, it 
remarks, but “given the complexity of the new instruments … they can never be absolutely 
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sure that a monumental crisis is not brewing somewhere” (Economist, 17 May 2007j). 
Finally, in the wake of Northern Rock it appeals to both the dotcom crash and the crises of 
1998. Once again, the suggestion is that their relatively contained effects on banking “could 
have more to do with economic stability than securitisation”, but the latter is now also linked 
to a new “circularity of risk”, which is seen to entangle financial institutions in an 
increasingly unknown web of interdependence (Economist, 20 September 2007a). In this way, 
then, the Economist enacts a clear shift from raising doubts about securitisation to underlining 
its inherent and potentially dangerous uncertainties. 
During the remaining months of 2007, both the WSJ and the FT start to echo this 
sentiment by alluding to the endogenous dysfunction of contemporary financial market 
practice. The WSJ does this by drawing a simple counter-analogy between the S&L crisis and 
the ongoing crisis, declaring the former to have been “made in Washington”, and deeming the 
latter to have instead been “made on Wall Street”, where all “the complex financial 
instruments were designed and sold” (Wessel, 8 November 2007). It does quickly then go on 
to insist that government must share some of the blame, but the thrust of its comparison is 
nevertheless to attribute the emergent turmoil to a new and poorly understood set of structured 
products. Meanwhile, the FT begins to develop a more subtle narrative of revelation, doing so 
through reference to both the Asian and dotcom crises. In December, for example, it 
diagnoses a similar and “equally important turning point” in the evolution of global finance, 
wherein the seemingly automatic seizing-up of credit markets has effectively “called into 
question the workability of securitized lending” (Wolf, 11 December 2007). It then adds to 
this observation by reflecting upon the relation between those two earlier turning points and 
the ongoing credit crunch. Specifically, it counter-poses the tale of a Fed-led boom in the US 
mortgage market (§ 9.1) with that of Asia’s reinvested over-savings (§ 9.3), linking the latter 
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to “an explosion in the depth, liquidity and inventiveness of financial markets that went too 
far, too fast” (FT Editorial, 25 January 2008). On this basis, it is then able to raise the prospect 
of the crisis being one of “hyperfinance” itself, rather than a mere by-product of some 
external stimulus (FT Editorial, 25 January 2008). Hence, while the WSJ does remain 
somewhat more hedged, by early 2008 both it and the FT effectively join the Economist in 
casting securitisation as a potential driver of financial disorganisation. 
This fledgling plotline persists throughout 2008, but it is developed and deployed in 
new ways by each three publications. In general, though, there are two key changes worth 
highlighting. Firstly, the WSJ belatedly takes up the idea of the dotcom crash as a turning 
point in the process of securitisation. However, unlike the two UK publications, it does this in 
a way that shifts the blame for financial dysfunction from away from securities per se. At the 
base of this move is a new focus on the systemic incentives for seeking out market 
information: 
For decades, the large Wall Street brokerages had armies of analysts who … asked 
the hard questions and issued tough reports that often alerted both company 
executives and public investors to market-moving issues. There are now about half 
as many Wall Street analysts as in 2000. Former New York Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer eviscerated the profession with $1.4 billion in settlements and a new 
mandate for how the industry would be structured, which made the analysts 
uneconomical. Some brokerages had mixed analysis with investment banking 
during the dot-com boom, but regulatory overkill undermined this source of 
informed analysis. (Crovitz, 22 September 2008) 
In the absence of such analysis, it continues, it is no wonder that there were “so many 
unknown unknowns, [which are] now at least becoming known unknowns” (Crovitz, 22 
September 2008). On this reading, then, it is an unintended and state-induced paucity of 
information regarding the assets that underpin new financial instruments – rather than the 
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structure of the instruments themselves – which have contributed to the undoing of 
investment banks. The WSJ therefore does also incorporate the dotcom crash into a story of 
securitisation, but its place within this is as the cause for an ultimately destabilising regulatory 
crackdown. 
Alongside this, however, both the Economist and the FT continue to develop their 
respective stories about the risks and uncertainties created through the very process of 
technical innovation. After the rescue of Bear Stearns, for example, the Economist reiterates 
and strengthens its earlier diagnosis by again invoking the dotcom bust as a turning point. 
This time, however, it does so by casting that episode as the beginning of an overgrowth in 
the American financial sector. Specifically, it suggests that while US GDP growth entered 
into period of relative stagnation after 2001, financial services were able to “def[y] gravity by 
using debt, securitisation and proprietary trading” (Economist, 19 March 2008h). New 
instruments are in this way cast as an enabling factor in the transformation of investment 
banking, which has since been revealed as central to the ongoing and exaggerated 
deleveraging in financial markets. Yet more interpretive shifts come later, though, when both 
UK publications begin to assess the nature and significance of this transformation.  
In August, for example, the FT undertakes an extended survey of possible parallels, 
drawing in particular upon 1929 and 1987. The immediate point of entry is an appeal to 1987, 
which it recalls was accompanied by a fleeting backlash against securitisation, but this is 
quickly then followed by a series of further analogies aimed at gauging both the likelihood 
and desirability of a similar fate for contemporary critique: 
… the credit crunch is more serious than 1987 … It would be unfortunate, 
however, if the lack of trauma on the scale of the Great Depression meant a weak 
regulatory response, because the financial flaws and perversions exposed by the 
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credit crunch are on a par with the 1920s. The moral hazard that allowed lax 
mortgage lending, because the risk would ultimately be sold on to a third party via 
securitisation, must be addressed. (FT Editorial, 7 August 2008) 
Here the FT makes two distinct moves. The first is to draw counter-analogies of scale with 
both 1987 and 1929, whereby the ongoing crisis is positioned somewhere in between these 
two episodes in terms of its economic impact. The second, however, is to draw an analogy 
with the kinds of practices that prevailed during the 1920s, thereby enabling the “flaws and 
perversions” of modern securitisation to be interpreted as warranting a more substantive 
regulatory response to that which followed the crash of 1987. Hence, in combining these 
analogies of scale and kind, the FT both reiterates and extends its earlier account of financial 
disorganisation, now also forging a more explicit link to the question of regulation. 
Meanwhile, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Economist returns to and 
combines some of its earlier portrayals of the dotcom crash. Specifically, it now invokes that 
episode as a step change in both the nature and perceived benefits of securitisation, enabling it 
to develop a subtler story about how key transformations in systemic risk were able to go 
unnoticed during the early 2000s. In particular, it emphasises the increasing pro-cyclicality of 
leverage during these years, and while it is quick to stress that “financial innovation bears 
only part of the blame” for this transformation, the process is nevertheless central to its 
analysis of the emerging crisis (Economist, 9 October 2008f, emphasis added). Hence, by the 
peak of the crisis in late 2008, both UK publications have clearly come to identify 
securitisation as form of structural change that is at the heart of the ongoing disorganisation of 
finance.  
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10.2 Stories of financial disorganisation, pt. II: Broken codes 
Although already implicit within early discussions of securitisation, from late 2008 onwards, 
past crises are explicitly used to suggest a relation between present modes of regulation and 
the ongoing financial turmoil. More specifically, we find a range of attempts to assess the 
contribution of the former to the latter, wherein prior episodes serve to reveal different 
geneses and/or pathologies of regulatory dysfunction. A broad linkage is therefore established 
between a present undoing of finance and the various practices through which it had 
previously come to be governed or codified. This section provides an analysis of the most 
prominent strand of debate within these discussions, focusing on the issue of accounting rules 
and standards.1 
The earliest references of this sort appear in early 2008 when, against the backdrop of 
spiralling prices in debt markets, both UK publications begin to focus on the interface 
between accounting conventions and the dynamics of crisis. The FT, for example, begins by 
asserting the importance of establishing “some sense of clearing prices” for impaired assets – 
citing the stabilising effects of fire sale auctions after the S&L crisis – but then goes on to 
identify current accounting conventions as a “crucial impediment to repeating this trick”: 
Back in the days of the S&L crisis, US banks were not forced to mark their books 
to the firesale prices. But now the mark-to-market creed has taken hold. And it is a 
fair bet that if US banks were forced to mark their books to the initial clearance 
price for a CDO squared, say, some would run out of capital. Hence the trap: in the 
modern financial system, you can have mark-to-market accounting, or quick 
action to establish clearing prices, but probably not both, without blowing up 
banks (Tett, 6 March 2008) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For an indication of the debates surrounding these rules and standards both before and during financial crisis, 
see Perry & Nölke (2006) and Smith et al. (2010). 
Chapter 10 
222 
	  
It then concludes that “one way to exit this trap would be to abandon mark-to-market rules for 
a while” (Tett, 6 March 2008). Hence, by combining a positive lesson of crisis management 
with a counter-analogy of regulatory context, the S&L episode is able to provide the FT with 
both a speculative account of financial disorganisation – wherein accounting conventions 
produce liquidity spirals – and an immediate lesson for financial regulators. It does however 
remain somewhat ambiguous on the question of whether a more enduring change to 
accounting rules might be needed.  
At the same time, the Economist also acknowledges the destabilising effects of mark-to-
market accounting, expressing similar fears about how excessive write-downs might 
transform illiquidity into insolvency. Rather than the S&L recovery, though, it turns instead to 
the Japanese banking crisis; and through reference to that episode, it ends up producing a less 
equivocal answer to the question of regulatory change. Specifically, it does this by 
underlining the flaws inherent in the predecessor and primary alternative to the mark-to-
market method: 
Under historic-cost accounting, the banks had every reason not to restructure 
assets, because that meant owning up to their losses. Look at Japan, where the 
economy was sunk for most of the 1990s by stagnant loans to ‘zombie’ 
companies. Historic-cost left investors in the dark about valuations; it was also 
prone to fraud and fraught with moral hazard, since sloppy lending went 
unpunished. (Economist, 6 March 2008) 
On this reading, both the genesis and duration of the Japanese crisis can at least in part be 
attributed to historic-cost accounting, and this in turn renders any permanent move back 
towards such a method problematic. The Economist does then go on to join the FT in 
suggesting that “[r]egulators and accountants could ease up when banks risk a liquidity 
spiral”, but its overarching lesson is that it “would be perverse to ignore market signals when 
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finance is increasingly based on broad capital markets” (Economist, 6 March 2008). In this 
way, then, during the early onset of crisis, both UK publications use past crises to ask and 
answer questions about accounting. And although each does draw a different lesson from their 
respective counter-analogies, neither ends up calling for a wholesale abandonment of mark-
to-market. The essence of their shared position is well captured by the Economist when it 
paraphrases Winston Churchill: “it is the worst kind of accounting, except for all the others” 
(Economist, 6 March 2008). 
Before long, the two US publications also begin to cast accounting conventions as a 
driver of financial disorganisation. Yet while both do find recourse to some of the same 
episodes as their UK counterparts, these are invoked in ways that provide for a much stronger 
critique of mark-to-market rules. The first to do this is the WSJ, which begins to emplot the 
turmoil of the present as a product of prior and misguided changes in accounting methods: 
For decades, lenders used historical cost accounting … The pressure to change this 
method came after the collapse of U.S. savings and loans in the 1980s, and the 
Japanese banking crisis of the '90s. Regulators and accounting bodies argued that 
traditional accounting allowed banks to "hide" bad assets on their books, and that 
financial instruments needed to be valued based on what they would trade for in a 
market today … This supposed ‘reform’ is exacerbating the current crisis. (Berlau, 
20 September 2008) 
Here the WSJ joins the Economist in associating the Japanese crisis with a lesson about the 
revealed shortcomings of historic-cost accounting. But rather than directly transposing this 
lesson into the present, the WSJ instead incorporates it into a story of regulatory change, 
wherein the very learning of the lesson figures as an explanation for the ongoing process of 
balance-sheet “contagion” (Berlau, 20 September 2008). It soon then develops this line of 
argument by taking more explicit issue with the lesson that was drawn from the Japanese 
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crisis. Specifically, it deems the duration of that episode to have had more to do with macro-
economic mistakes than a mere “unwillingness to book losses”, and blames precisely such a 
misreading for an unwillingness to “provide relief from mark-to-market accounting” 
(Wesbury, 1 October 2008). Hence, for the WSJ, it is only a relearning of wrong lessons that 
can account for the perverse persistence of mark-to-market, and the real lesson for regulators 
is that these prior reforms should be revisited and overturned.  
Meanwhile, Forbes develops its critique of mark-to-market through somewhat different 
practices of historical interpretation. Specifically, it employs a mode of emplotment that 
operates through a chain of analogical reasoning. This begins when it draws a double counter-
analogy between the 1930s and the ongoing turmoil. By contrasting both the number of bank 
failures and the regulatory context during each of these conjunctures, Forbes is able to blame 
the comparatively higher incidence of bankruptcy in the latter on the “mark-to-market mania 
of regulators and accountants” (Forbes, 6 October 2008). The interpretive move is therefore 
rather simple: the problem is worse because the rules are different. However, Forbes is quick 
to develop this point by using it as the basis for two further and related moves: 
The most immediate [virus] is the mark-to-market … rules that regulators have 
been enforcing since the early 1990s. If such rules had been in place during the 
Great Depression, we’d still be in it today … If we had had similar regs in the 
early 1990s when the S&L crisis and the bad loans of our major commercial banks 
came to a head, we'd have had a second Great Depression instead of a recession … 
Fair-value accounting is an absurdity for financial institutions.  (Forbes, 13 
October 2008) 
In the first of these moves, Forbes inverts its earlier counter-analogy with the 1930s, enabling 
it to imagine an amplification of that episode under present day accounting rules. In the 
second it then folds both this logic and its reference point into yet another leap of analogical 
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reasoning, whereby the S&L crisis retroactively acquires the potential to have become another 
Depression. Most crucially, though, the ‘virus’ that is capable of producing such an 
amplification is clearly located in the present, meaning not only that these counter-factual 
histories serve as a source of potential futures, but also that these extrapolated futures 
effectively underpin its lesson for financial regulators – namely, that the suspension or 
abolishment of mark-to-market is “the one big piece of business left undone in ending the 
credit crisis” (Forbes, 10 November 2008). In this way, then, Forbes brings the consequences 
of regulatory inaction into view by developing and recombining various scenarios of how 
prior crises would have unfolded were they to have done so from within a regime of mark-to-
market accounting. 
Finally, as financial sector rescue plans proliferate and the debate over accounting rules 
intensifies, both Forbes and the Economist reiterate their respective lessons for regulators. In 
March 2009, for example, Forbes once again invokes the figure of the S&L crisis as would-be 
Depression, using it to underline the “astonishing absurdity” of enforcing write-downs within 
the context of an impaired market (Forbes, 16 March 2009). It also then goes on to make a 
further move by recalling the suspension of mark-to-market in 1938 by Roosevelt, portraying 
this as the one regulatory response to the Depression that is worth repeating (Forbes, 30 
March 2009; see § 8.3). Meanwhile, the Economist takes explicit aim at precisely such 
arguments by returning the Japanese crisis. Specifically, it repeats its earlier reading of that 
episode as a lesson in the importance of recognising losses promptly, and then redeploys this 
lesson by arguing that new toxic asset schemes “will not work unless banks mark assets to 
levels which buyers find attractive” (Economist, 8 April 2009b; see § 8.2).  
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Hence, while by the peak of the crisis in late 2008, all four publications do identify 
accounting rules as a short-term driver of financial disorganisation, a clear split still emerges 
over the kinds of lessons that they draw from their recourse to past crises. On the one hand, 
the Economist repeatedly uses the Japanese crisis – and in particular, its duration – in order to 
warn against any move away from a market-based mode of valuing financial assets. Mark-to-
market, it seems to suggest, is a mere ‘messenger’ of the problems inherent in the process of 
securitisation (Economist, 8 April 2009b; see § 10.1). On the other hand, though, both Forbes 
and the WSJ instead use various past crises in ways that yield an entirely different conclusion. 
Specifically, each emplots the ongoing turmoil not simply as the product of a prior and 
misguided change in accounting standards, but also as a development that warrants an 
immediate retreat from the “perversity of mark-to-market accounting rules” (Forbes, 13 July 
2009). 
10.3 Regulatory reversals, returns and reorientations 
Finally, in addition to the above discussions of securitisation and its associated mode of 
accounting, past crises are also used to develop more substantive histories of regulatory 
change. Specifically, we find a wide range of attempts to envision the co-evolution of finance 
and its regulation, wherein prior events are used to both apprehend and negotiate the 
historicity of the ongoing crisis. These efforts repeatedly entail the figure of a regulatory 
reversal – or a turnaround in the relation between finance and regulation – but over the course 
of the crisis, individual publications come to take rather different views on what the substance 
of such a reversal both is and should be. This section identifies three distinct figurations of 
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reversal, and provides an analysis of the interpretive practices through which these are 
developed. 
The first such figuration, which is developed by both UK publications, diagnoses an 
ongoing reversal but uses this to advocate a regulatory reorientation rather than a mere return. 
This process rests primarily on references to the Great Depression, which serve as the basis 
for a sequence of three interpretive moves. The earliest of these appear during the onset of 
crisis in 2007, when each publication begins to invoke the repeal of the 1933 Glass-Steagall 
Act. In May 2007, for example, the Economist portrays this repeal as having produced a new 
and potentially destabilising form of competition between commercial and investment banks. 
Specifically, it suggests that a “growing pressure to find new sources of profits” has increased 
the vulnerability of investment banks by pushing them towards a greater reliance upon 
proprietary trading (Economist, 17 May 2007b). Meanwhile, only of a couple of months later, 
the FT is insistent on the overriding benefits of a post-Glass-Steagall system, but in response 
to recent rescues it too identifies an associated amplification of systemic risk via new 
investment-banking practices, leading it to suggest that financial regulation “should be 
tweaked in response to the credit squeeze” (FT Editorial, 28 December 2007). Hence, by late 
2007, both envision the repeal of Glass-Steagall as a prior reversal that has since given way to 
novel financial sector dynamics, but only the FT explicitly raises the prospect of these 
requiring some form of regulatory response.  
However, after the rescues of early 2008, each begins to develop a clearer position on 
re-regulation through further reference to the Glass-Steagall Act. The Economist, for 
example, first responds to these bailouts by stressing the challenge that they pose to the post-
Glass-Steagall system. Specifically, it suggests that the extension of state support to 
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investment banks – which has occurred “for the first time since the Depression” – warrants a 
corresponding shift in the treatment of such institutions, for it was only their effective 
independence that justified their various regulatory exemptions (Economist, 27 March 2008). 
Alongside this logic of counter-precedence, though, it soon also deploys a counter-factual one 
by reading the crisis through the lens of the Glass-Steagall Act itself. Even were such 
restrictions to have remained in place, it reasons, they would have done little to prevent the 
failure of narrow or focused institutions, and the state-backed rescue of Bear Stearns and 
others in fact “points away” from any simple restoration of Glass-Steagall (Economist, 15 
May 2008e). By mid 2008, then, the Economist joins the FT in calling for some form of 
response to the ongoing turmoil, but rather than a mere return to prior legislation, its appeals 
to Glass-Steagall suggest instead the need for a substantive regulatory reorientation. 
The FT, on the other hand, immediately responds these bailouts by again portraying the 
repeal of Glass-Steagall as a kind of wrong turn, describing it as the birth of a regulatory 
regime that was decidedly “ill-suited to modern finance” (FT Editorial, 30 March 2008). But 
in its subsequent commentary on “the demise of the stand-alone investment banks” during 
September 2008, it too goes back to the Act itself and explicitly argues against its 
reinstatement (FT Editorial, 22 September 2008a). Specifically, it recalls how the separation 
of investment and commercial banking in 1933 was pursued as a response to the revealed 
dangers of combined banking, and then contrasts this rationale with the new kinds of risk it 
sees in the rise of state-backed former investment banks. Such a development, it maintains, 
represents a “shift in systemic risk” that must be tackled via new rather than old measures (FT 
Editorial, 22 September 2008a). Thus, while the Glass-Steagall Act and its repeal do still 
serve as key point reference points, both the Economist and the FT now deploy them in ways 
that suggest the need for some form of substantive regulatory reorientation. 
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Finally, as the crisis proceeds, each then develops this position by situating the idea of 
reorientation within a new figuration of reversal. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, for 
example, the Economist begins to diagnose an ongoing process of reversal. This reading is 
based on a counter-analogy of scale and consequence between the S&L crisis and the 
Depression:  
The 1980s savings-and-loans crisis amounted to a sizeable banking bust, but 
because it did not result in an economic catastrophe, the regulatory consequences 
were modest. The Depression, in contrast, not only refashioned the structure of 
American finance but brought regulation to whole swathes of the economy. 
(Economist, 9 October 2008g) 
By drawing such a counter-analogy, the Economist links the regulatory consequences of the 
crisis to the severity of its economic impact, but in emphasising the potential for another 
1930s-style depression (see § 7.2), it also effectively diagnoses the present as a kind of 
tipping point in the history of financial regulation. Moreover, it explicitly endorses this 
reversal as a response to the prior evolution of finance itself, where rapid “innovation [clearly] 
outpaced a sclerotic supervisory regime”. Rather than a simple return, though, it is a careful 
“rebalancing” that is seen as being needed to bring the two logics back into alignment 
(Economist, 9 October 2008g).2 
During early 2009, the Economist does revisit the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, but 
in keeping with the above, this now figures as an attempted modernisation rather than a 
deregulatory reversal (Economist, 22 January 2009e). In its place, though, both UK 
publications instead cast the crisis of the 1970s as their primary and most recent prior 
reversal. To a certain extent, this was already implicit in their earlier visions of reversal – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In mid 2009 the FT makes more or less the same move, using an analogy of scope with the 1930s in order to 
advocate the seeking out of a “new normal” for financial regulation (Wolf, 21 May 2009). 
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where the 1970s figured as a point origin for the rebirth of liberal finance – but over the 
course of 2009, each explicitly includes it as a third-term alongside the 1930s and the ongoing 
crisis. In early 2009, for example, the Economist repeatedly uses such a manoeuvre in order to 
frame the challenge of rebalancing as one of establishing a new position along the historical 
continuum of financial regulation. While the 1930s pushed financial regulators into 
prioritising safety over returns, it argues, the 1970s yielded a shift too far in the other 
direction, and in the midst of yet another “tug-of-war”, the crucial task must therefore be to 
find some kind of mid-point between these two extremes (Economist, 22 January 2009c).3 
Meanwhile, in mid-to-late 2009, the FT similarly advocates what we might call a less-
than-complete reversal. This entails explicitly endorsing Obama’s call for a 1930s-style 
“overhaul” of the financial system (Wolf, 15 September 2009), but then supplementing this 
with an acknowledgement that the deregulation of the 1970s was equally needed in its own 
time. “The Thatcher and post-Thatcher eras were not wasted”, it declares, but “the UK 
became complacent … about where markets were taking the economy”, and in the face of 
another epochal crisis, some of Keynes” insights into financial dynamics must begin to inform 
regulatory design (Wolf, 3 December 2009). Hence, through repeated reference to the legacy 
of the Great Depression – and culminating in this being grasped together with that of the 
1970s – both the Economist and the FT not only diagnose an ongoing reversal in financial 
regulation, but also encourage that this be pursued via a regulatory reorientation or 
rebalancing rather than a mere return to prior measures.  
The second key vision of reversal – which emerges through the commentary of the WSJ 
– also entails the rejection of any outright return to Depression-era legislation. At the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The aim, in other words, should be to “create a system that supports economic growth through the best mix of 
state-imposed stability and private initiative” (Economist, 22 January 2009b; see also 22 January 2009a). 
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time, though, it is premised on a somewhat different account of structural change, and this in 
turn yields a more ambiguous appraisal of ongoing attempts at reorientation. Specifically, 
over the course of 2008, the WSJ begins to develop its own story about the evolution of 
financial regulation, wherein bad readings of prior reversals are themselves seen to engender 
new problems. The first move in this process occurs in mid 2008, when it uses the S&L crisis 
in order to make a double-claim about the relation between regulation and market dynamics 
(Hilsenrath, 21 July 2008). On the one hand, it suggests that the “Deregulation of interest 
rates on deposits at U.S. thrifts in the early 1990s … led to wave of risk-taking and the 
savings-and-loans crisis”, thereby crafting a broad link between liberalisation and financial 
instability. On the other hand, though, it also points out that in this case, “regulators [also] 
came to bear the brunt of the blame … because of the demands they placed on banks and 
thrifts to tighten their standards and build capital”. The very process of re-regulation is 
therefore also linked to that of destabilisation, enabling the WSJ to identify the potential for 
yet another episode of regulatory overshooting. “The pendulum between market forces and 
regulation has no reassuring place to swing”, it warns, “though in the short-run, it is surely 
swinging toward regulation.” 
The next move then comes in late 2008 when, amidst fears of epochal repetition and 
mounting calls for a regulatory reversal, it combines this double reading of the S&L crisis 
with a further critique of regulation. This takes place via two distinct steps. In the first, it 
suggests that present support for reregulation effectively ignores how the S&L crisis was in 
part a “regulatory failure”, and then adds that this pressure is based on a “fundamental 
misperception that regulation can prevent … [systemically significant financial institutions] 
… from taking the huge risks that their protected status would permit” (Wallison, 22 
November 2008). In the second, though, it goes further and attributes this enduring 
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“misperception” to the legacy of the Depression, describing it as a “New Deal notion [that] 
should be discarded”. Hence, the contemporary recollection of a prior reversal is linked to an 
excessive faith in reregulation, and this in turn is cast as capable of producing a new bout of 
overregulation. Reversal is therefore envisioned not only as a process that is already 
underway, but also as one that is conditioned or amplified by its status as a living idea. 
In addition to this rather general critique of latter-day New Dealers, the WSJ also 
addresses more specific Depression-era legislation. During the peak of the crisis, for example, 
it dismisses the idea that the repeal of Glass-Steagall “somehow contributed to the current 
financial turmoil”, citing the non-coincidence of combined banking with institutional failure 
(Wallison, 15 October 2008). In fact, it even suggests that the ability for commercial and 
investment banks to merge has acted as a “major stabilizer” both before and during the crisis 
(Calomiris, 18 October 2008). In this way, then, it effectively joins the UK publications in 
rejecting the notion that Glass-Steagall would have been able to prevent or temper the 
ongoing instability. For the WSJ, though, this does not simply amount to an argument against 
a return to prior regulatory frameworks. Instead, and in keeping with the vision of reversal 
outlined above, it also feeds into a broader questioning of regulatory reorientation.  
Once again, this move takes place via further and more general appeals to the 1930s. 
This time, however, the WSJ uses the regulatory overhaul of that period in order to predict 
another such reaction, and to underline the uncertain nature of both its form and 
consequences. In an article entitled Reshaping Financial Oversight, for example, the WSJ 
begins by drawing an analogy with the Great Depression, and then reasons that the sheer scale 
of the ongoing crisis “is about to prompt the most far-reaching renovation of the rules and 
institutions that regulate finance since the 1930s” (Wessel, 28 May 2009). In addition to this, 
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though, it adds that the ongoing reversal raises important questions about the role of the 
Federal Reserve within any new regulatory landscape. Specifically, it identifies a range of 
dilemmas and problems associated with transforming the Fed into “an overarching overseer of 
financial stability”, such as the decisions that this would entail about which institutions to 
designate as systemically important.  
This point is then taken forward in late 2009 when the WSJ refers to these changes as 
“the Bernanke power grab”, making explicit reference to his claims to have “staved off 
‘Depression 2.0’” (Strassel, 14 August 2009). Fears of epochal repetition are therefore 
charged with having produced a roadmap for regulatory response, and the changes this is seen 
to entail are in turn linked to a dangerous blurring of the “once hard line between the 
‘independent’ Fed and the rest of official Washington”. In this way, then, the WSJ 
acknowledges that a process of reversal is indeed underway, but it is more sceptical than 
either of the UK publications about the outcome of such efforts. Specifically, while clearly 
accepting the need for some form of reregulation, this is juxtaposed with a concurrent danger 
of regulatory overstretch, wherein the very recollection of prior reversals risks creating a 
perverse new set of incentives for financial institutions. The reversal is thus already a 
reorientation, but it is also one that may yet produce new instabilities. 
The third and final figuration – which is developed by Forbes – similarly diagnoses and 
rejects an ongoing reversal in financial regulation. In addition to this, however, it also 
indicates and endorses a different possible response to the crisis. Specifically, Forbes joins the 
WSJ in crafting a vision of reversal that is based on a counter-cyclical faith in reregulation, 
but rather than a mere scepticism over reorientation, it instead uses this to identify a kind of 
‘bad reversal’ that must be actively counteracted. This process begins in early 2008, when 
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Forbes invokes the S&L crisis as an instance of regulatory failure. In much the same way as 
the WSJ does after it, this entails recalling how “bank regulators lurched from laxity to 
zealotry”, causing “Hundreds of banks ... [to be] needlessly destroyed” (Forbes, 7 January 
2008; see also Hilsenrath, 21 July 2008). “What an activist-minded Treasury chief and the 
SEC should do”, it continues, “is make sure that bank regulators and the accounting 
profession don’t overreact”. It then goes on to mount a more general critique of 
interventionism by portraying a string of past crises as fundamentally state-induced in nature 
(see § 8.3). Within its account of the Great Depression, however, it specifically blames 
Roosevelt for retarding recovery through his “destructive regulatory meddling” (Forbes, 11 
February 2008b). Hence, during early 2008, both the Depression and S&L crisis are used to 
illustrate and warn against a recurrent danger of regulatory overreaction.  
Before long, though, Forbes deliberately counter-poses this diagnosis against the kind of 
narrative developed by both the Economist and the FT. After the rescue of Bear Stearns, for 
example, it expressly rejects the “now popular storyline … that Washington must regulate and 
subsidize more to avert a 1930s-like depression” (Malpass, 21 April 2008). This rejection is 
based on a counter-analogy of policy context between the two periods, but its import for the 
debate over regulation is still to identify “Government overreach” as a “major risk”. 
Meanwhile, during the peak of the crisis in late 2008, it reiterates and develops this point by 
attributing such a risk to mistaken readings of prior crises:  
Not surprisingly, despite government's big, basic blunders in this debacle, politicos 
and much of the media are blaming "excessive deregulation." "A free-market 
failure," they call it. We've been here before. The experiences of the two big 
economic disasters of the 20th century--the Great Depression in the 1930s and the 
great inflation of the 1970s--dramatically demonstrate how government mistakes 
can lead to economic stagnation or impoverishment and geopolitical disaster. Both 
of these economic horrors were blamed on greedy corporations and "economic 
royalists." (Forbes, 10 November 2008) 
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Here, Forbes joins the UK publications in deploying the events of the 1930s and 1970s in 
tandem. But by invoking these as episodes of misdiagnosis – and more importantly, in 
drawing a parallel between such readings and the contemporary critique of deregulation – its 
interpretive move is in fact much closer to the one made by the WSJ. Specifically, insofar as 
this couplet is presented as evidence of an enduring tendency to respond to crises with a 
regulatory backlash, it too casts ongoing efforts as potential precursors to yet another bout of 
destabilising overregulation. Forbes supplements this, however, by drawing a distinction 
between bad and good reversals.  
Such a distinction is already implicit in the article discussed above, where Forbes 
concludes by recalling how the initial misdiagnosis of the 1970s was followed by a much-
needed policy reversal. More significantly, though, it now uses this new liberalising counter-
reversal in order to indicate and endorse an alternative vision of regulatory return. “If we have 
the kind of policies that marked the 1980s and not the kind that marked the 1930s and 1970s,” 
it argues, “we will be in for a dazzling era of innovation and economic advances” (Forbes, 10 
November 2008). This basic figuration then continues to feature in its extended commentaries 
on emergency measures throughout early 2009, wherein the crises of the 1930s and the 1970s 
are used not only to diagnose a more general reversal in the relation between state and market, 
but also to indicate a way forward via the kind of deregulation that followed the 1970s  (see § 
8.3). It is not until mid-2009, however, that Forbes explicitly incorporates this distinction into 
its position on financial regulation. 
In June, for example, Forbes again uses these two episodes in order to underline an 
ongoing regulatory backlash. Specifically, it suggests that “One would have to go back to the 
1930s or perhaps the 1970s as hostile to economic growth and innovation as this one is” 
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(Forbes, 9 July 2009). This time, though, it singles out “a proposal from the Treasury 
Department to crush venture capital firms with burdensome new regulations”, deeming this a 
particularly pernicious component of “the Obama Administration's grand scheme to reform 
our higgledy-piggledy financial regulatory system”. In so doing, it is able to charge 
government with discarding the kind of policy orientation responsible for “the prosperity of 
1982—2007”. A similar move is also made in October, when it combines another such 
portrayal of these two episodes with the suggestion that “Just as happened under Reagan … a 
bright, new day is beckoning” (Forbes, 19 October 2009). In this way, then, Forbes not only 
diagnoses another ongoing bad reversal, but also identifies the potential for a much needed 
and countervailing good reversal. Or to put it differently, in its dual emplotment of regulatory 
change, the former of these processes is already underway, while the latter must instead be 
purposively enacted in order to save liberal finance as such. Hence, by recombining some of 
the very same interpretive moves that are used by the other three publications, Forbes in fact 
develops a story of reversal that differs from each of those that are produced by their 
respective figurations. 
10.4 Summary: Reorganising finance in and after crisis 
Within the press coverage of 2007-2009, histories of structural change are deployed in a 
variety of ways. During the initial onset of market turmoil, a range of relatively recent past 
crises is used to establish a relation between the process of securitisation and the emergence 
of financial instability. But as this instability becomes more pronounced, we also find these 
same episodes being called upon in order to assess the contribution of accounting rules and 
standards to the ongoing crisis. Finally, we find a range of appeals to prior turning points as 
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part of an attempt to grasp together these two histories and map-out new futures for financial 
regulation. Within each of these strands of discussion, however, different practices of 
historical interpretation yield diverse and sometimes competing positions on the question of 
regulatory reform. What follows here is a brief account of this process and its key outcomes.  
First, in response to early indications of a problem in the market for mortgage-backed 
securities, publications use past events in order to develop a story about the transformation of 
finance. To begin with it is the crises of the 1990s that serve as the key reference points, and 
by early 2008, most publications use these to emplot the rise of securitisation as a potential 
driver of financial disorganisation. From this point onwards, however, a minor split emerges 
between the WSJ and the two UK-based publications. Specifically, while both the Economist 
and the FT come to identify the dotcom crash as a dangerous turning point or step-change in 
the evolution of financial market practice, the WSJ casts it instead as the cause for an 
ultimately destabilising regulatory crackdown. Hence, in its combination with a range of other 
past crises, the dotcom crash is able to produce two different accounts of the relation between 
financial innovation and the ongoing crisis. 
Second, as spiralling asset prices begin to translate into bankruptcies, past episodes are 
drawn into an ongoing debate over accounting conventions. The S&L and Japanese crises in 
particular are subject to much discussion, but over the course of the crisis they too are 
construed in ways that yield competing lessons for financial regulation. For the Economist 
and the FT, counter-analogies with the management of these two crises serve to reveal the 
shortcomings of historic-cost and mark-to-market methods respectively, but it is the latter 
lesson that wins out, with both counselling against any move away from a market-based mode 
of valuing financial assets. The WSJ, however, uses the very drawing of these lessons to 
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develop a story of how accounting went wrong, while the Forbes instead constructs a series of 
counterfactual scenarios wherein mark-to-market would have made prior crises worse. In so 
doing, both are able to call for an immediate suspension of mark-to-market rules. Thus, while 
all four publications do identify accounting conventions as a short-term driver of financial 
disorganisation, a pronounced split still emerges over the kinds of regulatory changes that this 
revelation is deemed to require. 
And third, alongside these appeals to financial innovation and regulatory frameworks, 
we also find a range of attempts to envision their co-evolution. Such histories of structural 
change entail repeated reference to the 1930s as a kind of regulatory reversal, but in addition 
to this the 1970s are also appealed to as a prior turning point. Moreover, though, these 
episodes are grasped together and deployed in ways that produce three distinct figurations of 
reversal. For the two UK-based publications, an initial focus on the repeal of Glass-Steagall is 
replaced by the figure of an ongoing and 1930-style reversal that must be negotiated by a 
careful reorientation rather than a mere return to old regulations. For the WSJ, though, the 
reversal of the 1930s serves not only as evidence of a counter-cyclical faith in reregulation, 
but also as an idea that is itself producing a potentially destabilising response to the ongoing 
crisis. Finally, for Forbes it is a double-reversal that is underway, wherein a misguided and 
1930s-style backlash already carries within it the seeds of a deregulatory counter-reversal. 
Hence, through their differential emplotment as reversals or turning points, a small number of 
past crises are able to yield just as many histories and futures for the regulation of finance. 
More generally, we can say that past crises are used not just to narrate an ongoing 
disorganisation of finance, but also to appraise ongoing efforts at its reorganisation. Within 
the former enterprise, they serve primarily as points of origin within stories of financial 
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innovation and regulatory change. In the latter, though, they are primarily used to develop 
accounts of how previous such episodes were negotiated, and to draw broader inferences 
about the dynamics of financial history. Or to put it differently, recollected histories of 
structural change are effectively deployed as part of an attempt to envision the breakdown and 
remaking of finance in both past and present. 
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Part IV 
Re-imagining the crises of global capital
	  Chapter 11 
Meta-historical dimensions of crisis 
When a man or an assembly of men [sic] are in the grip of urgent or perplexing 
circumstances and obliged to take action, their deliberations take less account of 
the present state of things as something that has never happened before, than they 
do of their imaginary ‘memories’. Obeying a sort of law of inertia, uneager to be 
creative or to react inventively to the novelty of the situation, their wavering 
thought tends to behave automatically; it casts around for precedents and yields to 
historical-mindedness which leads it to remember first of all, even when it is a 
question of dealing with some entirely new problem. History feeds upon history. 
– Paul Valéry1 
It was with the Great Depression and the outbreak of war behind him that Valéry wrote these 
words, reflecting on how during each of these two episodes, European elites had appealed to 
the past in their attempts to negotiate a radically uncertain present. With the crisis of 2008, 
financial elites have once again succumbed to such a ‘historical-mindedness’, returning to 
some of the very same events that led Valéry to develop his aphorism in the first place. 
Indeed, during the peak of the crisis the Great Depression is omnipresent, figuring not only 
within the occasional pronouncements of finance ministries, central banks and international 
organisations, but also in the daily coverage of financial newspapers and magazines. 
Meanwhile, as the crisis takes its shape and then decomposes within history, these same elites 
all find recourse to a range of other more recent and seemingly affiliated episodes – such as 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the Japanese banking crisis of the 1990s, and the first-
world stagflation of the 1970s. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 (Valéry, 1951: 13, emphasis in original). 
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As these appeals to the historical record recede into the near past, it is becoming clear 
that they themselves form an important dimension of those events now recounted in so many 
histories of the ‘Great Credit Crash’. The preceding empirical chapters have sought to throw 
this dimension into relief by tracing out the place of past crises within the real-time 
historiography of 2007-2009. The present chapter explores the broader implications of this 
analysis for theories and histories of finance and crisis. In order to do this it pursues three 
related lines of inquiry. The first seeks to situate the ‘return of the past’ within capitalist 
history, asking what countless and desperate appeals to the past might reveal about the 
conjuncture from which they emanate. It is argued they can be fruitfully understood as a 
response to preceding transformations in global finance and its corresponding modes of 
historiography. The second then focuses more specifically on the relation between appeals to 
the past and efforts to interpret or manage the present, asking what role anachronism might 
perform in the discursive negotiation of crisis. Here a distinction is drawn between the 
possible functions of the practical past and the basic varieties of historical representation 
through which it finds determinate form. Finally, the third line of inquiry focuses more 
generally on the relation between crises of capitalist history and histories of capitalist crisis, 
asking what becomes of the present when the events of the past catch up with it. A new mode 
of historiography is proposed wherein the practical past and its attendant histories are recast 
as inputs into a process of history-production. 
11.1 The crisis of 2008 and the return of the past 
The crisis of 2008 has been accompanied by a proliferation of contending explanations. More 
recently, these explanations have been the subject of countless attempts at summary and 
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overview.2 There is no need to add to this literature here. What does warrant closer attention 
is the presence of the past within debates surrounding the crisis. As a simple fact or detail this 
has been noted, and historians in particular are beginning to acknowledge a return of the 
1930s to contemporary debate (e.g. James, 2009; Daunton, 2010; Temin, 2010; and Hawke, 
2011). But if “the Great Depression analogy refuses to go away”, as Michael Bordo and 
Harold James have rightly observed (2010: 127, emphasis added), then it is for reasons that 
few have found cause to investigate. Indeed, the fundamental puzzle opened up by such a 
return (What is its function? Why has it occurred in this present?) has yet to even find the 
form of a question. Here this puzzle is addressed by interposing two key developments 
between the crisis of 2008 and the appeals to the past that accompanied it. The first is the rise 
of postmodern finance, which has posed a significant challenge to traditional modes of 
historical representation; and the second is a shift towards formalism in economic 
historiography, which has rendered its histories increasingly unable to perform their basic 
sense making function. The return of the past can be understood as a response to these prior 
and mutually reinforcing transformations in the appearance of capitalist history. 
11.1.1 Transformations in the phenomenology of global capital 
Over the last twenty years it has become increasingly common to identify an ongoing 
‘financialisation’ of global capitalism. Although the term is a notoriously plastic one, it is 
typically used to designate an epochal transformation in the relation between finance and 
other spheres of human activity (Stockhammer, 2004: 720-1). On the postmodern left, 
emphasis is placed on what becomes of culture once money is detached from the circuit of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In one of the more comprehensive efforts at synthesis, Howard Davies (2010) identifies some fifty different 
explanations for the crisis. For diverse edited collections see Konings (2010) and Calhoun & Derluguian (2011). 
Chapter 11 
244 
	  
production and enters into a purely symbolic “space of flows” (Castells, 1996: 472; see also 
Baudrillard, 1993: 26-35; Jameson, 1997; and Lee & LiPuma, 2002). More traditional 
scholars across the political spectrum also stress the idea of “a prolonged split between the 
divergent real and financial economies” (Arrighi, 1994: 82), but they usually go on to identify 
a distorting or unsustainable impact of the latter on the former (cf. Boyer, 2000; Krippner, 
2005; Foster, 2007; and Posner, 2009). Both types of claims nevertheless entail a basic appeal 
to underlying changes in financial market practice, even if the innovation process itself 
remains relatively untheorised (Nesvetailova, 2012: 68-71). 
There are good reasons to be sceptical about these kinds of claims in their stronger 
forms. As Ronen Palan (2003) points out, while the rise of the Eurodollar markets may well 
inaugurate a form of global finance more deterritorialised than ever before, the cyber-
spatiality of offshore can only exist through legal support from the traditional state system 
(see also Burn, 1999). Similarly, Martijn Konings (2011) convincingly demonstrates that the 
apparent decoupling of finance from the real economy in the US simultaneously comes with a 
deeper anchoring of finance in the everyday lives of its citizens (see also Schwartz, 2009). 
That said, without going into the actual process of financial innovation, the changes it has 
wrought clearly mark a transformation in the phenomenology of global capital. Indeed, if 
there is anything that ties together the new literature on financialisation, it is an attempt to 
restore a semblance of unity to capitalism at a time when it appears only as a senseless 
kaleidoscope of abstract events and technical procedures (see Aitken, 2007; Montgomerie, 
2008; Allon, 2009). Following Hayden White (1999: 66-86), this kind of ‘senselessness’ can 
be understood as posing a significant challenge to traditional modes of historical 
representation and understanding. 
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On the side of the technical procedure is a deficit of historical experience, or a 
phenomenology that is always and knowingly outpaced by the conjunctive work of an 
evolving socio-technical assemblage. Take the world of offshore finance. Such a world does 
come into being through the intentional exercise of legal discretion, yet its consequence is a 
regime of money-signs wherein “the number becomes a subject” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 
389, emphasis added; quoted in Palan, 2003: 170), and the numerical principle begins to 
shape rather than merely follow the territorialities of capitalism. As Palan suggests this is 
already a quasi or parahistorical logic. However, within the emergent topography of this 
money-movement, it is the numerical prostheses of structured finance that map out its lines 
and points. The result, as sociologists of finance are beginning to acknowledge, is a kind of 
post-human automatism wherein option-pricing models and trading algorithms effectively 
create their own symptomatologies (see MacKenzie, 2006; and MacKenzie et al., 2012). 
Finance is therefore increasingly seen to consist in a bricolage that replaces history with a 
succession of equations. The implications of this for representational practice are neatly 
encapsulated by the new policy literature on complexity (e.g. Haldane, 2009; Gai et al., 2011; 
cf. Erturk et al., 2011; Datz, 2012). As a scientific aspiration, the turn to complexity affirms 
precisely the kind of post-humanism that makes finance parahistorical. But at the same time it 
also betrays an experience of epistemological shortcoming and an awareness that history – if 
it exists at all – may demand new forms of what Fredric Jameson (1988) refers to as 
‘cognitive mapping’. 
In marked contrast, on the side of the abstract event is a surplus of historical experience, 
or a phenomenology that imperceptibly moves through a multiplicity of illusions. Here the 
modern apparatus of cultural mediation is decisive. With the rise of its own dedicated 
broadcast media, finance in general becomes a spectacle, figuring forth as “a never-ending 
Chapter 11 
246 
	  
series of daily stories”’ and a “cacophony of voices, images and events” (Clark et al., 2004: 
289). But as White points out, this barrage does not so much condemn history to an eternal 
present as rob the present of a place within chronology. This transforms the status of the 
financial event in two key ways. By exploding occurrence itself into an atemporal field of 
appearance, mass media effectively strengthen the resistance of events to narrativisation 
(White, 1999: 70-4). Yet through this very resistance, events become able to partake in a 
virtually limitless number of replays, short-circuits, and transmutations (pp. 74-9); in the 
words of Baudrillard, they become “superconductive” (1993: 36). The new cultural 
mediations of capitalism therefore turn the already abstract events of modern finance into a 
dizzying mosaic of third-order simulacra. This has two key implications for representational 
practice. Before one can even begin to extract a configuration from a succession, a semblance 
of sequence must first be wrested from the crystal image of time.3 But if such a double-move 
is to succeed in returning events to history, it can only do so by working to conceal rather 
than disclose the vertigo of their actual experience. 
The senselessness of contemporary finance is therefore deeply paradoxical, consisting at 
once in both the excess and the lack of experiential knowledge that it provisions. Spectacular 
events are too parallactic to furnish only one apparent truth, but they are always undergirded 
by a creeping awareness of the unknown interactions that produce their image. This tension 
places the representation of capitalist history at a crossroads. On one hand, efforts to render its 
numerical logics visible foreclose traditional narrative modes of representation; and on the 
other, efforts to manage its excessive appearance rely on the forceful re-imposition of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Tellingly, in his A Global History of the Financial Crash Johan Lybeck (2012) devotes over sixty pages to 
the construction of a medieval-style annals, laboriously listing events alongside dates in an attempt to reinvest 
their occurrence with chronology. For a discussion of the annals form see White (1987: 1-25). 
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narrative closure. The challenge to historical representation that Hayden White sees in 
modernity is in this way exaggerated by the rise of postmodern finance. 
11.1.2 Transformations in the operation of capitalist historiography 
Alongside the developments outlined above, capitalist history also appears through 
increasingly formal modes of historiography.4  This shift reflects a broader and more widely 
acknowledged transformation in political economy that is usually traced back to the 
‘marginalist revolution’ of the late nineteenth century (e.g. Stigler, 1994/1941; cf. Blaug, 
1972). As William Jaffé (1976) points out, the pioneering marginalists are in many ways quite 
different to one another, but both W. S. Jevons and Léon Walras nevertheless help to establish 
mathematics as a preferred language for economic analysis (see Schabas, 1990; and 
Mirowski, 1991). In the wake of this change, modern physics becomes a model for economic 
science, and mechanical models of equilibrium – which entail a distinctly impoverished 
conception of historical time – become the basis for a neoclassical turn in economic theory 
(cf. Mirowski, 1984b; and Robinson, 1979; 1980). For example, in the influential model of 
‘general equilibrium’ put forward by Walras (2003/1874), all markets are born equal and 
equilibration is an immanent tendency set in motion by external change. Time is reduced to a 
path for variables, and the change that prompts adjustment remains a mystery, as does the 
historical genesis of the market system itself.5 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Roger Backhouse (1998) identifies the use of axioms, mathematics and rigidly defined methods as three basic 
varieties of formalism in economics. All three of these varieties are pertinent to the present discussion. 
5 On ‘missing’ conditions of possibility more generally, see Chick & Dow (2001: 708-9), who emphasise the 
ambiguity that surrounds the stock of labour in Walrasian models of the economy. See also § 1.2.1. 
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Of course, the world of economic thought has never been as homogenous or closed as 
the one envisioned by general equilibrium theory, but following its introduction into the field, 
formalism comes to acquire an ecological dominance.6 In addition to recruiting a new 
generation of scholars to neoclassical theory, formalism influences the development of 
Marxian economics by luring it into an increasingly technical and ultimately unproductive 
debate over the accumulation process (see Harcourt, 1972; Hodgson, 1997; Nitzan & Bichler, 
2009: 65-144). Even more visibly, it is able to domesticate Keynesian ideas by shoehorning 
them into the models of the so-called ‘neoclassical synthesis’ (Samuelson, 1955: 212; see 
Darity & Young, 1995). Neither of these developments have gone without criticism, but it has 
still become possible to tell plausible stories about “How Economics Forgot History” 
(Hodgson, 2001). Following Michel de Certeau (1988/1975), this shift can be read as 
breakdown in the machinery of capitalist historiography, whose primary function is precisely 
to produce convincing representations of history in its developmental or conjunctural aspects. 
Yet within both financial and historical economics, the apparent evisceration of history 
actually provisions a new and productive set of quasi-historiographic procedures. 
In terms of financial economics, the transformation begins with the application of the 
equilibrium framework to markets for loanable funds. Jan Toporowski (2000: 2) characterises 
the 1960s as a tipping-point in this process, arguing that finance theory has since been 
reduced to “the most abstract and other-worldly axioms of pre-Keynesian microeconomics”. 
Duncan Wigan (2009: 160-3) observes a similar “expurgation” of Keynesian ideas during this 
time, emphasising how modern portfolio theory effectively transforms uncertainty into an 
object of rational calculation. Insofar as this development has its roots in probability and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The notion of ‘ecological dominance’ is borrowed from the work of Bob Jessop (2000; 2007: 26). 
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general equilibrium theory, it reproduces the reduction of time to ‘inter-temporal choice’ that 
defines formal microeconomics more generally. But as Wigan points out, it also involves a 
dream of finance without history – in the form of a world with “fungible prices for all times, 
places and things” – which has been central to the rise of modern financial derivatives (p. 
161). Somewhat ironically, then, the near-total annihilation of time and history within finance 
theory coincides with the emergence of an industry that trades almost exclusively in claims on 
the future (Lee & LiPuma, 2004; Bryan & Rafferty, 2005; and Esposito, 2011); and yet this 
latter development depends precisely on the option-pricing models of the former. The fantasy 
of market-completion therefore enables a developmental process that its theoretical ciphers by 
definition cannot grasp. This is more than a mere ‘performativity’ of finance theory (as in 
MacKenzie, 2006; and Callon, 2007). To put it in Deleuzo-Guattarian terms, financial models 
are desiring-machines, providing the codes and producing the breaks or flows through which 
money is both cathected and put to work as principle of social organisation (see Deleuze & 
Guattari, 2007/1984: 23-45, 242-60). 
The conduct of historical economics undergoes a similar and related transformation. As 
de Certeau (1988/1975: 66) points out, in the wake of the Great Depression the writing of 
history becomes the writing of economic history. But one consequence of the rising 
neoclassical tide during the 1930s is a later sea change in historical economics. Specifically, 
the so-called ‘cliometrics revolution’ of the 1960s sees a new cohort of economists come to 
history armed with a combination of neoclassical price theory and statistical technique (see 
McCloskey, 1978; Crafts, 1987; and Lyons et al., 2008). Historical research is explicitly 
recast as an objective science, and the past in turn is approached “a giant experiment station 
for economic ideas” (Goldin, 1995: 191). At least in the US, then, economic historians take 
Chapter 11 
250 
	  
flight from the narrative form just as other historians do the opposite.7 To a certain extent this 
development is unsurprising, for as Deleuze & Guattari (2007/1984: 260) so bluntly put it, 
“Writing has never been capitalism’s thing”. And yet contemporary capitalism clearly comes 
to rely on writing in a way that is peculiar to the parahistorical logics of postmodern finance.8 
Specifically, while plot may be pushed out of economic historiography by the uptake of 
cliometric methods, narrated historical experience provides the focus for these methods, 
whose datasets in turn provide the numerical materials with which some of these new 
financial models must ultimately be fed.9 Hence, just as the formalisation of financial 
economics engenders new dynamics that its theoretical frameworks cannot grasp, so too does 
the related turn to statistical technique in economic history. 
Taken together, these two historiographic shifts amount to a broader transformation in 
the appearance and function of capitalist history. On the one hand, the neoclassical turn 
coheres into a form of political economy that is uniquely unable to produce convincing 
representations of either the developmental or conjunctural dimensions of capitalism. Insofar 
as both financial and historical economics are directly implicated in the machinery of 
capitalist historiography, this amounts to a dangerous hollowing-out of that machinery, whose 
function is precisely to provide a discourse that might extract a semblance of meaning from an 
otherwise senseless onslaught of events and phenomena. And yet on the other hand, this 
hollowed-out form of historiography serves as an input into precisely those dynamics that 
contribute to the senselessness of contemporary finance. In this way, the role of historical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This development can be readily observed in the literature on the Great Depression, where the landmark study 
of Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1963) helps to inaugurate a shift from the tales of J.K. Galbraith (1955) 
and Charles Kindleberger (1978) to the tests of Ben Bernanke (1983) and Barry Eichengreen (1995). For an 
indication of the state of the art in financial cliometrics during the 1990s, see Bordo et al. (1998). 
8 Deleuze & Guattari suggest as much when they insist that “the capitalist use of language … is realized or 
becomes concrete within the field of immanence peculiar to capitalism itself” (2007/1984: 261). 
9 For example, the ‘value-at-risk’ models that many financial institutions use to manage their proprietary-
trading portfolios rely heavily on historical price data (cf. Figlewski, 1997; and Saunders & Allen, 2010). 
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discourse within financialised capitalism exceeds the one that de Certeau (1984: 131-53) 
identifies for it within the modern scriptural economy; rather than merely furnishing society 
with a means of “managing the space that it provides for itself” (1988/1975: 6), it is also and 
perhaps even principally an accelerator of the terrifying flux that demands such a function in 
the first place. 
11.1.3 The return of the past as meta-historical crisis 
Guy Debord and Jean Baudrillard both had extreme and despairing visions for the future of 
history. These may now seem either outdated or overdone, but each still provides valuable 
insights into the place of history within an increasingly abstract or mediated form of 
capitalism. Indeed, the age of derivatives and securitisation has in many ways been an age 
without history. And yet history quite clearly refuses to disappear. If it had ever been fully 
neutralised, obliterated, or concealed, then the crisis of 2008 marks its reincorporation into the 
global financial imaginary. The web-like markets for risk, the cascading automatism of their 
undoing, and the constant news bulletins about this very process – none of these have been 
able to repress what Gillian Tett has referred to as a sudden and “violent thirst for historical 
knowledge” (26 August 2007). But the search for this knowledge has more or less bypassed 
the models and histories of financialised capitalism, whose icy formalism has slaked no thirst. 
Instead, the drip-feed commentary of its policy elites and journalists has flooded us all with 
appeals to prior and seemingly similar or affiliated financial crises. It is in this flood that the 
crisis of 2008 brings with it a return of the past. 
When grasped together with preceding transformations in capitalist finance and its 
corresponding modes of historiography, this return of the past can be taken as testimony to a 
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crisis of historical consciousness itself. On one side, the phenomenology of global capital 
undermines the apparent coherence of history by alerting us to a dark space between the 
technical procedures of finance and its spectacular blaze of events; on the other, existing 
modes of historiography rule themselves out for any role in apprehending this conjuncture by 
operating as an accelerator of those dynamics that render finance resistant to representation. 
Coming as it does at the interstices of these two developments, the crisis of 2008 cannot help 
but resurrect what Mircea Eliade (1991/1954: 149) calls the “terror of history”; it restores an 
unbearable sense of meaninglessness to events by revealing the inability of historiology to 
invest them with any definitive semblance of pattern or reason. Numerous and desperate 
appeals to the historical record are an effort to escape from precisely this ‘terror’ by returning, 
albeit in pseudo-scientific form, to the religious archetypes of revelation and recurrence that 
precede the rise of modern historical discourse.10 The return of the past is in this way an 
improvised attempt to somehow supplement the meagre defenses against history that 
economic science has proved able to provide. 
11.2 Historical imagination and the constitutive anachronism of crisis 
If the transformations outlined above provide an answer to how and why the past has come to 
acquire such a strange presence during the crisis of 2008, they only hint at the functions that 
such a presence might perform. Moreover, the relation between these functions and the 
interpretive practices on which they depend is also only implicit in the preceding discussion. 
In order to draw out these subtleties this section goes back into the return of the past, focusing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In The Myth of the Eternal Return (1991/1954) Eliade focuses on the role of such schemas within archaic 
societies, but his brief discussion of modern thought already anticipates the kind of backsliding identified here: 
“as the terror of history grows worse, as existence becomes more and more precarious because of history, the 
positions of historicism will increasingly lose in prestige” (p. 153; cf. Ruiz, 2011). 
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in particular on the temporal conjugations through which crises from one present are invoked 
and put to work within the context of another. It begins by revisiting the new crisis theory, 
which it now suggests would benefit from drawing an analytical distinction between ways of 
invoking the past and the various functions these practices might perform. In then uses a 
selection of empirical examples to illustrate how these ways of invoking the past can be 
disaggregated into at least three basic varieties. The return of the Great Depression in 
particular is then used to indicate how these varieties of historical representation can be 
combined in different ways, yielding a wider range of possible functions for the historical 
imagination than those currently envisioned by the new crisis theory. 
11.2.1 Revisiting the new crisis theory 
This thesis began by observing how the very idea of crisis entails an episodic dimension that 
renders figurations of time and history immanent to any crisis theory. It also underlined how 
this point is neglected in the new political economy at the same time as it is foregrounded by a 
theoretical emphasis on the intersubjective constitution and discursive negotiation of crisis. 
Nevertheless, passing acknowledgements of a role for historical interpretation were in fact 
located within all three major branches of the new crisis theory. Here these brief comments 
from each are used to underline the importance of drawing a distinction between the possible 
functions of the practical past and the specific practices of historical interpretation through 
which it finds determinate form. 
The first branch of crisis theory to gesture towards a role for the practical past is 
constructivist institutionalism. In his landmark article on the crisis of the 1970s, Colin Hay 
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(1996: 253) begins by observing how “The winter of discontent continues to exert a powerful 
hold over the British political imaginary”. By way of elaboration he offers the following: 
It acts as a discursive key to a collective mythology seemingly appealed to, and 
conjured, in each wave of industrial unrest, in each hint of political turmoil and, 
until recently, whenever the election of a Labour government looked credible. 
(Hay, 1996: 253) 
These are insightful but equally nebulous comments. Whilst no more than casual conjecture, 
Hay’s remarks usefully draw attention to how an event from the past can live on in one of its 
narrative representations. During the crisis of 2008, the ‘Smoot-Hawley disaster’ similarly 
circulates as shorthand for a particular narrativisation of the Great Depression, going more or 
less unchallenged as a truthful and timely reminder of history’s lessons (§ 4.2, § 7.2). And yet 
it is not clear how the ‘winter of discontent’ is ‘conjured’, nor is it obvious why such a 
conjuring must always be in the service of a pre-constituted narrative rendered as historical 
myth. By conflating the function of the past with the practice of its recollection in this way, 
Hay is able to provide analytical clarity on neither. 
The proponents of agent-centred or uncertainty constructivism approach the issue 
somewhat differently. In their article on the endogenous construction of crisis, Wesley 
Widmaier et al. (2007: 755) highlight “the importance of expressive struggles over the 
‘lessons of history’”. In so doing, they go some way towards to addressing Hay’s 
shortcomings. By acknowledging how “intensified debate over the meaning of contemporary 
events often fosters reinterpretations of past wars and crises” (p. 755), they overturn the idea 
that appeals to a past crisis must necessarily involve a reiteration of its prior narrativisations. 
They also offer more explicit comments on both the function of such appeals and the process 
through which they might be contested:  
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To the extent that debates over the ‘‘lessons of history’’ are themselves 
constitutive of future understandings and interests, the construction of crises 
involves ongoing persuasion in mass and elite settings alike” (Widmaier et al., 
2007: 755-6, emphasis added) 
It should now be clear that such debates do accompany the crisis of 2008. These have also 
frequently entailed investing past episodes with new meanings. For example, in its appeals to 
the Asian crisis, the US FRB effectively recasts that episode as the point of origin for an 
accumulation of global imbalances – a consequence it quite simply could not yet have had 
before the emergence of said imbalances (§ 6.3). But despite the subtlety of their comments, 
Widmaier et al. still pass over the interpretive practices through which these ‘lessons of 
history’ are drawn and contested. This is because their basic category of ‘lessons’ is defined 
only on the basis of its broad function (i.e. to constitute the ‘understandings and interests’ of 
agents in the face of crisis). 
Cultural political economy provides by far the clearest comments of all three 
approaches. According to Bob Jessop, “Lessons from the past” are invoked in the course of 
learning in, about, and from crisis (2011b: 16, emphasis omitted). By explicitly framing the 
question of history in terms of learning, Jessop is able to overcome the conflation of function 
and practice that marks constructivist crisis theory. On the side of practice, learning from the 
past entails an “effort to define appropriate historical parallels”; on the side of function, its 
purpose is to provide “a basis for responding effectively to … crisis in real time” (p. 16). 
However, in coupling together function and practice, Jessop arrives at a limited conception of 
each. Lesson drawing clearly relies on finding similarities between crisis episodes, but the 
‘effort to define appropriate parallels’ must entail more than the parallels themselves. 
Conversely, it seems unduly restrictive to treat these other kinds of apparent affiliations as 
always and only subordinate components in a broader process of learning. Hence, while 
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constructivism suffers from a failure to distinguish between the form and the content of 
historical representation, cultural political economy is limited by too narrow a conception of 
the latter. 
11.2.2 Three basic varieties of historical representation 
In order to overcome the elisions and ambiguities just indicated it is necessary to begin by 
delineating between different ways of bringing the past into the present. With an in-depth 
empirical analysis of such practices in place it is now possible to identify three basic varieties 
of historical representation. The disaggregation is strictly analytical, which is to say that the 
varieties are non-exclusive. However, for purposes of clarity in exposition they are addressed 
here in turn. 
The first and perhaps primary form of historical representation is narrative. 
Representation of this kind relies on a procedure of emplotment, which imposes a story order 
on history through the selection, sequencing, and configuration of more than one of its 
events.11 This procedure provides explication for a process that is only hinted in various 
appeals to power of narrative within crisis theory – such as Hay’s concept of “meta-narration” 
(1999: 333), Blyth’s reference to “causal stories” (2007: 762), and Jessop’s mention of 
“productively vague stories” (2008: 83). But more importantly, it also indicates a way of 
grasping together events that is properly distinct from identifying similarities. For example, 
when the FRB and the IMF portray precautionary saving in the East as having contributed to 
financial excesses in the West, they do not emphasise commonalities between the Asian crisis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This is Ricoeur’s use of the term. White speaks instead of narrativisation, reserving emplotment for the 
kinds of meanings that narrativisation produces (see § 2.2.2, fn. 17). 
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and the then ongoing turmoil in the US (§ 6.3). Rather, they cast the former as having 
contributed to the development of the latter. Hence, when applied to the question of crisis, 
emplotment enables prior events to be understood as contributing to a developmental process 
that culminates in a later present. 
The second basic form of historical representation is that which emphasises the 
similarities or differences between developments disjoined by chronological time. This relies 
on a procedure of analogical reasoning, which consists in drawing analogies or counter-
analogies between specific aspects of events or processes. There are two ways in which this 
can occur. On the one hand, analogical reasoning can be applied to specific point-like aspects 
of events or apparently self-evident processes of development. For example, early on in the 
crisis numerous comparisons are made between an ongoing decline in US house prices and 
the one that occurred during the 1930s (§ 4.1, § 7.1). Similarly, later on the speed and depth 
of public bailouts and fiscal retrenchment are frequently likened to or differentiated from the 
strategies pursued by Japanese and Nordic policymakers during the 1990s (§ 8.2, § 9.4). But 
on the other hand, analogical reasoning can also build on a preliminary or implicit 
emplotment and be applied to causal-chains of events. For example, when analogies are 
drawn between the Keynesian revolution of the postwar period and ongoing shifts in 
economic policy, the comparison necessarily entails identifying a similar sequence and 
configuration of events in two different presents (§ 8.3, § 9.2). Nevertheless, at its most basic, 
analogical-reasoning enables prior occurrences to be grasped as affiliated with those of the 
present through their apparent similarities or differences. 
The third and perhaps most complex form of historical representation is that which 
purports to reveal the lessons of history. This relies on a procedure of lesson drawing that 
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simultaneously entails those of emplotment and analogical reasoning. While there is no need 
for all analogies to serve as the basis for lessons, all lessons necessarily rely on identifying 
similarities between causal-chains of events in more than one present. As indicated above, this 
kind of analogical reasoning already relies on a preliminary emplotment of past events, but in 
order for lessons to be drawn from such analogies a further operation is required. Specifically, 
the causal-chain that is constructed around a past event must be transposed into the time of 
the present, whose apparent similarity enables causal claims deduced from the former to be 
deemed applicable in the latter. This itself is an operation of quasi-emplotment, for even 
though it relies on a procedure of transposition, the transposition effectively portrays the 
present as having been caused by a particular – albeit familiar – process of development. For 
example, when the Economist initially uses the historical record to draw lessons for US 
monetary policy, it does so via a story about the policy-induced inflation of the 1970s, which 
enables it to underline the negative consequences of continuing on a path of excessive 
monetary laxity (§ 9.2). Similarly, when it later draws the opposite lesson and emphasises an 
urgent need for monetary stimulus, it does so via a story about how a failure to do so turned 
the crash of 1929 into the Great Depression of the 1930s. In this way, the practice of lesson 
drawing entails the procedures of both emplotment and analogical reasoning, but it also 
remains distinct from each in terms of the kind of historical representations it is able to yield. 
11.2.3 Revelation and recurrence in the return of the Great Depression 
On the basis of the above typology it is now possible to be clearer about the kinds of functions 
that the practical past might perform during times of crisis. Specifically, an analytical 
distinction can be drawn between those practices of historical representation that seek a 
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compass in the past and those that instead seek an anchor. As Jessop (2011b: 16) points out, 
lessons from the past can serve as “a basis for responding effectively to the crisis in real 
time”. Their function in this instance would consist in providing guidance about how to 
negotiate the practical dilemmas posed by crisis in a particular present. But regardless of who 
may be seeking it, such guidance necessarily relies on first having established what the 
dilemmas of the present are, and this in turn hinges on how the historicity of said present is 
construed. Insofar as the procedures of emplotment and analogical reasoning are implicated in 
this kind of construal, the function of the past can therefore also consist in helping restore a 
semblance of order to the appearance of history. Here this second function is illustrated 
through appeals to the Great Depression, which perform pseudo-scientific versions of the 
work that Eliade sees in the archetypes of revelation and recurrence. 
According to Eliade, one way in which archaic religious societies dealt with the ‘terror 
of history’ was by turning traumatic events into theophanies (1991/1954: 102-12). If such 
events are treated as divine interventions then they are no longer senseless; they draw justice 
from God’s Providence, and at the same time they reveal more of what to strive for in 
advance of history’s promised End (see also § 1.1.2). An inverted version of this gesture can 
be found in linear emplotments of the Great Depression during the recent crisis. Rather than 
events in the present somehow revealing the shape of history through their relation to a 
coming and final event, portrayals of the ongoing crisis purport to reveal this shape through 
its apparent affiliation with crises from the near and distant past. For example, when the ECB 
traces the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act back to a dynamic of interbank competition that the 
Act itself set in motion, it apperceives this response to the Great Depression as a point of 
origin for transformations that ultimately culminate in the ongoing crisis of finance (§ 4.3). 
Similarly, when the IMF revisits its creation in the wake of the Depression, this too becomes a 
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harbinger for subsequent transformations in the structure of global capitalism – the only 
difference being that here they are seen to underpin a unique capacity for cooperation in the 
face of crisis (§ 4.2). In both cases a form of ‘historiophany’ is at work, wherein the ongoing 
crisis enables the Great Depression to reveal a new apparent truth about the logic of capitalist 
history.12 For White this is what would make the Great Depression a properly historical event 
– i.e., that its meaning is only ‘filled out’ by a later narrativisation (2008: 27-30). However, 
from the perspective of crisis rather than history, the point is that this ‘filling out’ enables the 
ongoing crisis to appear as an expression of history in its developmental aspect. On this basis 
lessons for the present can then be drawn, such as those that the aforementioned organisations 
draw in relation to financial regulation and crisis management. 
Another religious archetype that Eliade discusses is that of recurrence, which he 
suggests enables pre-modern civilizations to refuse historical consciousness altogether and 
identify instead with the eternal periodicity of the cosmos (1991/1954: 73-92, 112-30). A 
modern historical version of this gesture can be found in cyclical emplotments of the Great 
Depression during the recent crisis. Of course the figure of the cycle is here returned to 
domain of history, but in so doing history is invested with the precisely the kind of regularity 
whose absence makes the cosmos as an attractive refuge – that is to say, rather than an 
irreducibly novel occurrence, the historical event instead becomes a mere further iteration in 
an already familiar pattern of recurrence. For example, by emphasising the place of 1929 
within a history of the business cycle, early press coverage renders the then emergent crisis as 
little more than the latest phase in a perennial oscillation between boom and bust (§7.1). 
Similarly, when the crisis deepens and the socio-political transformations of the 1930s are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The term ‘historiophany’ is a neologism intended to specify an epiphany brought on through the apparent 
manifestation of History to humankind. It is a play on ‘theophany’, where of course it is God that appears. 
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invoked by all four publications, these new representations underpin visions of epochal return 
or reversal that also work to rob the ongoing crisis of any fundamental novelty (§ 7.2, § 8.3). 
In each of these cases a procedure of analogical reasoning intermediates between two 
operations of emplotment: in the first, the Great Depression is situated within a prior causal 
chain of events; in the second, the ongoing crisis is presented as a recurrence of this same 
basic sequence. Portrayals of the Great Depression in this way enable the ongoing crisis to 
affirm an old apparent truth about the logic of capitalist history. Once again lessons can then 
be drawn on the basis such a figuration, such those that all four publications do in relation to 
bank bailouts (§ 8.1 – 8.3), fiscal or monetary stimulus packages (§ 9.2, § 9.4), and broader 
programmes for regulatory reform (§ 10.3). 
The significance of these linear and cyclical emplotments of the Great Depression can 
be underlined by revisiting the content of the narrative form. As both White and Ricoeur point 
out, narrative discourse always has both literal and figurative referents, and in the case of 
historical narrative, the figurative referent is history as such (§ 2.2.2). Clearly the crisis of 
2008 brings with it a literal return of the Great Depression to contemporary debate. But these 
portrayals themselves entail a number of figurative returns, wherein the Great Depression 
reappears as a forgotten intimation or coming recurrence. In each case the event itself is made 
to reveal either the process of history or the present it has produced, and it is precisely this 
that then enables lessons to be drawn about how such a present might be negotiated. The 
function performed by the latter procedure therefore depends on an at least analytically prior 
dispensation of the former. As a result, it would seem inadvisable to simply assume that the 
function of the past during crisis can or should be limited to the provision of practical 
guidance, policy-related or otherwise. 
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11.3 Towards a theory of capitalist history-production 
If the three basic varieties of historical representation just identified open out onto functions 
that go beyond the simple provision of practical guidance, then this hints at a more 
substantive place for the past within the nexus of crisis and history than has so far been 
acknowledged. Specifically, appeals to the past are implicated in a process whereby histories 
of capitalist crisis are themselves an input into the crises of capitalist history. In order to 
illustrate precisely what is at stake in such a claim, this final section focuses on the historicity 
of crisis. It begins by returning one last time to the disappearance of history as theorised by 
Debord and Baudrillard, arguing that the alleged impossibility of crisis in fact turns historicity 
into the product of an imagined affiliation between events past and present. It then uses the 
typology of representational practice developed above to identify three different modes of 
‘history-production’, emphasising the distinct relation that holds in each case between the 
recollected past and the historicity of crisis. Finally, it discusses what might become of crisis 
theory were it to more fully acknowledge the imaginary institution of historicity. 
11.3.1 The strange loops of capitalist history 
Modern historical theory is replete with references to an intertwinement of history and our 
consciousness of it. One can recall Hegel’s belief that a capacity to record and interpret events 
enables historical progress to begin (1956/1837: 60-3); Marx’s image of how stockpiled 
tradition “weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living” (1996/1852: 32); or John 
Lukacs’ suggestion that the remembered past in fact provides a supple bridge between the 
present and the future (1994/1968: 224-72). Similar ideas also appear in the recent history of 
crisis theory. For Debray, the crisis event brings with it a “sudden contraction of past and 
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future times into the present” (1975: 113); for Widmaier et al. it prompts debates over the 
lessons of history, which are “constitutive of future understandings and interests” (2007: 755-
6); and for Jessop, this process of learning from the past involves “the use of history to make 
history” (2011b: 16). But what exactly do all these fleeting allusions to the entangled 
temporality of crisis actually intend to say about its status as an event within a historical field 
of occurrence? 
With the exception of Debray the above authors simply do not provide enough detail to 
answer this question without putting words in their mouths.13 Or to put it differently, if 
“History feeds upon history” (Valéry, 1951: 13), then it is unclear what such a loop implies 
for the dynamics of capitalist crisis. One way around this is to revisit the oppressive 
tautologies theorised by the French New Left. With Debord the ‘real’ of history somehow 
feeds on bad or corrupted historical imagery, leaving itself bloated, sick and unable to go on. 
Meanwhile, with Baudrillard, history enters into a carnival of metaphysical cannibalism, 
eating so much of itself that auto-referentiality is all that remains. In each case the 
disappearance of history is seen to render crisis impossible (§ 1.3.2). But the stories of 
revelation and recurrence identified above suggest an altogether different relation between 
historical representation and crisis (§ 11.2.3). In these portrayals of the Great Depression, it is 
the historicity of the present that feeds upon representations of the past, and it does this 
precisely in order to recognise itself. Moreover, it seeks this recognition so that it may remain 
within history, and will rewrite the very logic of historical process if this is the price it must 
pay. Thus, it is not simply the self-image of the historical present that is entangled with its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 That said the nature of the elision is clearly different in constructivist and cultural political economy. The 
latter provides ample indication of its views on history and historical method (see Jessop, 1994), whereas the 
former seems to lack anything that resembles an coherent position on these matters (cf. Widmaier, 2004b; 
Seabrooke, 2007b). 
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own regime of representation, but also the ‘actual’ historicity of said present, which is 
indistinguishable from its appearance as a figuration.  
In theoretical terms, this strange loop implies a new and interesting relation between 
histories of capitalist crisis and the crises of capitalist history. Specifically, while the objects 
of historical representation may be circumscribed by prior operations of historiography – such 
as those that establish a priority for the Great Depression within the story of capitalism – these 
representations act as a mediator between the present and visions of historical process. 
Competing emplotments of past crises serve to bring specific histories into view, but in so 
doing they also obscure other possible figurations of history that would reveal different truths 
about the place of the present within them. Recollected past crises in this way do not attest to 
a simple disclosure or concealment of history. Rather, they serve to reveal how the historicity 
of a crisis in the present hinges on the affiliations that are forged between it and the crises of 
the past. Hence, in place of Debord’s “false consciousness of time” (1994: 114) we might 
speak instead of the necessary fictions of historical process, and within Baudrillard’s 
destruction of history by virtualisation, we should identify the preconditions for a new mode 
of its very production. 
11.3.2 From crisis construction to history-production 
The lens of ‘history-production’ enables a further refinement of key theoretical categories 
within crisis theory. Specifically, if the emplotment of past crises can constitute the historicity 
of the present in different ways, then other practices of historical representation can be 
reframed in terms their relation to this process. Here the typology of representational practice 
developed above is used to identify three different modes of history-production. Once again 
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the disaggregation is strictly analytical in character, but by treating each variety of historical 
representation in turn important clarifications are offered regarding the functions of the past 
during crisis. 
The first and primary mode of history-production is that which operates through 
emplotment. As already indicated, this practice can produce either linear or cyclical narratives 
of historical development, and one possible effect for each is to form the basis for lessons 
about how to respond to crises in real-time (§ 11.2.3). But in performing this preliminary 
function, history-production via emplotment also underlines shortcomings in existing 
accounts of the confusion that accompanies crisis. While the idea of confusion occupies a 
slightly different place within each branch of the new crisis theory, for all it designates a kind 
of strategic disorientation. Put simply, economic agents know neither what their interests are 
nor how best to pursue these.14 Yet insofar as the emplotment of past crises renders the very 
relation between crisis and historical process open to contestation, it would seem that 
confusion-through-crisis might also be fruitfully understood as something that pertains to the 
historicity of crisis itself (§ 11.3.1). Theorists should therefore entertain the possibility that 
consciousness of crisis can produce a crisis of historical consciousness that is distinct from 
ideological or policy-related confusion. Or to put it differently, practices of emplotment might 
in fact serve to frame the initial ‘meta-narration’ of crisis (Hay, 1999). Moreover, within the 
specifically historical confusion that the recollection of past crises can create, these very same 
historical representations can also be deployed as part of an attempt to put history back 
together again. The emplotment of past crises might therefore also serve to shape the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Mark Blyth frames this in terms of a radical uncertainty on the part of economic agents, whereas Colin Hay 
and Bob Jessop focus instead on the indeterminate shape of any subsequent institutional fix (see § 1.3.3). 
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subsequent search for ‘crisis-defining ideas’ and ‘economic imaginaries’ (Blyth, 2007; Jessop, 
2004).  
The second mode of history-production is that which operates through analogical 
reasoning. As already indicated, this practice can rely on identifying either similarities or 
differences between crises disjoined by chronological time, and it is implicated in both lesson 
drawing and certain forms of emplotment (§ 11.2.2; § 11.2.3). But as a mode of history-
production it performs a specific function in relation to each of these other representational 
practices. On the side of emplotment, analogical reasoning works to help identify which past 
crises are legitimate subjects for narratives of recurrence. Put simply, before a crisis in the 
present can be interpreted as a repetition of one already seen in the past, the similarities 
between the two episodes must be identified (be these in terms of their specific point-like 
elements or imputed developmental aspects). As a corollary of this, analogies can also serve 
to adjudicate between competing stories of repetition, for once a parallel that is drawn 
between two crises is contested then any narrative this similarity underpins is rendered less 
credible. This in turn has implications for the procedure of lesson drawing. Specifically, if the 
parallel upon which a cyclical emplotment of crisis relies is undermined, then the lessons 
drawn from this narrative can be deemed inappropriate to transpose into the present. The 
practice of analogical reasoning therefore not only supports the function of emplotment, but 
also intermediates between this and the ones performed by lesson drawing. 
Finally, the third mode of history-production is that which operates through lesson 
drawing. As already indicated, this practice consists in an operation of quasi-emplotment 
whereby a causal narrative is transposed from one present into another, enabling inferences 
from the former to be deemed applicable in the latter (§ 11.2.2). Given the above comments, 
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lesson drawing can now be grasped as process whose function is to aid the negotiation of a 
historicity already constituted through analytically prior procedures of emplotment and 
analogical reasoning. However, this process has history-producing effects via its own peculiar 
narrativity. Specifically, lessons drawn from past crises themselves constitute a hanging or 
unfinished plot, whose completion only properly exists in the form an invitation to learn the 
lesson. The implications of this for the logic of lesson drawing depend on the preliminary 
modes of emplotment through which lessons are first developed. In the case of lessons 
derived from a cyclical narrative of crisis, the operative analogy necessarily opens out onto a 
wider range of family resemblances. For example, once a crisis is construed as ‘another 
balance-sheet recession’, lessons can be drawn from any prior episode already deemed as 
belonging to this basic category. Moreover, this ascription of a non-unique status to crisis 
means that drawing lessons in the present can entail recovering those once learnt but since 
forgotten. Conversely, when lessons are derived from a linear narrative of crisis, the emphasis 
on its historical novelty means that the invitation is to learn a fundamentally new lesson. Such 
lessons can serve as the basis for responding to crisis in real-time, but they can also be about 
preparing for the negotiation of crisis in another present. This second function corresponds to 
Jessop’s category of “learning from crisis” (2011b: 14, emphasis added), and the suggestion 
of Widmaier et al. that debates over the lessons of history are “constitutive of future 
understandings and interests” (2007: 755-6, emphasis added). 
At this point it is worth returning to the fundamental question uncovered by the new 
crisis theory (i.e., ‘What is the power of ideas or discourse during times of crisis?’). Each 
branch of theory provides a different concept in their attempts to answer this question – 
uncertainty constructivism discusses ‘crisis-defining ideas’, constructivist institutionalism 
focuses on ‘crisis narratives’, and cultural political economy offers instead the notion of 
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‘economic imaginaries’. From the very outset these concepts do not seek to capture the same 
phenomena, and on this basis alone it would already appear sensible to avoid the temptation 
to build mono-causal theories about the non-material dimensions of crisis. The preceding 
analysis provides further reason to exercise such caution. It has shown that while all three 
master concepts rely on figurations of history, none of these need rely exclusively on any one 
type of representational practice. It has also indicated how three basic varieties of historical 
representation can be combined to perform a wider range of interpretive functions in the face 
of crisis. Taken together these points highlight a complex interaction not only between 
historical analogies, lessons and narratives, but also between these diverse practices and the 
discursive negotiation of crisis. It is in this nexus that that a future theory for crisis and history 
should be found. 
	  Conclusion 
2008 – The crisis in past and future perfect tense 
‘The future is there,’ Cayce hears herself say, ‘looking back at us. Trying to make 
sense of the fiction we will have become. And from where they are, the past 
behind us will look nothing at all like the past we imagine behind us now.’ 
– William Gibson1 
The financial turmoil that erupted in late 2008 has already become the subject of many crisis 
narratives. In their reformist variety these range from those that identify a crisis of confidence 
or liquidity all the way through to others that diagnose a crisis of finance and its associated 
modes of regulation. Critical alternatives to these go further and typically cast the undoing of 
finance as a broader crisis of Anglo-Saxon capitalism, debt-fuelled accumulation, or 
neoliberal globalisation. More recently, it has become common to speak instead about crises 
of sovereign debt, the welfare state, European integration, and even of Western hegemony in 
general. This list of names will both grow and shrink with time. The events of 2008 will be 
transformed into a date, and just like every date before it there will be no final word on its 
place within capitalist history. New crises will occur, and in their occurrence old meanings 
will be reborn, transfigured, and put to work in ways we cannot foresee.2 After all, this is the 
only possible truth that a crisis episode can possess in the future perfect tense – what it will 
have been depends on a set of temporal conjugations whose literal referents do not yet 
actually exist. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This aphorism appears in Gibson’s novel Pattern Recognition (2003: 57). The young protagonist Cayce 
offers it to a table of avant-garde advertising executives over cocktails. 
2 As Mikhail Bakhtin puts it, “Nothing is absolutely dead: every meaning will celebrate its rebirth” (quoted in 
Der Derian & Shapiro, 1989: 23, emphasis in original). 
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But as the crisis of 2008 recedes from the present and enters into the virtual storehouse 
of history, it is possible to ask what its occurrence brought with it from the past. This is the 
truth of a crisis in the past perfect tense, which exists within a world of potential narrative 
meanings already specified by prior crises. In order to apprehend such a world one must go 
back into the crisis event and trace out all of its imagined affiliations with the accumulated 
dates of capitalist history. This is what has been attempted in the empirical sections of this 
thesis. Taking the public pronouncements of financial technocrats, policymakers, and 
journalists as an index for the historical experience of crisis, it has sought to go back into 
2008 and provide an account of the way in which past crises circulated within that present. To 
impose a unified and linear narrative on the entanglements uncovered through this exercise 
would be counter-productive, for its most important empirical contribution is to have 
provided a systematic account of the non-linear and quasi-historical process through which 
new events find form in a congress with those of the past. 
Of course there has been a more traditionally historical dimension to the work 
undertaken in this thesis, and it concerns the place of theory and method within the analysis of 
crisis. Specifically, the thesis has developed a linear narrative regarding its two master 
concepts of crisis and history. There were two key steps in the construction of this narrative. 
The first was made in Part I of the thesis, where the theoretical literatures on capitalist crisis 
and historical representation were used to underline the need for a heretofore-missing mode of 
crisis historiography. Chapter 1 began by locating the problem of history within existing 
theories of capitalist crisis. It argued that the concept of crisis contains a temporal ambiguity 
that is both foregrounded and obscured by its use within the new political economy – in 
turning the concept into a tool for analysing how discrete moments are construed or 
constructed as crises, the new political economy reveals a place for figurations of history 
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within the very dynamics of a crisis event; but by attending to debates over the objective and 
subjective dimensions of crisis, it fails to explore how these figurations of history are 
generated. Chapter 2 then focused on debates over historical theory and method, using these 
to assess the ability of modern historiography to provide insight into the nexus of crisis and 
historical imagination. It argued that even those theorists who identify a productive 
relationship between historical discourse and its figurative referent stop short of exploring 
how imagined histories might serve as a practical resource within the context of a particular 
present. It also demonstrated how historical theory within international studies remains a step 
behind the discipline of history, with the vast majority of scholarship having yet to even 
consider that an event’s historicity might hinge on how different pasts are conjured and put to 
work within the present. Finally, this argument culminated in Chapter 3, where the literatures 
on capitalist crisis and historical representation were grasped together and used to identify a 
mode of historiography fit for the further development of crisis theory. Here it was argued 
that the recollected past must be approached as a practical resource for those seeking to 
diagnose and negotiate the apparent pathologies of a crisis in the present. 
The second key step in the argument then came in Chapter 11, where the quasi-
historical analysis of Parts II and III was used to develop a set of reflections on the issues 
raised in Part I. Specifically, an attempt was made to achieve greater theoretical and analytical 
clarity on precisely those aspects of crisis theory that were identified as neglected or 
underdeveloped. A new distinction was drawn between the possible functions of the past 
during crisis, and the specific practices of historical representation through which past crises 
might be brought into the present. Three basic varieties of historical representation were then 
identified, corresponding to those that rely on procedures of emplotment, analogical 
reasoning, and lesson drawing. Finally, each basic variety of representational practice was 
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used to elucidate a distinct function for the past during the crisis. Here a concept of ‘history-
production’ was introduced and used to illustrate the different roles that anachronism can play 
in the discursive negotiation of crisis. These conceptual innovations highlight the truly 
peculiar place of crisis within capitalism and history within crisis. But in addition to this, they 
also imply a prospect for theoretical and methodological development. Specifically, they hint 
at a future that would see theorists of crisis afford a greater sense of history to the subjects of 
their theory. Or to put it differently, where before crisis theory could prioritise its visions of 
history over those held by the agents whose actions it sought to understand, these latter 
visions must now become an object of study in their own right. In order to indicate what such 
a shift might mean for contemporary IPE, these last pages use a metaphor drawn from Marxist 
theory to sketch out some possible futures for crisis theory and historical method. The 
political implications of the arguments that underpin these futures are then discussed in a 
short epilogue. 
A future for crisis and history in IPE 
In classical Marxism the ‘combined’ nature of capitalist history flows from its initial 
‘unevenness’, with backward nations being trapped into primitive modes of accumulation by 
the establishment of a world market (e.g. Trotsky, 2008/1932; see also Novack, 1972). The 
so-called law of ‘combined and uneven development’ therefore seeks to understand the 
spatiality of capitalist development as a product of its fundamental logic. Turning this 
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terminology against itself, the present thesis can be taken as indicating a combined and 
uneven historiography of capitalist crisis.3 
In the same way that Trotsky sees the process of capitalist history as consisting in a 
commingling of different national economies and their respective institutional endowments, 
the ongoing historiography of capitalist crisis involves representational practices employed by 
actors operating from within diverse institutional contexts. Moreover, just as Trotsky sees an 
initial unevenness between these nations as colouring the form of their subsequent interaction, 
it seems unlikely that all versions of the past exert an equal influence over the discursive 
negotiation of crisis. This thesis has focused on the historiographic work of global financial 
elites, who function as the analogue of the advanced core countries in the theory of combined 
and uneven development. In order to better understand how recollected past crises are 
implicated in the production of capitalist history, more attention must be paid to the practices 
of historical representation employed within other, non-elite milieus. This much is already 
hinted at in the new political economy, where references to counter-hegemonic discourse and 
mass-elite interactions explicitly seek to situate interpretive struggles over crisis within a 
stratified social landscape (cf. Jessop & Sum, 2006b; and Widmaier et al., 2007). There is 
clearly scope to follow this lead and extend the approach adopted here to include a wider 
variety of actors. 
The Trotskyist connotations of a ‘combined and uneven historiography’ also draw 
attention to questions of structural determination that have so far been downplayed. This is 
implicit in the point just made about the potentially unequal powers of different crisis 
histories, but it can be put in more direct terms. Specifically, if an actor who invokes a past 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In this wilful misuse of Marxist terminology I take my cue from Evan Calder Williams (2011). 
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crisis must speak to and through the (extra-) discursive structures of the present in order to be 
heard, then what is the relation between these structures and the emergence of ‘new’ past 
crises? A meta-historical answer to this question has already been given in relation to global 
financial elites during the crisis of 2008, whose turn to the past was interpreted as a response 
to preceding transformations in the nature of capitalist finance and its corresponding modes of 
historiography (§ 11.1). However, a more radical site-specificity is needed if particular 
versions of the past are to be understood in relation to the milieus within which they circulate. 
Here the tools of cultural political economy – and in particular, its appeals to concepts and 
methods from critical discourse analysis – provide a potential route forward (Jessop, 2004; 
Fairclough et al., 2004; Fairclough, 2006). But this promise notwithstanding, its borrowed 
methods might first need to be liberated from their more or less explicit subservience to the 
labour of an overarching concept: the dialectic. 
This is the third and most wilfully seditious effect of transforming Trotsky’s 
terminology into a trope. In the law of combined and uneven development, an essential logic 
of capital underpins a vision for universal history. However, in the combined and uneven 
historiography of capitalist crisis, it is the ongoing attempt to conjure something like this 
universal history that pulls global capitalism into its different futures. This process entails a 
circulation of past events or crises, which when grasped together with those of the present, 
can both constitute the historicity of that present and shape the ways in which it is negotiated. 
Of course, in its concept of ‘complexity-reduction’ cultural political economy does seek 
precisely to theorise the path-shaping powers of our efforts to make sense of economic 
interactions and processes. Yet these efforts are nevertheless still theorised in the form of a 
dialectic between discursive and material structure, which itself is an abstraction of historical 
change. This is problematic because recollected past crises are able to serve as vehicles for 
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competing abstractions of historical change. And insofar as the historicity of crisis is 
constituted through this competition, no single abstraction can definitively govern the process 
of change it purports to capture. Instead, the combined and uneven historiography of capitalist 
crisis invites us to ask how history is produced through its own abstractions of change. This 
would require that we situate the practice of historical imagination, rather than any one 
concept, at the heart of history’s process. 
That said there are clearly limits to the kinds of claims that can be made on the basis of 
the research undertaken in this thesis. From the very outset an explicit decision was made to 
focus the bulk of the theoretical effort on interpretive or representational practice, and insofar 
as the stronger conceptual toolbox will always secure an apparent victory for its ontology, this 
move prevents any fair and convincing dismissal of a place for structural and material factors 
within the discursive negotiation of crisis. But such a dismissal was never the aim of this 
thesis, whose bracketing off of debates over the relation between discourse and materiality 
was motivated instead by an attempt to draw out a heretofore-neglected dimension of crisis. 
Put simply, these divisive meta-theoretical debates have served to keep the past from the 
present in crisis theory, and this in turn has obscured the potentially productive power of 
anachronism within capitalist history. By adopting the approach that it has, this thesis has 
simply sought to ask whether discursive practices might be able to inflect the path of history 
in ways other than those theorised by constructivist and cultural political economy approaches 
to crisis. Its stance has therefore been an ontologically agnostic one, with each theoretical 
authority being approached and questioned on its own terms.  
This non-foundational strategy has proved able to yield new theoretical insights, but in 
order to further develop the idea of ‘history-production’ difficult questions about ontology 
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will need to be posed. Clearly, more theoretical work is needed on the interface between 
capital as it operates today and those practices of historical representation that bring its 
accumulated dates and histories into the interpretive orbit of the present. But the relation of 
these practices to that present might not be readily grasped through frameworks that posit a 
trans-historical logic of ideological and institutional change. After all, what is at stake are 
competing abstractions of historical change, generated through the recall of more or less 
distant events and their representations. Both constructivist and cultural political economy 
would appear to be ill-equipped in the face of such a constitutive anachronism, and in order to 
begin treating two presents as mutually-becoming orders of reality, it may be necessary to 
take recent calls for a critical empiricism in IPE more seriously (Cameron & Palan, 2004; 
2009). To do this would require that the apparent affiliations between historical events remain 
an object of theoretically oriented empirical inquiry, but also that the circulation of these 
events be situated more firmly within specific or local milieus. The very notion of historicity 
would, in turn, need to be approached as a product of ‘the practical subject’ in action, and the 
historiography of capitalism and crisis would have to enact the kind of shift that Gilles 
Deleuze once demanded of philosophy, “constitut[ing] itself as the theory of what we are 
doing, not as a theory of what there is” (1991/1953: 133). Capitalist history, in other words, 
would need to be approached as an idea that somehow pulls itself up by its own bootstraps. 
Epilogue: Susan’s strange histories 
In her last book Mad Money, Susan Strange ends by discussing some possible futures for the 
politics of global finance. Her comments illustrate precisely the kind of historical-mindedness 
that has been explored in this thesis, but they also underline what is at stake in the exercise of 
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such a propensity. It is worth quoting them at length. She begins by situating the Asian crisis 
within what is by now a familiar narrative of contemporary globalisation: 
The last two decades of the twentieth century saw the shift from state power to 
market power, the apparent worldwide victory of neo-liberal ideas in economics 
over Keynesian ones. It is an open question whether that tide is about to turn, or 
not … The one [scenario] most generally feared is the crash of 1999, 2000, or even 
2003. It has been a theme of scare thrillers for at least twenty years. Paul Erdman’s 
The Crash of ‘79 was the first but by no means the last. And by late 1997, even 
quite sober commentators in the financial press, reflecting on the financial typhoon 
that hit Asian markets that year, were starting to hedge their bets and to say that 
though the crash might not happen, it could happen. 
What exactly did they have in mind? As retrospective reviews of 1929 and 
of 1987 and 1997 all show, the sudden collapse of stock markets almost always 
follows an ‘unnatural’ or at least an unsustainable boom – a bubble of some sort 
that cannot go on rising indefinitely. But 1987 and 1997 also suggested that such 
bursting bubbles did not necessarily cause permanent damage to the real economy. 
The question, therefore, if a repeat of 1929-39 scenario is to be taken seriously, is 
whether there are conceivable circumstances in which another stock market fall 
would damage the real economy. (Strange, 1998: 183, emphasis in original) 
Her answer that “There are” is doubly prophetic. On one hand, it anticipates the advent 
of another financially induced global recession in 2008; and on the other, it prefigures how 
the Great Depression would again come to shape fears for the future of global capitalism. But 
more crucially, Strange also suggests that the forms given to these recurrent fears might 
themselves circumscribe possible futures by exerting an influence over the response to crisis. 
This point emerges as she discusses a number of different scenarios for the world economy in 
the wake of the Asian crisis. The most dramatic ones are already implied in the passage 
above, and they entail a financial system unchecked by state power reaping havoc on 
monetary relations and patterns of trade (pp. 183-5). Her more moderate scenario sees a 
progressively self-sabotaging financial sector causing a downward spiral in business 
confidence, landing production and trade in a prolonged slump (pp. 185-6). But it is in her 
appraisal of those apparently optimistic scenarios that Strange foregrounds the power of 
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historical imagination itself. Some of these scenarios entail the uptake of a dream for the 
future – such as the one in which ‘sustainability’ emerges as a new model of development – 
but others do not: 
An opposite kind of dream would take us back to the past instead of forwards to a 
sustainable future … Now, it may come to that [i.e. a return to national economies] 
– but only after an experience of such economic pain that people would accept 
drastic remedies. History does suggest that human beings find it easier to recreate 
the past – or to try to – than they do to imagine the future. When the Soviet Union 
was attacked by Hitler in 1941, Stalin found that an appeal to old-fashioned 
Russian nationalism worked better than the dream of a socialist future; history, not 
ideology, moved his people to resist Hitler as they had Napoleon. But today, the 
question is whether the genie can be put back in the bottle. Is it practicable, given 
the technology of communication, to turn the clock back in financial markets? 
(Strange, 1998: 187) 
Again, her question is one that resurfaces during the crisis of 2008. Yet its more 
important effect is to illustrate how historical-mindedness can undermine the utopian impulse. 
Put simply, the presence of the past today not only leads us to approach new events through 
the lens of old ones; it also threatens to limit actions and responses in the present to those 
once pursued in the past. This in turn brings with it the very real possibility that the future 
might hold promise for nothing more than a recurrence of those patterns already identified 
with capitalist history.  
Strange rejects this scenario because it would entail an abrogation of possibility itself. 
Rather than “hoping for the best but expecting and preparing for the worst” (p. 188), those 
who have the time to spare should spend it attempting to break through the political 
resignation that capitalist historiography cultivates in us: “We have to invent a new kind of 
polity but we can not yet imagine how it might work” (p. 190, emphasis added). While this 
thesis may not have offered anything in the way of concrete visions for such a polity, I hope 
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for it to serve as a reminder of how the crises of the past – in their limitless resonance and 
conductivity – might always one day be used to counter-actualise the present and help drag us 
into a different, better future. After all, this is not just a question of learning; it too is one of 
imagination. 
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2009_03_11 (Geithner) In Advance of the G20 FMers & CBers meeting.doc 
2009_03_14 (Geithner) At the meeting of the G20 FMers & CBers.doc 
2009_03_29 (Treasury & Fed) Joint statement on preserving monetary and financial stability.doc 
2009_04_01 (Geithner & Clinton) Joint Statement on the US-China Strategic Dialogue.doc 
2009_04_15 (Geithner) On the report to congress on International Economic & XR Policies.doc 
2009_04_24 (G7 FMers & CBers) Joint statement.doc 
2009_04_24 (Geithner) At the meeting of G7 FMers & CBers.doc 
2009_04_25 (Geithner) At the IMFC meeting.doc 
2009_04_26 (Geithner) At the IMF & WB Development Committee Meeting.doc 
2009_05_13 (Geithner) On the Bank Secrecy Act.doc 
2009_05_22 (Geithner) On the senate passage of IMF Legislation.doc 
2009_06_10 (Geithner) On executive compensation.doc 
2009_06_13 (G8 FMers) Joint statement.doc 
2009_06_13 (Geithner) At the G8 FMer meeting.doc 
2009_08_03 (Krueger) For the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee.doc 
2009_09_05 (Geithner) At the meeting of G20 FMers & CBers.doc 
2009_10_03 (Geithner) At the IMF-WB annual meeting.doc 
2009_10_04 (Geithner) At the IMFC meeting.doc 
2009_10_05 (Geithner) At the IMF-WB Development Committee meeting.doc 
2009_10_06 (Geithner-Sobel) At the IMF & WB annual meeting.doc 
2009_11_03 (Swagel) Economic outlook & Treasury borrowing.doc 
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Articles from the global financial press 
Below is a complete list of the texts that comprise the corpus for empirical analysis. These are divided 
by publication title then by article category. An in text citation to (Forbes, 19 October 2009) can be 
found in this list as “2009_10_19 (Forbes) Fact and Comment; Capitalism- A True Love Story”. 
The Economist 
Economist ‘Briefings’ 
2007_03_08a (ECNMST) Buttonwood; We all fall down 
2007_03_08b (ECNMST) Markets; It's behind you 
2007_03_08c (ECNMST) Subprime lending; Rising damp 
2007_03_22a (ECNMST) America's housing market; Cracks in the facade 
2007_04_19a (ECNMST) Credit derivatives; At the risky end of finance 
2007_06_28 (ECNMST) East Asian economies; Gold from the storm 
2007_08_02a (ECNMST) The credit squeeze; Abandon ship 
2007_08_02b (ECNMST) The effect on financial firms; Holiday horrors 
2007_09_20a (ECNMST) Securitisation; When it goes wrong 
2007_09_20b (ECNMST) The global economy; The turning point 
2007_10_18k (ECNMST) Northern Rock; Lessons of the fall 
2007_10_25a (ECNMST) Financial markets; Spooking investors 
2007_11_15a (ECNMST) Emerging economies; Dizzy in Boomtown 
2007_11_29a (ECNMST) The City of London's tumble; After the fall 
2007_11_29b (ECNMST) The falling dollar; Losing faith in the greenback 
2008_02_14a (ECNMST) Securitisation; Fear and loathing, and a hint of hope 
2008_03_19a (ECNMST) Buttonwood; Apocalypse now 
2008_03_19b (ECNMST) Central banks; A dangerous divergence 
2008_03_19c (ECNMST) Commodities; A bit tarnished 
2008_03_19d (ECNMST) Derivatives; Caveat counterparty 
2008_03_19e (ECNMST) Economics focus; History lesson 
2008_03_19f (ECNMST) Investment banks; The $2 bail-out 
2008_03_19g (ECNMST) The fallout at Bear Stearns; Sore heads 
2008_03_19h (ECNMST) The financial system; What went wrong 
2008_04_10a (ECNMST) The American economy; The long hangover 
2008_05_22a (ECNMST) Inflation in emerging economies; An old enemy rears its head 
2008_07_03a (ECNMST) Who runs the world; Wrestling for influence 
2008_07_17a (ECNMST) World trade; Defrosting Doha 
2008_09_25a (ECNMST) America’s bail-out plan; The doctors' bill 
2008_10_02a (ECNMST) Money markets; Blocked pipes 
2008_10_23a (ECNMST) Hedge funds in trouble; The incredible shrinking funds 
2008_10_30a (ECNMST) Policy in a recession; Putting the air back in 
2008_11_06a (ECNMST) Credit derivatives; The great untangling 
2008_11_06b (ECNMST) The economic crisis; Wolves at the door 
2008_11_13a (ECNMST) The global economic summit; After the fall 
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2008_11_27a (ECNMST) Unorthodox economic policies; Plan C 
2008_12_04a (ECNMST) Savings; Whe the golden eggs run out 
2008_12_11a (ECNMST) Iceland; Cracks in the crust 
2009_01_22h (ECNMST) Global economic imbalances; When a flow becomes a flood 
2009_01_29a (ECNMST) Asian economies; Troubled tigers 
2009_02_05a (ECNMST) Globalisation under strain; Homeward bound 
2009_02_12a (ECNMST) Irving Fisher; Out of Keynes's shadow 
2009_02_26a (ECNMST) A glimpse of optimism; Green shoots 
2009_02_26b (ECNMST) American banks; A ghoulish prospect 
2009_02_26c (ECNMST) Bank capital; Stress-test mess 
2009_03_26a (ECNMST) Globalisation and trade; The nuts and bolts come apart 
2009_04_08a (ECNMST) The IMF; Mission-Possible 
2009_04_23a (ECNMST) Central banks; The monetary-policy maze 
2009_05_28a (ECNMST) Government v market in America; The visible hand 
2009_06_11a (ECNMST) Government debt; The big sweat 
2009_07_23a (ECNMST) World trade; Unpredictable tides 
2009_09_10a (ECNMST) Wall Street's new shape; Rearranging the towers of gold 
2009_10_01k (ECNMST) Unrepentant bears; The end is nigh (again) 
2009_10_22a (ECNMST) America's public debt; Tomorrow's burden 
Economist ‘Leaders’ 
2007_01_04 (ECNMST) Global markets; Bull session 
2007_01_25 (ECNMST) Trade; The real world economic forum 
2007_02_22 (ECNMST) The world economy; Switching engines 
2007_03_01 (ECNMST) Markets and the world economy; A walk down Wall Street 
2007_03_08d (ECNMST) Financial markets; Still not sober 
2007_03_22b (ECNMST) Housing markets; The trouble with the housing market 
2007_04_19b (ECNMST) Financial markets; Twenty-six days clear 
2007_05_17m (ECNMST) International banking; Risk and reward 
2007_05_17n (ECNMST) Trade and the economy; America's fear of China 
2007_07_05 (ECNMST) Business; The trouble with private equity 
2007_07_19 (ECNMST) Monetary policy; From helicopter to hawk 
2007_07_26 (ECNMST) Regulating business; Smelly old SOX 
2007_08_02c (ECNMST) Market turmoil; A good time for a squeeze 
2007_08_16 (ECNMST) Risk and the new financial order; Surviving the markets 
2007_08_23 (ECNMST) Monetary policy; Hazardous times 
2007_09_06 (ECNMST) Credit; Beware miracle cures 
2007_09_13 (ECNMST) America's economy; It ain't easy 
2007_09_20c (ECNMST) Britain's bank run; The Bank that failed 
2007_09_20d (ECNMST) The world economy; Will the credit crisis trigger a downturn 
2007_09_27 (ECNMST) World economy; Stronger China 
2007_10_04 (ECNMST) America's housing giants; Don't free Fannie and Freddie 
2007_10_18l (ECNMST) The world economy; Lessons from the credit crunch 
2007_10_25b (ECNMST) World economy; More trick than treat 
2007_11_08 (ECNMST) Banks; Capital punishment 
2007_11_15b (ECNMST) Recession in America; America's vulnerable economy 
2007_11_22 (ECNMST) Northern Rock; Pulling the plug 
2007_11_29c (ECNMST) The dollar; The panic about the dollar 
2007_12_13 (ECNMST) Central banks; A Christmas package for banks 
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2007_12_19 (ECNMST) The credit crunch; Postcards from the ledge 
2008_01_03 (ECNMST) America's economy; Aspirin, not morphine 
2008_01_10 (ECNMST) America's economy; A long slog 
2008_01_17 (ECNMST) Capital markets; The invasion of sovereign-wealth funds 
2008_01_24a (ECNMST) Northern Rock; Hocking the Rock 
2008_01_24b (ECNMST) The markets; It's rough out there 
2008_01_31 (ECNMST) Financial regulation; Repairs begin at home 
2008_02_14b (ECNMST) The world economy; In search of an insurance policy 
2008_02_21a (ECNMST) Northern Rock; Now make it work 
2008_02_21b (ECNMST) The world economy; Japain 
2008_03_06 (ECNMST) The credit crunch; Mark it and weep 
2008_03_13 (ECNMST) Credit crunch; Plugging holes 
2008_03_19i (ECNMST) Wall Street; Wall Street's Crisis 
2008_03_27 (ECNMST) Banking; The regulators are coming 
2008_04_03 (ECNMST) Credit crisis; Fixing finance 
2008_04_10b (ECNMST) The world economy; The great American slowdown 
2008_04_17 (ECNMST) Derivatives; Taming the beast 
2008_04_24 (ECNMST) Bank capital; Joseph and the amazing technicalities 
2008_05_01 (ECNMST) Credit crunch; Too soon to relax 
2008_05_08 (ECNMST) America's housing; Home truths 
2008_05_15k (ECNMST) Banks; Barbarians at the vault 
2008_05_22b (ECNMST) The world economy; Inflation's back 
2008_06_05 (ECNMST) Central banks; Playing politics with the Fed 
2008_06_12 (ECNMST) The Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank; Hawk alert 
2008_06_26 (ECNMST) Inflation; The importance of being in earnest 
2008_07_03b (ECNMST) International government; What a way to run the world 
2008_07_03c (ECNMST) The credit crunch; Britain's sinking economy 
2008_07_10 (ECNMST) The economy; On the ropes 
2008_07_17b (ECNMST) Banks and markets; Twin twisters 
2008_07_17c (ECNMST) Trade; Remember Doha 
2008_07_24a (ECNMST) America; Unhappy America 
2008_07_24b (ECNMST) Short-selling; Naked fear 
2008_07_31a (ECNMST) Housing bill; A hair of the dog 
2008_07_31b (ECNMST) World trade; So near and yet so far 
2008_08_07 (ECNMST) The credit crunch; A year of living dangerously 
2008_08_14a (ECNMST) Bank strategies; No size fits all 
2008_08_14b (ECNMST) The world economy; A problem shared 
2008_08_28 (ECNMST) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; Fire the bazooka 
2008_09_11 (ECNMST) Financial services; Hank to the rescue 
2008_09_18 (ECNMST) The financial crisis; What next 
2008_09_25b (ECNMST) America's bail-out plan; I want your money 
2008_09_25c (ECNMST) Pay and the financial crisis; Questions of equity 
2008_10_02b (ECNMST) John McCain and Barack Obama; An inconvenient truth 
2008_10_02c (ECNMST) The credit crunch; World on the edge 
2008_10_09h (ECNMST) The credit crunch; Saving the system 
2008_10_16 (ECNMST) The world economy; Capitalism at bay 
2008_10_23b (ECNMST) The financial crisis; Into the storm 
2008_10_23c (ECNMST) The state as owner; Re-bonjour, Monsieur Colbert 
2008_10_30b (ECNMST) The economy; The next front is fiscal 
2008_11_06c (ECNMST) British bank mergers; Call it off 
2008_11_06d (ECNMST) Derivatives; Giving credit where it is due 
2008_11_13b (ECNMST) China's fiscal stimulus; Dr Keynes' Chinese patient 
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2008_11_13c (ECNMST) The world economy; Redesigning global finance 
2008_11_20a (ECNMST) American fiscal policy; No time to waste 
2008_11_20b (ECNMST) Bank bail-outs; Leaving Las Vegas 
2008_11_27b (ECNMST) The world economy; The perils of incrementalism 
2008_12_04b (ECNMST) Savings; Where have all your savings gone 
2008_12_11b (ECNMST) Public works; Filling the hole 
2008_12_18a (ECNMST) The Madoff affair; Dumb money and dull diligence 
2008_12_18b (ECNMST) Trade and the world economy; Fare well, free trade 
2009_01_08a (ECNMST) America's budget; After the recession, the deluge 
2009_01_08b (ECNMST) British manufacturing; Coming in from the cold 
2009_01_15a (ECNMST) Britain's credit-guarantee plan; Buddy, can you insure a loan 
2009_01_15b (ECNMST) World economy; Accelerating downhill 
2009_01_22i (ECNMST) The future of finance; Inside the banks 
2009_01_29b (ECNMST) Asia's sinking economies; Asia's suffering 
2009_02_05b (ECNMST) The world economy; The return of economic nationalism 
2009_02_12b (ECNMST) Bank bonuses; Sound and fury 
2009_02_12c (ECNMST) Saving the banks; The Obama rescue 
2009_02_19 (ECNMST) The economy; The collapse of manufacturing 
2009_02_26d (ECNMST) The White House and America's banks; In knots over nationalisation 
2009_03_05 (ECNMST) Bankers; Scapegoat millionaire 
2009_03_12a (ECNMST) The London summit; The better part of valour 
2009_03_12b (ECNMST) World economy; The jobs crisis 
2009_03_19 (ECNMST) AIG and the president; Easy does it 
2009_03_26b (ECNMST) Saving America's banks; Only halfway there 
2009_03_26c (ECNMST) The G20 summit; London calling 
2009_04_02a (ECNMST) The G20 and the world economy; Be bold 
2009_04_02b (ECNMST) The rise and fall of the wealthy; The rich under attack 
2009_04_08b (ECNMST) Banks and accounting standards; Messenger, shot 
2009_04_08c (ECNMST) The G20 and the IMF; Banking on the Fund 
2009_04_16a (ECNMST) American banks; Payback time 
2009_04_16b (ECNMST) Housing; Building castles of sand 
2009_04_23b (ECNMST) The world economy; A glimmer of hope 
2009_04_30 (ECNMST) Latin America's economies; That fragile thing-a good reputation 
2009_05_07a (ECNMST) Deflation in America; The greater of two evils 
2009_05_07b (ECNMST) Europe's economies; A new pecking order 
2009_05_14j (ECNMST) The banking industry; Three trillion dollars later 
2009_05_28b (ECNMST) China, America and the yuan; Time for a Beijing bargain 
2009_05_28c (ECNMST) Government and business in America; Piling on 
2009_06_11b (ECNMST) Public debt; The biggest bill in history 
2009_06_18a (ECNMST) Business in Japan; No exit 
2009_06_18b (ECNMST) Reforming financial regulations in America; Better broth, still too many 
cooks 
2009_06_18c (ECNMST) Wall Street and the taxpayer; Thanks, for nothing 
2009_07_02 (ECNMST) Financial reform in the EU; Neither one thing nor the other 
2009_07_09 (ECNMST) Regulating banks; Appetite suppressant 
2009_07_16a (ECNMST) Economics; What went wrong with economics 
2009_07_16b (ECNMST) Mark-ro-market accounting; Divine intervention 
2009_07_23b (ECNMST) Central banks and regulation; Rulers of last resort 
2009_07_23c (ECNMST) Rebalancing global growth; A long way to go 
2009_07_30 (ECNMST) Commercial property; A concrete problem 
2009_08_06 (ECNMST) Regulating executive compensation; Pay and politics 
2009_08_13 (ECNMST) Asia; An astonishing rebound 
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2009_08_20 (ECNMST) World economy; U, V or W for recovery 
2009_08_27 (ECNMST) The Federal Reserve; Right man, rough job 
2009_09_03 (ECNMST) Trade agreements; Doing Doha down 
2009_09_10b (ECNMST) Fiscal policy; The other exit strategy 
2009_09_10c (ECNMST) The financial industry; Unnatural selection 
2009_09_17a (ECNMST) Barack Obama and free trade; Economic vandalism 
2009_09_17b (ECNMST) The IMF; Back from the dead 
2009_09_17c (ECNMST) Tobin taxes; The wrong tool for the job 
2009_10_01l (ECNMST) A new normal for the world economy; After the storm 
2009_10_01m (ECNMST) Markets; Please do feed the bears 
2009_10_08a (ECNMST) Managing banks; It wasn't me 
2009_10_08b (ECNMST) The debate about Chinese asset prices; A bubble in Beijing 
2009_10_22b (ECNMST) Bank bonuses; Compensation claim 
2009_10_22c (ECNMST) Currencies; The diminishing dollar 
2009_10_29 (ECNMST) Capital controls; Raining on India's Parade 
2009_11_05a (ECNMST) Battling joblessness; Has Europe got the answer 
2009_11_05b (ECNMST) Restructuring banks; The living dead 
2009_11_12 (ECNMST) Derivatives; Options have a future 
2009_11_19 (ECNMST) Fund managers' pay; A defective directive 
2009_12_03 (ECNMST) Risk after Dubai; When sovereign doesn't mean safe 
2009_12_10 (ECNMST) The sharp end of the credit crisis; Small business, big problem 
2009_12_17a (ECNMST) London as a financial centre; The real windfall 
2009_12_17b (ECNMST) The world economy; The Great Stabilisation 
Economist ‘Special Reports’ 
2007_05_17a (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Black boxes 
2007_05_17b (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Capital spenders 
2007_05_17c (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Comeback kid 
2007_05_17d (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Eggheads and long tails 
2007_05_17e (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Here, there and everywhere 
2007_05_17f (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Les fleurs du mal 
2007_05_17g (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Merchants of boom 
2007_05_17h (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Share-cropping 
2007_05_17i (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Spreading the muck 
2007_05_17j (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; The alchemists of finance 
2007_05_17k (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; The art of courtship 
2007_05_17l (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; The wobble factor 
2007_10_18a (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; Amid the gloom 
2007_10_18b (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; Assets and their liabilities 
2007_10_18c (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; CSI credit crunch 
2007_10_18d (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; Expect a lot 
2007_10_18e (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; Fast and loose 
2007_10_18f (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; Heroes of the zeroes 
2007_10_18g (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; On credit watch 
2007_10_18h (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; Only human 
2007_10_18i (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; Smash the glass 
2007_10_18j (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; Talk is expensive 
2008_05_15a (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Black mark 
2008_05_15b (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Cycle clips 
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2008_05_15c (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Make them pay 
2008_05_15d (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Paradise lost 
2008_05_15e (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Paradise regained 
2008_05_15f (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Professionally gloomy 
2008_05_15g (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Ruptured credit 
2008_05_15h (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Spanish steps 
2008_05_15i (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; The next crisis 
2008_05_15j (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Tightrope artists 
2008_10_09a (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; A monetary malaise 
2008_10_09b (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; Beyond Doha 
2008_10_09c (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; Charting a different course 
2008_10_09d (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; Of froth and fundamentals 
2008_10_09e (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; Shifting the balance 
2008_10_09f (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; Taming the beast 
2008_10_09g (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; When fortune frowned 
2009_01_22a (ECNMST) A special report on the future of finance; Fixing finance 
2009_01_22b (ECNMST) A special report on the future of finance; Greed—and fear 
2009_01_22c (ECNMST) A special report on the future of finance; How to play chicken and lose 
2009_01_22d (ECNMST) A special report on the future of finance; In Plato's cave 
2009_01_22e (ECNMST) A special report on the future of finance; The uneven contest 
2009_01_22f (ECNMST) A special report on the future of finance; When markets turn 
2009_01_22g (ECNMST) A special report on the future of finance; Wild-animal spirits 
2009_05_14a (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Back at the branch 
2009_05_14b (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Don't blame Canada 
2009_05_14c (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Exit right 
2009_05_14d (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; From asset to liability 
2009_05_14e (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; From great to good 
2009_05_14f (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Opportunity gently knocks 
2009_05_14g (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Rebuilding the banks 
2009_05_14h (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; The revolution within 
2009_05_14i (ECNMST) A special report on international banking; Too big to swallow 
2009_10_01a (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; A dull, heavy calm 
2009_10_01b (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; A fine balance 
2009_10_01c (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; From Ozzie to Ricky 
2009_10_01d (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; Gandhian banking 
2009_10_01e (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; Industrial design 
2009_10_01f (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; Market fatigue 
2009_10_01g (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; Rolling the hoop 
2009_10_01h (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; Separation anxiety 
2009_10_01i (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; The hamster-wheel 
2009_10_01j (ECNMST) A special report on the world economy; The long climb 
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The Financial Times 
FT ‘Editorial’ 
2008_11_18 (FT Editorial) Superman wanted for US Treasury 
2008_11_19 (FT Editorial) Paulson's billions 
2008_11_23a (FT Editorial) Risky mini budget 
2008_11_23b (FT Editorial) Wanted - borrower of last resort 
2008_11_27 (FT Editorial) Credit creationism 
2008_11_28 (FT Editorial) Payback time for the financiers 
2008_11_30 (FT Editorial) Banks vs markets 
2008_12_03 (FT Editorial) Affairs of state 
2008_12_15 (FT Editorial) Eurozone needs its fiscal rules 
2008_12_22 (FT Editorial) A mad dash for government cash 
2008_12_28 (FT Editorial) Bad start for new Bretton Woods 
2008_12_29 (FT Editorial) A straitened future for troubled banks 
2008_12_30 (FT Editorial) The return of the real economy 
2009_01_01 (FT Editorial) Drawing on the rich legacy of 1989 
2009_01_05a (FT Editorial) Reinventing the European left 
2009_01_05b (FT Editorial) Saving the savers is not the priority 
2009_01_08 (FT Editorial) Caution in a crisis 
2009_01_22a (FT Editorial) Only by spending can Asia save itself 
2009_01_22b (FT Editorial) Retake the reins 
2009_01_28 (FT Editorial) Japan joins world bailout race 
2009_01_29 (FT Editorial) Corporate bonds 
2009_02_02 (FT Editorial) Chinese leadership besieged by caution 
2009_02_04a (FT Editorial) Beyond convention 
2009_02_04b (FT Editorial) Risks in Obama's needed pay curbs 
2009_02_10 (FT Editorial) Son of Tarp follows in father's footsteps 
2009_02_11 (FT Editorial) Relax your reserve 
2009_02_12 (FT Editorial) Easing does it 
2009_02_13 (FT Editorial) Brown's chance to save himself 
2009_02_18 (FT Editorial) Protect European unity against crisis 
2009_02_20 (FT Editorial) Takeaway truths 
2009_02_24 (FT Editorial) Clear up the mess 
2009_03_01 (FT Editorial) Public control, not public ownership 
2009_03_06 (FT Editorial) The double edge of dividend cuts 
2009_03_08 (FT Editorial) A survival plan for global capitalism 
2009_03_09 (FT Editorial) The consequence of bad economics 
2009_03_10 (FT Editorial) World badly needs transatlantic unity 
2009_03_13 (FT Editorial) Slow progress, but the right direction 
2009_03_16 (FT Editorial) Let the sunlight in 
2009_03_22 (FT Editorial) Europe coughs up 
2009_03_26 (FT Editorial) Signs of progress 
2009_03_27 (FT Editorial) No need to panic in interesting times 
2009_03_29 (FT Editorial) What the G20 has to do in London 
2009_04_01a (FT Editorial) Revising the rules 
2009_04_01b (FT Editorial) When to judge the G20 moment 
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2009_04_02 (FT Editorial) The first bricks in a new world order 
2009_04_14 (FT Editorial) Golden fetters 
2009_04_19 (FT Editorial) The folly of hoping for the fiscal best 
2009_04_27 (FT Editorial) A single stress test 
2009_04_29 (FT Editorial) McCreevy caught in the middle 
2009_05_08a (FT Editorial) As good as gold 
2009_05_08b (FT Editorial) World discovers it is still breathing 
2009_06_03 (FT Editorial) Brown's vestigial authority on the wane 
2009_06_17a (FT Editorial) Belt and braces 
2009_06_17b (FT Editorial) Not quite yet a house of Brics 
2009_06_19 (FT Editorial) Central bankers strike back 
2009_06_24 (FT Editorial) Sarkozy hesitates to wield the axe 
2009_07_05 (FT Editorial) Government's response like that of a rowdy drinker in a bar brawl 
2009_07_08 (FT Editorial) Making banks safe 
2009_07_22 (FT Editorial) Raters berated 
2009_07_27 (FT Editorial) At your own risk 
2009_08_02 (FT Editorial) The value of bank independence 
2009_08_07 (FT Editorial) Bouncy houses 
2009_08_09 (FT Editorial) The numbers game 
2009_09_07 (FT Editorial) Capital ideas for financial reform 
2009_10_01 (FT Editorial) The IMF has a new lease on life 
2009_10_02 (FT Editorial) Rock bottom price 
2009_10_04 (FT Editorial) G7 struggles to remain relevant 
2009_10_11 (FT Editorial) Wall Street has its attractive side too 
2009_10_12 (FT Editorial) Nobel insights 
2009_10_15 (FT Editorial) Affordable defence 
2009_10_20 (FT Editorial) Hedge trimming 
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